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Never have so many countries owed so much money to so many
banks, with so little prospect of repayment. For more than two
years the international financial system has staggered under the
burden of a so-called "debt crisis," in which a group of non-oil de-
veloping countries1 (NODC's) and their lenders have struggled to
prevent default on a level of external debt that is by almost any
measure excessive. The most dramatic debt figures are those for
the major Latin American borrowers. By the beginning of 1985,
Brazil's estimated external debt was almost $100 billion, Mexico's
in excess of $96 billion, and Argentina's at least $45 billion.2 The
nine largest U.S. banks have over 110% of their capital exposed in
loans to these three debtor states, and over 200% exposed to
1. I have employed the term "NODC" to include those countries in which (1) oil exports
do not constitute two-thirds of total exports, or (2) oil exports are less than 100 million
barrels per year. (This is the convention adopted by the IMF and other analysts of interna-
tional financial matters.) Even though the oil exports of Mexico and Venezuela have consti-
tuted more than two-thirds of their respective total exports in the 1980's, those countries
will also be included as NODC's, since that was their status through most of the 1970's.
2. Like most of the other numbers used in this Article, these are approximations based
upon estimates or figures compiled by financial concerns, the media, and international orga-
nizations (especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). For slightly
different estimates of Latin American indebtedness, see Riding, Latin Debt: Postponing the
Burden, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, § 3, at 1, cols. 2-4; Witcher, Bankers, Preparing for 1985
Debt Talks with Third World, Are Warned Not to Let 1984's Successes Go to Their Heads,
Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1984, at 16, cols. 1-2. See also the figures in Rowe, New Debt Repay-
ment Terms Expected, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1984, at D8, cols. 3-4:
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NODC's as a whole.3 Many of the outstanding bank loans have re-
quired some form of renegotiation in 1983 and 1984. Although
prospects for the debtor states to continue to pay their debts have
brightened considerably due to the worldwide economic recovery,
sober analysts nonetheless warn that the crisis has deeper implica-
tions and may remain a concern for several years.4
With so much at stake, there has been an avalanche of popular
and scholarly literature on the causes of the debt crisis, especially
for Latin American countries (which will be the main focus of this
Article). What is most striking about much, if not most, of this
commentary is its emphasis on "external shocks" as the main ex-
planation for the crisis. This external economic shocks explanation
posits that the debt crisis was, as the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (the World Bank) put it in 1984,
"the result of an unexpected mixture of circumstances-[OPEC-
induced oil price increases in 1973 and 1979], prolonged recession
in industrial countries, the strong dollar, and high rates of inter-
est."5 The international financial system and its sovereign borrow-
ers were simply unlucky: the upward surge in oil prices in 1973 and
Latin American Indebtedness
(billions of dollars)
Country Total Debt Public Sector Private Sector
Brazil 100.0 62.0 38.0
Mexico 94.0 76.0 18.0
Argentina 43.5 29.6 13.9
Venezuela 34.0 28.0 6.0
Chile 21.0 7.0 14.0
Peru 12.4 10.5 1.9
Colombia 10.5 6.7 3.7
Bolivia 5.3 3.8 1.5
Ecuador 6.8 5.2 1.6
Uruguay 4.6 3.3 1.3
3. See International Financial Markets and Related Problems: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 73, 76 (1983) (state-
ment of Paul Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.) [hereinafter cited as
International Financial Markets Hearings]. As of June 1982, claims on NODC's by the nine
largest U.S. banks constituted 10.6% of total assets, 222% of total capital; claims on Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Mexico constituted 112.5% of total capital.
4. See, e.g., Quale, The International Debt Crisis-Phase M: Time for a New Approach, in
A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the International
Debt Problem ch. 7 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming).
5. World Bank, World Development Report 31 (1984); cf. Hughes, Debt and Develop-
ment: The Role of Foreign Capital in Economic Growth, 7 World Dev. 95, 109 (1979) (mini-
mizing dangers of a general debt crisis in 1979, though recognizing possibility of default by
individual developing countries that follow imprudent policies).
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1979 led to increased NODC debt, which borrowing countries were
unable to service (i.e., to make yearly principal-and-interest pay-
ments) when the worldwide recession cut into their export earnings
and rising interest rates increased the yearly servicing expenses.
The external shocks theory is a reassuring one for Western finan-
cial and political systems because if it is correct, the global eco-
nomic recovery and the decline of OPEC in 1984-1985 ought to
rescue the system from the crisis. Once the external shocks disap-
pear or are ameliorated, the theory posits, the crisis will dissipate.
And so it may.
Although many people continue to pay lip service to the external
shocks explanation because of its optimistic overtones, most
knowledgeable analysts also realize that this explanation is over-
simplified. Many NODC's subject to similar if not greater external
shocks have been able to accumulate a large external debt without
significant problems (e.g., South Korea); some countries even
seemed originally to have benefited from the external shocks yet
now have problems servicing their large external indebtedness
(e.g., Mexico and Venezuela).
As a result of these and other anomalies, more sophisticated ex-
planations for the crisis are emerging. One approach, explored in
Part I of this Article, is to view the external shocks as the trigger
of a problem which did not become a crisis until the NODC bor-
rowers and the international financial institutions made mistakes
in dealing with that problem between 1973 and 1982. This
"shocks-and-mistakes" explanation is realistic and analytically so-
phisticated, without sacrificing much of the optimism of the origi-
nal external shocks explanation. If the external shocks dissipate
and the actors learn from their mistakes, then the crisis will re-
solve itself.
One problem with the shocks-and-mistakes theory is that it is
ahistorical and unsystematic. It presumes that the roots of the
debt problem extend back about ten years (from the OPEC price
increases in 1973 to 1982), and it tends to ignore longer range
trends and structures that generated the mistakes made in the
1970's. Indeed, it attributes mistakes to bankers and borrowers
that might, in truth, have been eminently reasonable conduct given
the circumstances and the assumptions of the period.
Drawing from models and sources of international finance, Latin
American socio-political dynamics, and bank regulation, Part II of
this Article argues that the debt problem was a natural result of
socio-political, institutional, and economic structures which con-
[Vol. 25:2
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tributed to the rapid accumulation of too much international sov-
ereign debt. The predominant ideology of growth impelled certain
NODC's, especially those in Latin America, to seek foreign capital
to sustain their development plans. Because of weak political
structures, however, the debtor countries continued to borrow from
foreign banks, even when it should have been clear that borrowing
was just postponing hard political sacrifices that would ultimately
have to be made.
Moreover, just when the debtor states sought massive inflows of
foreign capital to sustain their growth after the early external
shocks, the banks were poised to lend unprecedented sums of
money. In addition to the availability of large OPEC deposits, the
bankers' systematic underappreciation of sovereign risk and their
confidence that political pressures would protect them against
NODC default contributed to a mania of sovereign lending. Also
important was the decline of the Bretton Woods system, for its
demise left international lending virtually unregulated and ex-
posed to crashes and panics of the kind to which it had historically
been subject. Western bank regulations were not structured to deal
with risks and transactions of this sort, and if anything the role of
the Western governments was to encourage and subsidize interna-
tional lending. By the time the banks and the regulators better re-
alized the risks of the NODC indebtedness, the banks, the borrow-
ers, and the national and international regulators had become
hostages to the large volume of outstanding loans.
This structural explanation posits neither fools nor villains. The
mistakes were either hard to avoid or all but compelled by histori-
cal trends beyond the control or comprehension of any but the
most cassandric observer. Such an explanation is a more satisfac-
tory exposition of the crisis because it represents a better view of
the historical context and contours of the problem. For these same
reasons, however, this second explanation might generate less opti-
mism than the short-term shocks-and-mistakes theory. It might
take the banks a long time to work themselves out of the involun-
tary lending cycle, especially if the debtor countries refuse to sacri-
fice their economic development and the Western governments
postpone meaningful financial reform. New external shocks (an-
other round of oil price increases or a faltering of the global eco-
nomic recovery) or policy mistakes (large government deficits or
persisting problems of currency overvaluation) could make the cri-
sis worse and press some countries closer to default.
While more expositionally complete, this structural approach
1985]
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might itself be too confining a perspective on the international
debt problem. A third way to look at the problem is to see it as
part of, or a symptom of, a larger crisis of development. This idea
is explored in Part III of this Article, which analyzes the origins of
the debt problem under three paradigms of development.
Traditional development theory, based upon a Western modern-
ization paradigm, views development as an endogenous process of
industrialization and economic growth, and emphasizes the role of
capital accumulation in achieving growth. The debt problem has
exposed the traditional theory to criticism insofar as infusions of
capital have not necessarily led to sustained economic growth and
have, instead, tightened ties of dependency of borrowing countries
on lending countries, ties which threaten the former's economic
viability.
A second theory of development, the dependency paradigm, may
explain the debt problem better: the industrialized core states of
the world create international economic structures which ensure
the dependency of the peripheral states, so that they can be ex-
ploited by those of the core. The debt problem, in that view, may
be a symptom of the continuing hegemony of the core states in the
world system. While this theoretical explanation may be a cogent
normative framework for the debt problem, it is an incomplete his-
torical description because it fails to recognize the ways in which
the problem exposes core states' vulnerability. Moreover, the debt
problem has not impacted equally on all non-core states, some of
which may have profited considerably from infusions of Western
capital. States are not doomed to eternal dependency or blessed
with everlasting hegemony.
A third paradigm, based on interdependent global development,
may be a more useful way to view the debt crisis historically. The
world systems model developed by historian-sociologist Immanuel
Wallerstein is a starting point: although the core capitalist coun-
tries continue to lead and dominate the world system, countries on
the periphery can seize opportunities to advance, or at least to be-
come part of the semi-periphery of partially industrialized states
and regional socio-political powers. The world economic situation
has been in flux since 1966-1968, when U.S. political and economic
hegemony began to falter. The decline of this hegemony has been
both a test and an opportunity for the newly industrializing coun-
tries. It is an opportunity for these countries to ascend, primarily
by reliance on their state-centered approach to capitalism. It is
also a test to determine whether individual countries have the eco-
[Vol. 25:2
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nomic discipline and internal political strength to weather the
crisis.
The international debt problem is a "crisis" only within the con-
text of the modernization paradigm. Indeed, it exposes that view of
development to question. Under the dependency and world sys-
tems paradigms, on the other hand, the debt problem is only a
symptom of broader problems. Late developing countries face se-
vere obstacles in their economic plans and are highly vulnerable to
economic and political decisions of industrial countries. The debt
dilemma demonstrates the difficulty of Latin American "develop-
ment" within the capitalist world system. Indeed, it raises anew
the fairness questions of unequal opportunity and distribution of
risks and rewards under the existing system.
I. EXTERNAL SHOCKS, AND MISTAKES MADE BY DEBTOR COUN-
TRiES, BANKS, AND REGULATORS IN RESPONDING TO THE SHOCKS
Working from data gathered by such organizations as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, sophisticated
analyses published by authors working under the auspices of the
Brookings Institution, the Institute for International Economics,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), and the Federal Reserve Board have recently stressed the
role of both exogenous and endogenous factors leading to the debt
crisis in 1982. Without the exogenous factors (external shocks),
they argue, the crisis would not have occurred. The important ad-
vance made by this literature, however, is its recognition that busi-
ness and policy mistakes of the leading participants in these loan
transactions have been just as important contributions to debtor
vulnerability as the exogenous factors. Specifically, the NODC's,
especially those in Latin America, responded to the 1973 and 1979
oil price shocks by borrowing far too much money; the banks were
eager to lend far more money than they should have; and the regu-
lators raised no objections to the excessive lending, even after it
became apparent that the loans represented a clear threat to the
banks' solvency. Finally, the other shocks of 1979-1982-recession,
declining prices for NODC products, rising interest rates, and a
strong dollar-made the servicing burdens intolerable for the
debtor countries, which in turn failed to adjust to the drastically
changed conditions. When the banks finally realized that problems
existed, the whole house of cards collapsed.
19851
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A. Excessive Sovereign Borrowing in Response to the Oil Price
Shocks, 1973-1982
The sharp rise in the price of oil in 1973-1974 and again in 1979-
1980 was an important exogenous cause of the debt crisis. William
Cline of the Institute for International Economics calculates that,
between 1973 and 1982, NODC's paid $260 billion (real dollars, ad-
justed for inflation) extra because of the price shocks.6 This precip-
itous and largely adverse shift in the terms of trade left the
NODC's with potentially enormous current account deficits.
At least three responses were possible to actual or projected in-
creases in current account deficits. The NODC's could have (1)
sought to reduce the trade imbalance by encouraging import sub-
stitution and/or increased exports to make up for the increased
sums needed to pay for the imported oil; (2) attracted the capital
needed to finance the payments deficits, either by an enhanced do-
mestic savings effort or by more direct foreign investment; or (3)
borrowed the money from foreign official and/or private lenders.
Typically, countries employed a combination of these mechanisms.
For example, many of the Asian developing countries, such as Sin-
gapore and South Korea, combined export expansion and an en-
hanced public savings effort, and (in the case of South Korea) di-
rect foreign investment, to cover their increased oil payments. Very
few countries were able to perform this economic feat, however,
and those that were able to do so tended to be "upper-income de-
veloping countries." A second group of countries, including Kenya
and other African states, adjusted through import substitution and
enhanced public savings, but at the price of slower export growth
than in the 1960's. Unlike the first group, these countries also had
to resort to a substantial amount of external borrowing to cover
the remainder of the oil import deficit. Most of these countries
were "lower-income or middle-income developing countries."8 Fi-
nally, many countries relied on external financing to cover the deft-
6. W. Cline, International Debt: Systemic Risk and Policy Response 10 (1984).
The value of oil imports increased from 6% of the NODC total merchandise imports in
1973 to about 20% in 1980. Id. at 8-9.
7. These responses and the following discussion in text are based upon World Bank,
supra note 5, at 25 (Box 2.3).
8. The distinction among "upper-income," "lower-income," and "middle-income" devel-
oping countries is based on distinctions drawn in Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, External Debt of Developing Countries: 1983 Survey 10-11, 49 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as 1983 OECD Survey].
[Vol. 25:2
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cits. These countries tended to be fast-developing, upper-income
developing countries in Latin America. It is this third group of
countries upon which the remaining analysis will concentrate.
In sum, for NODC's as a whole (and especially for the third
group of countries), increased domestic savings, export growth, and
import substitution did not cover the higher oil prices. The conse-
quences are represented graphically in Chart 1: the NODC's as a
whole ran substantial current account deficits after 1973. And the
deficits increased in size-from an overall NODC deficit of $11 bil-
lion in 1973 to $108 billion in 1981-until 1982, when the trend
reversed itself and the deficit fell back to $87 billion., Direct for-
eign investment increased only by modest amounts. Rather than
using foreign exchange reserves to cover those deficits (indeed,
they generally added to those reserves in the 1970's), most NODC's
paid for the deficits by borrowing money. (Because the NODC
economies were centered around the state, or around state enter-
prises, the overwhelming bulk of the indebtedness was owed by the
public sector.10) As a result, the external debt of NODC's nearly
quintupled between 1973 and 1982, increasing at an average an-
nual rate of 19%. Even after discounting for inflation, the debt
more than doubled.11 The ratio of NODC debt to NODC exports
rose from 115% in 1973 to 144% in 1982.12 Particularly trouble-
some were the trends for the main Latin American borrowers. Bra-
zil's and Argentina's external debt increased sixfold between 1973
and 1982, while Mexico's increased ninefold-all well above the
general fivefold increase for NODC's as a whole.13 Similarly, the
ratio of debt to exports rose sharply for these three largest borrow-
ers in the period 1973-1982: from 106.2% to 365.3% for Brazil,
from 154.6% to 248.6% for Mexico, and from 140.8% to 353.5%
for Argentina. 4
9. See Appendix, Table 1. The economic tables cited in the footnotes may be found in the
Appendix at the end of this Article.
10. In 1981, the World Bank estimated that about 801 of the long-term external debt of
NODC's was either owed by the state or guaranteed by its subdivisions, departments, or
agencies and instrumentalities. World Bank, World Debt Tables viii (1983). By another esti-
mate in late 1984, approximately 70% of the Latin American external indebtedness was
owed by the public sector. See Rowe, supra note 2, at D8.
11. See Appendix, Table 2; W. Cline, supra note 6, at 2-3 (Table 1.1).
12. See Appendix, Table 2.
13. See Appendix, Table 3.
14. Id.
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This level of debt was, for many countries, imprudently large
under the circumstances and reflected mistaken judgments both by
the borrowing countries and the lending banks. Latin American
NODC's, for their part, believed that their payment balances were
temporary and that difficult policy adjustments restricting growth
and domestic consumption could be avoided or postponed by for-
eign borrowing. 15 Foreign borrowing was an appealing substitute
for currency devaluation and import restrictions, and in light of
the brisk inflation of the 1970's, the real rates of interest (nominal
interest rate minus rate of inflation) paid by these countries were
minimal and in some years actually negative.1 6 For these reasons,
NODC's borrowed heavily in the 1970's, and their short-term
growth continued, though typically at somewhat reduced rates.
For much the same reasons, the long-term prospects worsened:
state enterprises grew accustomed to borrowing abroad, the elites
continued their high level of import consumption, state enterprises
and projects had insufficient incentives to economize, and the cur-
rent account deficit increased each year. According to a recent
Brookings Institution study by Thomas Enders and Richard Mat-
tione, foreign financing in the 1970's enabled the Latin American
countries to live beyond their means for ten years by covering the
costs of balance-of-trade deficits, overappreciated currencies, and
public sector deficits. Current account deficits rose from 2.2% of
the GDP in 1971-1973 to 5.0% in 1980. In the same period (1970-
1980), the average real exchange rate of Latin American currencies
increased by 31%, and public sector deficits increased to between
5% and 8% of the GDP for the largest countries.' These payment
imbalances were not temporary, and Latin American countries
could not borrow indefinitely to cover them. The excessive borrow-
15. See Crowe, International Public Lending and American Policy, in Debt and the Less
Developed Countries 27-29 (J. Aronson ed. 1979); T. Enders & R. Mattione, Latin America:
The Crisis of Debt and Growth 6-13 (1984); [Sec'y of Treasury] Regan, The United States
and the World Debt Problem, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 32, cols. 3-6.
16. Real interest rates in the United States from 1976 to 1980 were as follows:






Int'l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 120-21 (1984) (Tables 2.6 & 2.7).
17. T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 8, 65 (Table 1 & Appendix, Table B-6).
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ing, it turned out, had been a miscalculation.
The borrowing countries could not have obtained these huge
loans from their traditional sources-the IMF, the World Bank,
and Western governments-because those sources had limited
funds and imposed stringent guidelines and restrictions.18 The sov-
ereign borrowers, therefore, obtained most of their loans from pri-
vate banks. The banks, in turn, were just as eager to make the
large volume of loans as the countries were to take the money.
Bankers viewed international lending as a profitable activity in the
1970's, and a number of financial cheerleaders, notably Walter
Wriston of Citicorp, vociferously espoused the view that interna-
tional lending was the wave of the future.'
One reason, no doubt, for the desire of banks to make these sov-
ereign loans was the large pool of "petrodollars" (OPEC profits de-
posited in Western banks) they had available and the paucity of
other profitable loan opportunities which could absorb those pe-
trodollars. That is, the current account deficits of the NODC's had
been matched or exceeded by huge surpluses for most of the OPEC
states, which had deposited most of their revenues in U.S. and Eu-
ropean banks. Conventional borrowers, such as individual mortga-
gors and businesses, could not absorb the enormous new supply of
loanable funds, especially during the recession of 1974-1975. In or-
der to maintain earnings on their large reserves of petrodollars,
banks were happy to lend money to developing countries.2 0
It may be that these supply-side pressures were even more im-
portant than the demand-side pressures in explaining why so many
lent so much to Latin American and other countries. One recent
account of the crisis describes the leading international bankers as
"travelling salesmen" or "hucksters" who persuaded countries to
borrow enormous sums of money, to be provided by far-flung syn-
dicates of banks, each contributing millions of dollars based on lit-
tle more than telexes describing the deals.2'
18. See generally I. Friedman, The World Debt Dilemma: Managing Country Risk 27-50,
63-74 (1983).
19. See, e.g., Stabler, Mideast Oil Money Proves Burdensome to Eurodollar Banks, Wall
St. J., June 6, 1974, at 1, 29 (contrasting the caution of Chase Manhattan's David Rockefel-
ler with the optimism of Walter Wriston).
20. See generally D. Delamaide, Debt Shock: The Full Story of the World Credit Crisis
34-37 (1984); Solomon, Developing Nations and Commercial Banks: The New Dependency,
12 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 325, 326-34 (1978).
21. D. Delamaide, supra note 20, at 43-45. Because huge syndicated loan deals had to be
put together quickly, and because the banks generally relied on the lead bank's judgment,
[Vol. 25:2
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Whatever the general validity of such an indictment, the bankers
(and the bank regulators) made two very big mistakes. First, they
underestimated the possibility that countries would overborrow
and then default on their loans, or at least not be able to pay cur-
rent principal and interest. Bankers told one another repeatedly
that "countries don't go broke,"22 but to the extent that failure to
pay interest and principal payments is the same thing as being
"broke," this view was oversimplified.
The second mistake was excessive concentration by the largest
banks in loans to similarly situated sovereigns, an elementary fail-
ure to diversify their portfolio of risks. In 1979, the nine leading
U.S. banks had on loan to the three main Latin American debtor
countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina) more than 100% of their
paid-in capital, and by the end of 1983 the figure for several of the
banks exceeded 150%.23 Had any one of those countries defaulted,
the banks' shareholders would have lost much of their investment,
and several banks might have become insolvent themselves. Yet
the bank regulators-chiefly the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Federal Reserve Board in the United States--did almost noth-
ing about the bankers' chief mistakes until 1979, when they insti-
tuted a largely ineffectual system of hortatory country lending
guidelines.24 Not until 1983, under the threat of stringent congres-
there developed a practice one executive called "receptionist banking"--"When you went
out to lunch you could have told the receptionist to watch the telex and take $5 million of
any deal offered." Id. at 44-45.
22. See generally Schirano, A Banker's Point of View, in A Dance Along the Precipice:
The Political and Economic Dimensions of the International Debt Problem ch. 2 (W. Es-
kridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming) (personal account by an international banker).
23. See International Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 3, at 386 (statement of
Richard Dale, Brookings Inst.). Exposure of eight leading U.S. banks as of December 31,
1983, was as follows:
Millions of Dollars in Loans
Bank Argentina Brazil Mexico Venezuela Loans as % of Capital
Citicorp 1090 4700 2900 1500 154.3
Bank America 300 2484 2741 1614 116.7
Mfg'rs Hanover 1321 2130 1915 1084 200.3
Chase Manhattan 775 2560 1553 1226 136.5
J.P. Morgan 741 1785 1174 464 102.9
Chemical 370 1276 1414 776 136.0
Bankers Trust 230 743 1286 436 119A
Continental Ill. 401 476 699 436 83.9
The Latin American Times, Apr. 16, 1984 (No. 58), at 8.
24. In 1979, the federal regulators created the Interagency Country Review Committee
(ICERC), which was charged with administering a new system for evaluating country risk.
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sional legislation, did the regulators propose mandatory rules to
prevent banks from making too many ill-advised international
loans.25
B. Debtor Country Vulnerability to Higher Interest Rates and
Worldwide Recession, 1979-1982
The level of debt for NODC's as a whole, and particularly for the
leading debtor countries in Latin America, posed problems both
for the debtor countries and for the international financial system
because it represented a postponement of hard economic choices.
Still, between 1976 and 1979, the debt situation appeared to be
under control. Export growth of the leading debtor countries was
sufficient to service their growing external indebtedness. 2 The
The system had four elements: (1) assessing and reporting the country exposures of each
bank to enable regulators to monitor such exposures; (2) evaluating the banks' internal sys-
tems for reviewing country risk with the aim of encouraging more systematic internal review
of foreign lending; (3) classifying the credit risk of countries whose external payments had
been (or were likely to be) interrupted; and (4) commenting on the risks associated with
each bank's large exposures in particular countries with the aim of encouraging portfolio
diversification. International Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 3, at 53-54, 84-89
(statement of Paul Volcker). The object of this system was "to call significant exposures to
the attention of senior management and boards of directors of the banks, to raise questions,
and to force careful consideration." Id. at 54. However, the ICERC had virtually no effect (it
appears) on the escalating foreign sovereign debt, in part because its guidelines were only
hortatory, too timid, and too late in the cycle of lending.
25. In response to congressional dissatisfaction with previous efforts, the Federal Reserve
Board, Comptroller General, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation submitted a "Joint
Memorandum" on a "Program for Improved Supervision and Regulation of International
Lending," reprinted in Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-52
(1983). The Joint Memorandum proposed a five-point plan: (1) strengthening the existing
program of country risk evaluation; (2) increasing disclosure of banks' country exposures;
(3) establishing a system of special reserves for questionable foreign loans; (4) promulgating
new rules for fee accounting; and (5) improving international financial cooperation. Id. at 25.
Congress embodied most of the regulators' proposals in the International Lending Supervi-
sion Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912. An
excellent analysis of the Act and its regulations may be found in Lichtenstein, The U.S.
Response to the International Debt Crisis: The International Lending Supervision Act of
1983, 25 Va. J. Int'l L. 401 (1985), reprinted in A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political
and Economic Dimensions of the International Debt Problem ch. 8 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985)
(forthcoming).
26. Former Brazilian Planning Minister Mario Simonsen has suggested that so long as
export earnings are growing at a higher rate than the interest rate, debt-servicing problems
should not develop. M. Simonsen, The Developing Country Debt Problem 6 (1984); see W.
Cline, supra note 6, at 7 (citing M. Simonsen, The Financial Crisis in Latin America (1983)).
Cline notes that in the period 1973-1980, the interest rate averaged 10.2% while the growth
rate of NODC exports averaged 21.1%. W. Cline, supra note 6, at 8; see Appendix, Table 5.
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world of international debt changed dramatically after 1978, how-
ever. The second OPEC oil price shock placed new pressure on
NODC current account balances and, more importantly, triggered
severe deflationary policies, higher interest rates, and diminished
trade in the Western industrial countries (chiefly the United
States). Although, astonishingly, bankers were still scrambling to
make NODC sovereign loans, the combination of higher oil prices,
lower demand for the exports of developing countries, and higher
interest rates after 1979 severely impaired the ability of many of
the sovereign debtors to service their debts.
The NODC borrowers were particularly vulnerable in the post-
1979 crisis because of the terms of their private bank loans. Sover-
eign loans from official sources (IMF, World Bank, Western gov-
ernments) in the 1950's and 1960's came with constraining condi-
tions, but also included concessionary terms such as below-market
fixed-interest rates and easy repayment schedules over a long term.
In the 1970's, NODC's found private banks to be more reliable
sources of funds (without the conditions often attached to official
loans), but the non-concessionary nature of their loan terms
presented very substantial future risks for the heavily indebted
countries.
First, and primarily, the private loans tended to carry floating-
interest rates: the rates were periodically adjusted at one to two
points above the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR). Roger
Kubarych of the New York Federal Reserve Bank estimates that
international sovereign debt contracted at floating-interest rates
constituted 70% of the total sovereign debt in 1983.27 And the
floating-rate debt was concentrated in a handful of countries: ac-
cording to OECD calculations, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South
Korea, and Chile owed 87% of the total floating-interest debt in
1983.28 As a result, fluctuations in interest rates would be felt
Thus, under Simonsen's standard, the debt-servicing burden of NODC's did not become a
cause of concern until 1981-1982, when the world recession contributed to a sharp reduction
in the rate of NODC export growth and high interest rates. This approach is not completely
satisfactory, however, because it assumes that no new borrowing occurs in the given year.
When the country is committed to borrowing more money each year, and the existing debt
must be serviced at the current interest rate, an export growth rate exceeding the interest
rate does not suggest that the country has no problems.
27. Kubarych, The Financial Vulnerability of the LDC's: Six Factors, in A Dance Along
the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the International Debt Problem
ch. 1 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming).
28. 1983 OECD Survey, supra note 8, at 37-38.
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quickly by the most heavily indebted countries. Second, most of
the external debt was contracted in U.S. dollars, rather than in a
diversified range of hard currencies, thus exposing the debtor
countries to the risk that the dollar would prove unusually
strong.29 Third, much of the external debt was short-term. From
1972 to 1974, the typical maturity of NODC sovereign debt had
gone up to ten to twelve years, but after 1974 the average maturi-
ties fell back to five to seven years, and fewer ten-year loans were
obtainable after 1977.30 The major borrowing countries had twice
as much short-term debt as the average NODC.31 One disadvan-
tage of this increase in short-term debt was that when new loans
were negotiated (or old loans renegotiated), the borrowing country
would have to pay not only the going interest rate, but also the
various fees attending such loans (commitment fees, participation
fees, and, where a banking syndicate was involved, management
fees).32 As a result of the risk premium assessed by banks and of
these various fees and commissions, the effective interest rate on
these loans was sometimes as much as 4% above LIBOR.33
These risks materialized in the period 1979-1982, when the
Western countries, led by the United States, responded to the sec-
ond round of OPEC price increases by a monetary policy which
made it substantially more difficult for the main NODC borrowers
to service their external debts and to repay or renegotiate loans
29. See id. at 39 (56% of LDC debt and 58% of debt-device payments were in dollars for
1981-1983); Mohl & Sobol, Currency Diversification and LDC Debt, Fed. Res. Bd. N.Y.Q.
Rev., Autumn 1983, at 19, 19 & n.1 (although 10.6% of the overall international syndicated
financing in 1980 was accomplished in currencies other than the dollar, only 1.4% of the
syndicated loans to the five main NODC borrowers [Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea,
and The Philippines] was made in such currencies).
30. Lichtensztejn & Quijano, The External Indebtedness of the Developing Countries to
International Private Banks, in Debt and Development 185, 208-09 (J.C. Sfinchez Arnau ed.
1982). The debt obtained on the Eurocurrency market showed a remarkable shortening of
maturities: while 62.5% of the loans to developing countries had maturities greater than
seven years in 1974, only 8.6% had such maturities in 1977 (only 5.0% and 4.7% had such
maturities in 1975 and 1976, respectively). Id. at 209 (Table 11).
31. See Appendix, Table 4.
32. See Lichtensztejn & Quijano, supra note 30, at 214 (Table 13) (typical extra fees
charged borrowers by commercial banks: commitment fee payable on that part of the loan
which has not been made during the drawdown period, 0.5% of the loan amount per annum;
participation fee to banks in the syndicate, 0.625%; management fee to the managing bank
or agent, 0.375% plus $10,000 per annum).
33. Lichtensztejn & Quijano, supra note 30, at 212 n.2 (citing Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, Latin America's External Indebtedness: Current Situation & Prospects 25
(1977)).
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when their terms expired.34 The chief result of the new policies was
that both nominal and real interest rates soared. Average market
rates for new or rolled-over loans jumped to 13.0% in 1979, 15.4%
in 1980, and 17.5% in 1981.35 More important, as the rate of infla-
tion fell after 1980, the real rate of interest soared, reaching 7.5%
in 1981 and 11.0% in 1982.36 Based only upon the interest rates
that might have been expected from the period 1961-1980, William
Cline estimates that real interest rates were 5.8% higher than ex-
pected in 1981 and 9.3% higher in 1982.
A second consequence of these policies was appreciation in the
value of the dollar-on the whole an unfavorable development for
debtor countries that had to repay loans in dollars. The dollar ap-
preciated by 11% in 1981 and 17% through November 1982.
Though it lost some strength in 1983 it remained at levels well
above those of the 1970's, and overall it appreciated against other
"hard" currencies.3 It is estimated that the dollar in February
1985, was over 50% stronger in comparison with other major for-
eign currencies than it was in mid-1980.3 9
A third, less direct result of the severe monetary policies of the
Federal Reserve Board was a worldwide recession in 1980-1982.
Real growth in the industrialized countries fell off in 1980-1982,
which had a predictable effect on NODC exports.4 0 Consequently,
NODC export growth, which had averaged 8% in the 1970's, was
only 1.8% in 1982.41 Also, because commodity export prices were
34. For background on the complicated decision to tighten U.S. monetary policy to com-
bat inflation in 1979 and afterward, see Blustein, Monetary Zeah How Federal Reserve
Under Volcker Finally Slowed Down Inflation, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
35. See Appendix, Table 5. These market rates represent LIBOR plus one percent.
The average nominal rates of interest paid on all outstanding long-term external debt of
NODC's increased from an aggregate of 4.5% in 1973.1977 to 8.5% in 1982. Int'l Monetary
Fund, World Economic Outlook 173 (1982).
36. Overall, the real rate of interest on NODC indebtedness increased from an aggregate
of -6% for 1973-1977 to an aggregate of +3% for 1981-1982, and went even higher in 1983-
1984. W. Cline, supra note 6, at 11-12.
37. Id. "For the 1960's and 1970's real interest rates ... averaged 1.66%. In 1981 this
real rate was 7.46%, and in 1982 it reached 10.95%. Thus the excess of interest rates above
the real level that might have been expected based on the past two decades was 5.8 percent-
age points in 1981 and 9.29 percentage points in 1982." Id. at 12.
38. Int'l Monetary Fund, Annual Report 1983, at 26-27 (1984) (Chart 10).
39. Pine, Calls for Action: Rapidly Rising Dollar, Big Trade Deficit Stir More Pleas for
Help, Wall St. J., Feb -12, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (dollar has appreciated about 140% against the
franc, 110% against the pound, 15% against the yen).
40. Int'l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 170 (1983) (Table 1).
41. W. Cline, supra note 6, at 13.
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more sensitive to this downward swing in the business cycle,
NODC aggregate export prices fell in 1982 to 90% of their 1980
value, while import prices remained about the same (after fluctuat-
ing upward in 1981).42
In short, at the very time that debtor countries desperately
needed strong export sales to pay the suddenly mounting costs of
servicing their high-interest debt in overvalued dollars, their earn-
ings were falling. The result of this dilemma, represented graphi-
cally in Chart 2, is that total debt and debt-servicing payments
surpassed export growth after 1978. Between 1973 and 1977, the
ratio of debt service-payments to exports of goods and services
hovered around 15% for NODC's as a group; the figure shot up to
19% in 1978-1979 and reached 23% by 1982.43 Again, the leading
Latin American borrowers were significantly worse off: the ratio of
debt service to exports in 1982 was 87% for Brazil, 59% for Mex-
ico, and 103 % for Argentina.4 For these countries, export earnings
were barely able to keep up with existing payment schedules in
1982.
42. Id. at 12 (citing Int'l Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 56-57 (May
1983)).
43. See Appendix, Table 2.
44. See Appendix, Table 3.
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Risky planning by both borrowers and lenders left the NODC's
highly vulnerable to the problems of the early 1980's, though it is
fair to say that few analysts predicted such a confluence of events
in 1977. William Cline estimates that the NODC's as a group "lost
approximately $141 billion in higher interest payments, lower ex-
port receipts, and higher import costs as the consequence of ad-
verse macroeconomic developments" after 1978.41 Other analysts
estimate that these countries lost another $30 billion through their
failure to diversify their currency repayments.46
Not surprisingly, the impact of the external shocks differed from
country to country. In their study of the debt crisis in Latin
America, Thomas Enders and Richard Mattione conclude that the
cumulative negative shocks of 1979-1982 were enormous for Brazil
($48.5 billion) and substantial for Argentina ($13.4 billion), Colom-
bia ($6.8 billion), and Chile ($4.8 billion). Because Peru, Mexico,
and Venezuela were on balance oil-exporting nations in 1979-1982,
however, Enders and Mattione conclude that they incurred "posi-
tive shocks" (they were better off, considering the higher oil prices,
higher interest rates, and recessionary world market).47 Although
Bela Balassa and Desmond McCarthy found small negative shocks
for Mexico and Peru in a similar study,48 the point is that while
Mexico, for example, was much less severely impacted by the vari-
ous external shocks than Brazil, to take the worst case, it was
45. W. Cline, supra note 6, at 13. The specific line items, according to Cline's calculations,
are:
Effect Amount
Real interest rate (1981-1982) in excess of
1961-1980 average $ 41 billion
Terms-of-trade loss, 1981-1982 $ 79 billion
Export volume lost because of recession $ 21 billion
Total: $141 billion
Id. (Table 4).
46. Mohl & Sobol, supra note 29, at 20.
47. T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 16-19 (Tables 3 & 4).
48. B. Balassa & D. McCarthy, Adjustment Policies in Developing Countries 1979-82
(1983), conclude that "[t]he benefits Mexico derived from improvements in its terms of
trade, resulting from higher petroleum prices, were offset by the adverse effects of the slow-
down of world demand for its exports." Enders and Mattione, however, conclude that Mex-
ico suffered no adverse effects in its non-oil exports. (Both studies found substantial adverse
effects as a result of higher interest rates.) The different conclusions with regard to Peru are
minor: Balassa and McCarthy found no adverse shocks in 1979-1980 and a 2% shock in
1981, while Enders and Mattione concluded that Peru came out slightly ahead in the period
1979-1982.
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nonetheless Mexico, and not Brazil, which found itself unable to
service its debt in August 1982. The explanation for the debt crisis
rests, it would appear, not only with the large-scale lending of the
1970's and the unanticipated cumulative shocks of 1979-1982. One
must also look at the policy responses of the debtor countries to
the last series of oil price, interest rate, and trade shocks.
C. Debtor Country Policy Errors Exacerbating the Debt-Servic-
ing Problem, 1979-1982
Although the banks remained willing, even anxious, to lend them
ever more money (until 1982), NODC's facing substantial adverse
external shocks after 1979, according to classic adjustment theory,
should have adopted policies to attract hard currency that could be
used to service the external debt. Even those countries that had
benefited from the oil price increases needed to avoid policies that
could have turned a favorable situation into a disaster. 9
First, countries should generally avoid overvalued exchange
rates, namely official rates that do not reflect the value the cur-
rency brings on the free market. Overvalued exchange rates dis-
courage exports by making them relatively more expensive and en-
courage imports by making them relatively less expensive. The
result harms both trade and current account balances. Overvalued
exchange rates also encourage capital flight: if the NODC's cur-
rency is not really worth the official rate, the holders of that cur-
rency will want to convert their money into a hard, more stable
currency.
Second, a classic adjustment policy would require that borrowing
countries reduce or eliminate special subsidies, state enterprise
deficits, and trade restrictions, because they impede the operation
of free markets and efficient allocation of productive efforts. To
the extent that Latin American industries were "protected" by
means of subsidies, and to the extent government enterprises were
unprofitable and suffered losses, NODC governments were proba-
bly not working in the most effective way to promote exports or
reduce dependence on imports.
Third, vulnerable debtor countries should apply monetary and
49. For a discussion of the policy alternatives open to NODC's confronted by adverse
external shocks, see B. Balassa & D. McCarthy, supra note 48, at 6-8; Int'l Monetary Fund,
supra note 38, at 42-43; de Vries, Restructuring Debtor Economies: Long-Term Finance, 38
J. Int'l Aff. 31, 34-36 (1984).
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fiscal policies to control inflation. Specifically, public sector deficits
must be reduced and expansion of the money supply restrained.
Inflation, like overvalued currency, tends to harm the terms of
trade by rendering exports more costly abroad and foreign imports
less expensive to domestic consumers. Moreover, where domestic
interest rates on savings are lower than the rate of inflation-a
common consequence of insufficiently restrictive monetary and fis-
cal policies-savings are reduced and capital will be exported to
safer and more profitable currencies. Again, investment, highly de-
pendent on the availability of domestic capital, would be impeded.
Adjustment efforts differed from country to country. Countries
such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina followed very poor poli-
cies (according to traditional adjustment theory), which induced or
facilitated more than $40 billion in capital flight between 1979 and
1982.50 Brazil and Peru made the greatest adjustment efforts, but
were nevertheless unsuccessful in controlling runaway inflation.5 1
When the banks curtailed their lending to the region in 1982,12 the
international debt "crisis" was triggered.
That Mexico, which suffered less than most other Latin Ameri-
can countries from the external shocks of 1979-1982, was the first
to confess inability to service its debts is explained by the policies
its government followed. Because Mexico had become a net oil ex-
porter by the end of the 1970's and foresaw (incorrectly) continued
increases in the price of oil, the Mexican government followed a
highly expansionist policy. The peso was deliberately overvalued
until 1982, and public sector deficits were almost a quarter of the
50. According to T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 20 (Table 5), Argentina
suffered a negative shock of $13.4 billion between 1979 and 1982. That is, higher oil pay-
ments, higher interest rates, and the trade recession cost the country $13.4 billion in that
period. This negative shock was compounded by capital flight of $14.3 billion. Mexico felt a
positive shock of $11.7 billion, which was erased by capital flight amounting to $18.7 billion.
Venezuela's positive shock ($19.1 billion) was not completely offset by capital flight of $13.0
billion.
Roger Kubarych estimates that 40% of all bank lending from 1979 to the end of 1981
($40-$50 billion) may have ended up as capital outflows from the debtor countries.
Kubarych, supra note 27.
51. T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 22, argue that "internal causes of the
[international debt] crisis were more significant than were external causes." Although this
thesis is far from accepted wisdom, the internal factors were critical, for they contributed to
bank skepticism about Latin American lending.
52. Commercial bank lending to developing countries fell by $23 billion in 1982, with the
main Latin American borrowers (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile) being hit hardest. See
World Bank, Debt and the Developing World: Current Trends and Prospects x (1984)
(abridged version of World Debt Tables, 1983-84 edition).
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GDP.5 s Although the economy grew rapidly in this period, these
expansionist policies yielded predictably harmful side effects. In-
flation ran out of control, and real interest rates were negative,
leading to a massive capital flight from pesos into more stable cur-
rencies. More than $17 billion left the country in 1981-1982, con-
tributing nearly one-fifth of the total external debt. As a result of
the domestic inflation and the overvalued peso, non-oil exports
were crippled and imports soared. The enormous government defi-
cit, based upon the prospect of continuing oil price increases, had
mortgaged the country."
Deteriorating oil market conditions in 1981-1982 alerted the
Mexican government to the fact that it had overextended itself. In
February 1982, the government devalued the peso and made an
effort to reduce the federal deficit. Price controls were tightened.
Flexible interest and exchange rate policies were instituted to pre-
vent new overvaluation of the peso. Notwithstanding these efforts,
inflation continued at an alarming rate and the flow of interna-
tional loans dried up. Mexico was unable to meet its scheduled
payments in August 1982, because of its payments deficits, capital
flight, and a new-found reluctance of foreign banks to continue
making loans based upon the prospect of future oil price increases.
The United States and the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) extended Mexico emergency credits in August, and in De-
cember the IMF agreed to a loan of SDR 3.61 billion ($3.86 bil-
lion).55 In return, Mexico agreed to reductions in the public sector
deficit and the current account deficit and to a greater effort
against inflation. The commercial banks formally agreed to $5 bil-
lion in new loans in March 1983, and much of the Mexican public
53. See Appendix, Table 6.
54. The consequences of Mexico's development policies from 1979-1982 are explored in
more detail in Buira, The Exchange Crisis and the Adjustment Program in Mexico, in Pros-
pects for Adjustment in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: Responding to the Debt Crisis 51 (J.
Williamson ed. 1983). See also T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 28.
55. T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 28. "Special Drawing Rights" (SDR's) are
the "currency" of the IMF. They consist of a weighted average of several key currencies and
are, essentially, bookkeeping entries. Each member country in the IMF contributes a
"quota" of its own currency, thereby creating a pool of assets.that the IMF can lend to
countries experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties. On demand, a member of the Fund
may swap its own currency (up to its quota) for SDR's or hard currencies. If the member is
willing to agree to an IMF readjustment program, it can obtain funds up to several times its
quota. See generally L Friedman, supra note 18, at 41, 63; World Bank, Annual Report 185-
86 (1983).
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debt was rescheduled in the summer of 1983.56 A second major
rescheduling of a substantial part of the Mexican external debt oc-
curred in the summer of 1984, when Mexico was rewarded for pro-
gress against inflation with longer maturities for its outstanding
loans and with interest rate concessions.
57
Argentina did not fare as "well." Highly sensitive to external
markets and terms of trade, Argentina nevertheless followed, al-
most in textbook fashion, policies which aggravated the negative
shocks caused by oil price increases, higher interest rates, and di-
minished trade.58 By 1982, a severely overvalued peso, public sec-
tor deficits exceeding 14% of the GDP, triple-digit inflation, and
severe negative real interest rates left Argentina with a $30 billion
foreign debt (most of it due in 12 months), massive capital flight
and current account deficits, declining government revenues, and
bankruptcy and illiquidity in the foundering private sector.,,
Some efforts were made after March 1981 to ameliorate the
problem-including devaluations of the peso and reductions in the
current account deficit and the level of wage increases-but they
proved unavailing in light of political instability and the war with
Great Britain."0 The Falklands-Malvinas War not only contributed
to the government deficits and inflation, but undermined the confi-
dence of Western bankers in Argentina and its ability to manage
its own affairs. When foreign bank funds dried up, Argentina was
forced to ask for relief. Argentina obtained from the IMF a loan of
SDR 2.02 billion ($2.16 billion) in January 1983, conditioned upon
an IMF adjustment program to reduce government deficits and in-
56. Details of the 1982-1983 restructuring of Mexico's external debt may be found in J.
Kraft, The Mexican Rescue (1984). See also Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspec-
tive of Counsel to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, in A Dance
Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the International Debt
Problem ch. 4 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming).
57. See generally Sesit & Frazier, Mexico, Foreign Banks Agree to Work Out Plan to
Reschedule Several Years of Debt, Wall St. J., June 6, 1984, at 37, col. 2; Tapia, Mexico's
Debt Restructuring: The Evolving Solution, 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 1 (1984); Witcher,
Banks Give Ground on Mexico Debt Terms in Exchange for Close Watch on Economy, Wall
St. J., Aug. 30, 1984, at 23, col. 1.
58. Argentina's problems are explored in more detail in Pastore, Progress and Prospects
for the Adjustment Program in Argentina, in Prospects for Adjustment in Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico: Responding to the Debt Crisis 7 (J. Williamson ed. 1983). See also W. Cline,
supra note 6, at 268-73.
59. See Appendix, Table 6.
60. See T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 21-22, 26; Pastore, supra note 58, at
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flation. Commercial banks extended a $1.1 billion loan, which they
supplemented with more new money later in 1983.61 Argentina had
problems in meeting the IMF program goals in 1983, and in 1984
fell into arrears on its servicing payments. After months of difficult
renegotiations, Argentina reached tentative new loan agreements
with the IMF and with its bank advisory group in late 1984.2
Most Latin American countries adjusted to the external shocks
better than Mexico and Argentina did, but after the Falklands-
Malvinas War and the Mexican crisis of August 1982, the banks
further reduced their lending in the entire region. Outstanding
U.S. bank loans in the region increased only $1.2 billion in the last
six months of 1982, compared with $7.3 billion in the latter half of
1981.63 This psychological, chain reaction, tied to the notorious
herd instinct of banks, precipitated a series of Latin American
reschedulings in 1983, the chief one being that for Brazil.
Brazil was a NODC that made an effort to adjust to the substan-
tial external shocks it suffered, though its efforts, and its success,
were only partial. While a proposed stabilization program was
never implemented, and the government followed an inflationary,
high-growth policy through most of 1979, in late 1979 and in 1980,
Brazil devalued the cruzeiro, abolished subsidies to domestic in-
dustries, and followed restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. By
1981 these policies had brought growth to a halt, but they did dis-
courage the corrosive capital flight that had afflicted Mexico." On
the other hand, the high public sector deficits contributed to an
annual inflation rate exceeding 100% and to negative real interest
rates, which discouraged domestic savings and investment."" In
short, Brazil was able to reduce the effects of the severe external
shocks, but was not able to eliminate them.
In part because of the Mexican crisis, Brazil after September
1982, was unable to obtain enough new loans to cover its current
61. See T. Enders & &L Mattione, supra note 15, at 26-27.
62. See Pine, Argentina Gets Loan From IMP of $1.66 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec 31, 1984,
at 12, col 1; Rowe, Bankers Said Skeptical of Argentine Plan, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1984, at
El, col 2.
63. See W. Cline, supra note 6, at 18.
64. See T. Enders & R Mattione, supra note 15, at 23-24; B. Balassa & D. McCarthy,
supra note 48, n.p. (table entitled "Brazil: Indicators of External Shocks and Structural
Adjustment 1978-82"). See generally Diaz-Alejandro, Some Aspects of the 1982-83 Brazilian
Payments Crisis, 1983 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 515 (excellent analysis of
economic background).
65. See Appendix, Table 6.
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account deficit and to service its existing debt. Thus in early 1983,
Brazil also requested a rescue package from its official and private
lenders. The IMF extended SDR 4.955 billion ($5.3 billion) in re-
turn for the government's commitment to encourage export
growth, reduce current account deficits, and slow inflation. The
private banks agreed to new loan commitments of $4.4 billion and
to a rescheduling of $4.7 billion due in 1983, contingent upon Bra-
zil's following the IMF program."' In fact, it soon became apparent
that Brazil would not be able to meet those IMF conditions, and a
milder program (plus $6.5 billion in new loans from commercial
banks) was agreed to in late 1983.7 A new longer term reschedul-
ing of Brazil's external debt was negotiated by early 1985, but the
package is still tentative because of Brazil's failure to meet IMF
goals.68
By mid-1983, the external debts of Peru, Venezuela, and Chile
were also being rescheduled as part of this financial chain reaction;
previous renegotiations continued in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
and Nicaragua.6 9 In the cases of Venezuela (which enjoyed net ben-
efits from the external shocks of 1979-1982 but failed to manage
them to create permanent growth opportunities), and Peru (which
had few if any net adverse shocks until 1982 and was trying to
66. See Bacha, The IMF and the Prospects for Adjustment in Brazil, in Prospects for
Adjustment in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: Responding to the Debt Crisis 31, 32-33 (J.
Williamson ed. 1983); Fund Approves Package of Assistance for Brazil Totaling SDR 5 Bil-
lion, IMF Survey 65 (Mar. 7, 1983).
67. See Gilpin, Brazil Gets $6.5 Billion in New Loans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1984, at 39,
cols. 3-5.
68. Kristoff, Banks and Brazil Resolve Big Issues, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1985, at 34, col. 4.
69. For these countries, the pattern was similar to that in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico:
external shocks; failure to cope; resultant inflation and (sometimes) capital flight; drying up
of new bank credit; confession of inability to service debts; a rescue package by the IMF, the
banks, and (sometimes) the U.S. government. Chile was a severe disadjuster, following a
highly expansionistic growth policy until 1981, fueled mainly by foreign debt (since domestic
saving was very low). Highly overvalued exchange rates led to capital flight and undermined
the country's export position. As a result, credit dried up in 1982 (and this would probably
have occurred even without the Mexican and Argentine problems), and agreements for new
loans and rescheduled debt were made with the IMF and the banks in 1983. See T. Enders
& R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 25-26.
Although Peru had small positive results from the external shocks, they were over-
whelmed by other adverse developments in 1982, including excessive public sector deficits
and the resulting inflation, shortfalls in the expected levels of exports caused in part by
natural disaster (El Nino), and limited availability of new credit. In the summer of 1983,
Peru obtained $830 million in commercial bank financing (new money plus rescheduled
debts), together with $1 billion through a Paris Club rescheduling of official indebtedness.
See id. at 29.
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adjust at least in part), the early restructurings were precipitated
by the abrupt cut-off of new funds to the region rather than by any
urgent need in 1982 to reevaluate their particular external debt
levels.70 Just as decisively as they had earlier encouraged almost
limitless sovereign borrowing, the banks in 1982-1983 grew nervous
and began a long cycle of renegotiations and adjustment programs
as prerequisites for new money in most parts of the suddenly less
creditworthy Latin American region.
Under the emerging economic policy analysis recounted above,
there was no single "cause" for the debt problem. Among the con-
tributing causes were the external shocks (oil price increases, high
real interest rates, deterioration in terms of trade and trade levels);
short-sighted planning and risk assessment by the borrowing coun-
tries, the banks, and the people who were supposed to have been
regulating the banks; poor policy responses by some of the debtor
countries to the external shocks after 1979; and a herd-like crisis
mentality that gripped bankers after the first few countries
faltered in their debt servicing.
IL POLITICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND ECONOMUC STRUCTURES CON-
TRIBUTING TO THE DEBT PROBLEM
The shocks-and-mistakes explanation for the debt crisis set
forth above is in many ways a satisfactory one. If the external
shocks had not been so severe and cumulative, or if borrowers,
lenders, and regulators had behaved differently, then the emer-
gency might have been averted. Such an explanation has a number
of shortcomings, however. One is that it is ahistorical. If one's his-
torical frame is broader than the last ten years, it is easy to see
that the current problem is not unique."1 Latin American coun-
tries, for example, were regular borrowers on the European bond
70. "To be sure, there was... underlying deterioration in the debt-servicing capacity of
many of the Latin American countries in 1982, largely because of the depressed level of
their exports (which fell from $97 billion in 1981 to $87 billion in 1982 for the region as a
whole). Nonetheless, the sharp psychological shift aggravated debt problems and at least in
some cases (especially Peru) probably precipitated debt-servicing disruptions that otherwise
could have been avoided." W. Cline, supra note 6, at 18 (citations omitted). See also T.
Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 27, 29.
71. Charles Kindleberger, for example, notes that manias of foreign lending occurred in
1808-1810, 1823-1825, 1856-1861, 1885-1890, 1910-1913, and 1924-1928, and that all of these
manias were stimulated by an external economic crisis that led to a euphoric period of lend-
ing, which in turn snapped back in a series of revulsions. C. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics
and Crashes (1978).
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market after 1820. Though they defaulted with regularity during
trade recessions, they continued to receive loans on a large scale
until the 1930's.2
There is nothing new about international debt crises. Indeed, the
debt crises of the last thirty years have in at least one respect been
less alarming, because they have generally not resulted in sovereign
defaults. It appears that structural incentives regularly lead certain
countries to overborrow and banks to overlend. The present prob-
lem, however, is in many respects unique. To understand its uni-
queness and its origins, one must examine not only the shocks and
mistakes of the last ten years, but also the massive reordering of
the world's politics, economics, and finance after World War II.
Another shortcoming of the short-term analysis of the crisis is
that it begs a number of questions by implicitly attributing the
crisis to fortuity (external shocks) and error (policy mistakes). As
history, this sort of approach requires elaboration. Why do large
groups of sophisticated and intelligent people make such enormous
"mistakes"? The modern historian is reluctant to believe them idi-
ots or blunderers and, therefore, seeks an explanation for system-
atic errors in the structures and institutions of society. Professor
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro has recently argued that the shocks-and-
mistakes explanation is an unfair, post hoc attribution of error to
banks and countries, for no reasonable observer in 1980-1981
would have predicted the "crisis" of 1982-1984.71 This argument
may go too far (there were actually a number of Cassandras warn-
ing of the danger before 1981), but it is historically acute in sug-
gesting that structural reasons, rather than isolated mistakes, gave
rise to the amplitude of the problem. To what extent were the'ex-
ternal shocks truly fortuitous? Why have Latin American countries
fallen into illiquidity while other NODC's have not? While individ-
72. Thus, £21 million was on loan to the newly independent Latin American states by
1825, and the foreign indebtedness continued to grow during the nineteenth century (gener-
ally in the form of bonds, not bank loans). Despite regular defaults on the debt (especially a
massive one in the 1870's), British investment in Latin America stood at £179.5 million in
1880 (£123 million invested in state bonds) and £995.3 million in 1913 (£314.3 million in
state bonds). Overall, Latin America has been the largest consumer of industrial country
capital in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Corm, The Indebtedness of the
Developing Countries: Origins and Mechanisms, in Debt and Development 14, 29-35, 45
(J.C. SAnchez Arnau ed. 1982) (Table V). For a detailed discussion of the history of lending
to Latin America, see generally R. Conde, The First Stages of Modernization in Latin
America (1974); J. F. Rippy, British Investment in Latin America, 1822.1949 (1959).
73. Diaz-Alejandro, Latin American Debt: I Don't Think We Care in Kansas Anymore,
1984 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 335, 336-49.
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ual events may have an adventitious quality (e.g., the OPEC price
increases), the modern historian finds patterns where the tradi-
tional historian or the ahistorical analyst would see accidents.
Even without the accumulation of external shocks, one might
doubt that some reckoning would not have occurred.
Specifically, the argument of Part H is that structural weak-
nesses of Latin American politics (mainly, uncritical dedication to
growth, but without the ability to make hard decisions in support
of long-term growth), together with historical changes in interna-
tional financing, led to a great mania of sovereign lending after the
late 1960's, followed quite inevitably by a revulsion when external
events revealed vulnerability. Because of the unique nature of in-
ternational sovereign lending and of the cooperative mechanisms
to deal with the problem collectively, however, the revulsion did
not lead to a great panic or crash, but it has posed a continuing
problem which private and public institutions are now struggling
to resolve. Some kind of crisis, in short, was inevitable. Although
its timing and some of its dimensions have been affected by the
external shocks, the debt problem is the result of colliding struc-
tural changes in Latin American development strategies, the busi-
ness of international lending, and its regulation or lack thereof.
A. The Politics of Latin American Development and The Ideol-
ogy of Growth
Through most of the nineteenth century, the newly independent
Latin American states were socially and politically dominated by
oligarchies derived from the agrarian, landowning class of the colo-
nial period. Socially, most of the countries were authoritarian, elit-
ist, hierarchical, and corporatist."4 The Church, the military, and
the landowners were sharply differentiated from the bulk of the
population and ensconced in power. Although most of the Latin
American states were nominally democracies in the nineteenth
century, political power rested with bureaucracies and executives
74. Major sources for my discussion of Latin American socio-political evolution are D.
Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition 26-33 (1980); Wiarda & Kline, The Latin Ameri-
can Tradition and Process of Development, in Latin American Politics and Development 1
(H. Wiarda & H. Kline eds. 1979).
The basic point of Wiarda and Kline's study is that Latin American society has evolved in
fundamentally different ways from North American society since the seventeenth century.
The following dichotomies, apparent since the seventeenth century, characterize the
contrast:
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that protected the interest of the elites. Economically, the coun-
tries imported manufactured and luxury goods, and exported pri-
mary commodities. Foreign debt was incurred mainly to support
consumption by the elites, major government projects, and military
ventures.
Many of the Latin American states defaulted on their foreign
debts in the 1870's, marking in some ways a convenient starting
point for the present analysis. In the hundred years after 1870, the
main Latin American countries seriously devoted themselves to





















More mobile and multiclass
Scholastic, rote memory, de- Empirical, scientific, induc-
ductive tive
Id. at 23 (Table 2.1).
75. Chart 3 is based in large part on the synthetic socio-political analysis found in T.
Skidmore & P. Smith, Modern Latin America 46-70 (1984) (especially Table 2.1), and G.
Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development (2d ed. 1984).
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Chart 3
































































1. The First Period: 1870's-1930
Change came slowly in the first period. A modest middle class,
consisting of merchants, bureaucrats, and craftsmen, existed in the
Latin American countries in the nineteenth century, but on the
whole it was conservative, dependent on the state, and
nondynamic because it was tied to the agrarian commodity export
economy of the latifundia (large estates). In Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, the old landed wealth and the newer commercial wealth
1985]
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joined forces to produce stable oligarchic rule from 1870 to 1930.
Other countries, most notably Mexico and Venezuela, saw caudi-
llos (military dictators) seize power for long stretches. Both types
of leaders, however, introduced an improved infrastructure and
some industry."6 The purpose was to modernize society, to make it
more like the powerful and wealthy societies to the North. Mod-
ernization was for the most part imported from the United States
and Europe and was both cause and incentive for an expansion of
the countries' basic commodity exports: coffee (Brazil, Colombia),
bananas (Central America), meat and wool (Argentina), and even
guano (Peru). Modernization, in turn, generated new social
forces-including entrepreneurs in both agriculture and industry
and a working class.
The gradual social diversification of the Latin American coun-
tries had some effect on both the politics and economic programs
of those countries. Politically, the middle class upset the oligarchi-
cal, corporatist rule of the nineteenth century but did not
necessarily displace it. That is, the agrarian oligarchs who had long
ruled these countries were not eager to relinquish power to middle-
class coalitions and typically had staunch allies within their respec-
tive military structures. On the other hand, the needs and de-
mands of a larger middle-class and working-class population could
not be lightly ignored. The typical political strategy was co-option
of the middle sectors by the existing government: if the middle
groups would support the oligarchy, government would be in some
measure responsive to their needs.
2. The Second Period: 1930-1960's
The worldwide Depression in the years after 1929 was a major
turning point because it exposed the weaknesses of the oligarchic
policies: as the prices of primary commodities plummeted in the
1930's, opportunities for growth dissipated, and existing oligarchic
regimes were supplanted. Understanding the political, social, and
economic forces waxing during this second period of development
(1930-1960's) is critical to an understanding of the origins of the
debt problem of the 1980's.
Politically, this second period in Latin America was one of crisis
76. On Latin American modernization before 1930, see generally R. Conde, supra note 72;
D. Palmer, supra note 74, at 18-67 (emphasis on Peru, but general analysis of Spanish
America as well).
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and transition away from the relative stability of oligarchical rule,
which had been discredited. 7 There was a political lacuna, filled at
first in some countries (Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela) by en-
trepreneurial middle class democracy, and in other countries (Bra-
zil, Argentina, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Guatemala) by dictators whose state-building efforts
were influenced by modernization aspirations. These moderniza-
tion policies, discussed below, ensured the permanent political sig-
nificance of the entrepreneurial middle class and workers. As Chart
4 illustrates, five corporate elites-the large landowners, the mili-
tary, the Church, the entrepreneurial middle class, and the un-
ions-were the socially and politically relevant ones in the period
after 1930. (The post-1930 socio-political structure is only an ex-
pansion of the ninetenth century hierarchy.) These groups vied for
control of power and policy, but no one group or cluster of groups
was able to preserve lasting domination. As a result, the relative
political stability of oligarchic rule (1870-1930) gave way to insta-
bility after 1930.
77. The discussion in text is based upon tables (developed by Dr. Riordan Roett, Ms.
Stephanie Humbert, Ms. Abby Tabb, and me) which summarize the main political events in
selected Latin American countries. The tables, developed in connection with Roett, The
Foreign Debt Crisis and the Process of Redemocratization in Latin America, in A Dance
Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the International Debt
Problem ch. 9 (W. Eskridge, Jr. ed. 1985) (forthcoming), appear as Appendix C to that book
[hereinafter cited as Latin American Political Tables]. For comparative socio-political anal-
yses of individual countries and the countries as a group, see, eg., G. Wynia, supra note 75;
Wiarda & Kline, supra note 74.
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Source: Wiarda & Kline, The Latin American Traditional Process
of Development, in Latin American Politics and Develop-
ment 32 (H. Wiarda & H. Kline eds. 1979).
Reprinted with permission.
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For most of the Latin American countries, politics during this
second period was cyclical, alternating between populist democracy
and authoritarian (usually military) rule.78 With an established
landowning class, a strong military, and a vigorous entrepreneurial
middle class, Brazil was a classic example of this cycle. 8 Brazil's
oligarchic First Republic lost its legitimacy when its commodity-
export policy was crushed by the worldwide Depression, and it was
overthrown in a military coup led by General Getaflio Vargas, who
ruled as a dictator supported by the new entrepreneurial middle-
class and working-class groups. Vargas himself was overthrown by
a military coup in 1945 but returned to office in the 1950 presiden-
tial elections. Civilian middle-class-oriented presidents governed
from 1955 to 1964, but when the economy faltered in 1961-1964
the military again intervened. The unstable cycle of democracy
and dictatorship also characterized the political systems of Argen-
tina, Peru, Colombia, Venezeula, Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, Hon-
duras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama in the perod 1930 to
1960, although each country followed its own unique pattern of
coping with the tensions among the five or more power groups in
society. 0
Two groups of Latin American countries did not adhere to the
78. In countries following this model, the society is dominated by elites which accept
democratic institutions unless they threaten the elites' vital interests. Elections may be
held, but democratic governments are punctuated by military coups when the government
challenges a vested interest or appears incapable of managing the country. After several
years of authoritarian government, there may be another coup, or new elections may be
held. The alternation of democracy and despotism is the political system. See Huntington,
Will More Countries Become Democratic?, 99 PoL Sci. Q. 193, 210 (1984) (developing cycli-
cal model and arguing that it can pose real obstacles to long-term democratic institutions);
Roett, supra note 77 (applying cyclical model to Latin America).
79. See Latin American Political Tables, supra note 77, Table for Brazil. On Brazil's po-
litical history after 1930, see, e.g., P. Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis (1978); R. Schneider,
The Political System of Brazih Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-
1970 (1971); T. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy
(1967).
80. For a chronology of transitions in the politics of these countries, see Latin American
Political Tables, supra note 77. For historical and political analyses of individual countries,
see, e.g., J. Alexander, Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of Its Politics (1982); R. Dix, Co-
lombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (1967); M. Goldwert, Democracy, Militarism
and Nationalism in Argentina (1972); D. Levine, Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela
(1973); L. Lott, Venezuela and Paraguay: Political Modernity and Tradition in Conflict
(1972); J. Martz, Ecuador Conflicting Political Culture and the Quest for Progress (1972);
D. Palmer, supra note 74 (Peru); P. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Con-
flict Among Political Elites (1974); P. Snow, Political Forces in Argentina (1979); M. Wein-
stein, Uruguay:. The Politics of Failure (1975).
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cyclical model. Mexico and Chile, for example, consolidated and
stabilized their democracies before 1930 and enjoyed free elections
in the second period.81 Mexico was particularly successful, in large
part because its governing party explicitly organized itself around
the major interest groups (agrarian, middle class, union, and mili-
tary). Nicaragua and Paraguay illustrate a different pattern of re-
sponse to the crisis of the 1930's: reactionary dictators remained in
power for decades and stifled political conflict and development.
82
Notwithstanding these exceptional cases, the cyclical model has
generally characterized Latin American politics since 1930 and
contributed to two structural weaknesses in Latin American politi-
cal systems. One weakness has been a lack of permanence in the
governments, which impairs their ability to formulate and execute
long-term policy. Democratically elected leaders are typically not
in power long enough to carry out systematic policy, and the au-
thoritarian governments, even when they cling to power, sooner or
later lose their legitimacy, and hence their ability to make broad
plans for the country. At its extreme, the cyclical model all but
conditions the population to expect a change of government when
things start going wrong.83 Even when a government may imple-
ment a policy, the policy might be changed or abandoned when the
government itself is overthrown.
A second weakness is that "hard decisions"-those requiring
sacrifice by major groups in the country (such as redistribution or
dimunition of property or income)-do not get made. Since all
groups are politically relevant, and no one group is able to hold
power alone for very long, the power groups tend to agree (tacitly)
not to harm the interests of one another.8 4 This system of mutual
81. On Mexico, see J. Hellman, Mexico in Crisis (2d ed. 1983); R. Newell & L. Rublo,
Mexico's Dilemma: The Political Origins of Economic Crisis (1984); L.V. Padgett, The Mex-
ican Political System (1976). On Chile, see B. Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Cap.
italism (1979); B. Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile,
1919-1973 (1976); M. Mamalakis, The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy: From
Independence to Allende (1976); J. Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Develop.
ment (1969); B. Stallings, Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973
(1978).
82. On Nicaragua, see R. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Cre-
ated Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family (1977); T. Walker, Nicaragua:
The Land of Sandino (1981). On Paraguay see L. Lott, supra note 80; G. Pendle, Paraguay:
A Riverside Nation (1956); Wiarda & Kline, supra note 74, at 134-37.
83. See Huntington, supra note 78, at 210.
84. This has been called the "living museum" effect: Before a new group can participate
in the political process, it must show the established elites that it is powerful and is willing
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accommodation among the corporatist powers yields either no pol-
icy (in theory harming no group) or contradictory policies (a group
harmed by one policy will get a trade-off policy that is in its inter-
est)."" Such a system may operate satisfactorily during favorable
times, but not during adversity. The fragility of the government
even under the best of circumstances makes it hazardous to risk
alienating its power base, or intensifying its opposition, by de-
manding unpopular sacrifices. Thus, if the democratic government
makes a hard decision, it stands to lose the next election or to be
overthrown by the military on the edge of the political situation. If
the authoritarian government makes a hard decision, it may lose
its always evanescent legitimacy and fall under renewed pressure
to hold free elections. Even the more stable democracies have had
this second problem. Stability in Mexico under the Revolutionary
Constitution of 1917 has depended upon the ability of the gov-
erning party to accommodate all its constituent interest groups,
which has often resulted in wildly contradictory policies.80 Even a
long-lived democracy such as that of Chile proved vulnerable to
military overthrow in 1973 when President Allende proposed poli-
cies that stimulated intense opposition among the military and
landowning elites."7
Economically, Latin American politics in this second period gen-
erally embraced the middle-class, entrepreneurial philosophy of
growth. Even when they did not actually hold political power, the
middle class was disproportionately influential in matters of policy,
in part because it offered greater competence and efficiency to the
government and in part because the Depression discredited the la-
tifundiaria's (large landowners') development philosophy (export
primary commodities, import manufactured goods). Moreover, the
to respect the rights of already established groups. Thus the power structures will either co-
opt the rising group or repress it. (The third alternative is a genuine social revolution such
as that of Cuba in 1958.) See C. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America:
The Governing of Restless Nations 104 (1967); Wiarda & Kline, supra note 74, at 42.
85. Wiarda & Kline, supra note 74, at 81-82. See generally Schmitter, Military Interven-
tion, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967, in Armies
and Politics in Latin America 113 (A. Lowenthal ed. 1976).
86. See R. Newell & L. Rubio, supra note 81, at 121-26; R. Vernon, The Dilemma of
Mexico's Development 188-93 (1963).
87. Some useful sources on the political and socio-economic forces that contributed to
Allende's overthrow include J. Carriere, Landowners and Politics in Chile: A Study of the
"Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura" 1932-1970 (1981); Allende's Chile (K. Medhurst ed.
1972); Chile 1970-73: Economic Development and Its International Setting (S. Sideri ed.
1979); G. Wynia, supra note 75, at 179-90.
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middle class penetrated both the increasingly "professionalized"
military and the Church, and thus infected these important power
groups with their values of economic growth and long-range plan-
ning."' The "ideology of productive growth" heralded by the en-
trepreneurial middle class posited that (1) the purpose of develop-
ment is to become more like the wealthy economies of the
industrialized countries; (2) Latin American countries will not de-
velop by relying on primary commodities as their chief economic
activity and therefore must diversify into manufacturing activities;
and (3) in order to catch up with the industrialized countries and
ultimately become competitive with them, the Latin American gov-
ernments should stimulate a rapid and decisive growth in their
countries' GDP's.s9 Some of these ideas were not utterly alien to
the old-fashioned oligarchies, which naturally favored any growth
that enriched them and which also wanted to emulate the wealthy
industrial countries. What was most different about the new ap-
proach to development pressed by the entrepreneurial middle class
was the idea that growth requires active government encourage-
ment plus massive inflows of capital for industrial production,
rather than consumption, purposes.
Although the foundations for later growth were laid in the 1930's
and 1940's, the Depression and World War II were dampers on
dramatic Latin American growth. The post-War period was more
auspicious because of the boom in world trade, the creation of in-
ternational financial organs to encourage Third World develop-
ment, and the improvement in the terms of trade for Latin Ameri-
can primary commodities.g0  Specifically, the leading Latin
88. See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text for a case study of this phenomenon.
89. G. Wynia, supra note 75, argues that the 1929 Depression yielded three new develop-
ment strategies in Latin America: (1) "progressive modernization" or industrialization com-
bined with some effort at more equitable income distribution; (2) "conservative moderniza-
tion" or industrialization centered on investment, without any effort at income
redistribution; and (3) "revolutionary socialism." Id. at 111, 128-29 (Table 5.2); see also T.
Skidmore & P. Smith, supra note 75, at 51-64. The first two strategies, or some hybrid of
them, were the only ones actually attempted in the second period (1930-1960's). The third
one, of course, has had some application in the third period (in Cuba, primarily, and the
1970-1973 Allende period in Chile) and is of great theoretical importance. For the purposes
of this Article, however, discussion will focus on the two "modernization" strategies. For
other sources on the Latin American embrace of the ideology of productive growth, see, e.g.,
W. Glade, The Latin American Economies (1969); United Nations, The Economic Develop-
ment of Latin America in the Post-War Period (1964); United Nations, The Process of In-
dustrial Development in Latin America (1966).
90. The typical pattern during this second period was the following:
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American countries underwent substantial economic growth be-
tween 1950 and 1970. Annual real GDP growth of 7% or more was
registered in most years between 1950 and 1970 by the two largest
countries, Mexico91 and Brazil.s2 Venezuela and Peru saw steady
growth rates of between 5% and 6% per year.93 Growth was sub-
stantial, but less even, in Argentina and Chile." The average
growth rate in Latin America during this second period was more
than 5% per year.95
Generally, the middle-class ideology of productive growth was
triumphant after 1950: most of the power groups (whatever their
rhetoric or background) came to accept it, and it worked to yield
1. The middle class became increasingly important in the early twentieth cen-
tury, and the Depression gave them intellectual force by discrediting the oligar-
chy's policies.
2. The Depression was an economic blow to the country, but it also provided
incentives for local industry to develop, potentially a source for new economic
growth opportunities.
3. Between 1945 and 1955, rapid growth based on import substitution began. At
some point in the 1950's, the government moved from encouragement to active
financial involvement in industrial development. Substantial growth then
followed.
For specific country patterns, see L. Allen, Venezuelan Economic Development 103-13
(1977) (very high growth rate 1950-1957; recession 1958-1962; uneven growth 1962-1975;
mounting inflation of government expenditures); M. Mamalakis, supra note 81, at 89-99
(Chile struggled in the period 1930-1955, but after 1955 major growth gains were registered);
L. B. Pereira, Development and Crisis in Brazil, 1930-83, at 15-32 (1984); D. Syvrud, Foun-
dations of Brazilian Economic Growth 12-41 (1974) (ideology of growth dominated govern-
ment policy after 1940's).
91. Gollas, External Debt and Economic Growth: Mexico, in Foreign Debt and Latin
American Economic Development 139, 141 (A. Jorge, J. Salazar-Carillo & R. Higonnet eds.
1983) (Table 1) (Mexico's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.2% in 1954-1955; 6.75
in 1956-1970; 5.3% in 1971-1972). See R. Newell & L. Rubio, supra note 81, at 158 (Graph
VI-1) (Mexico's GDP grew in constant prices at an average annual rate of 6.8% between
1958 and 1970).
92. Baer, The Brazilian Growth and Development Experience: 1964-1975, in Brazil in the
Seventies 41, 47 (R. Roett ed. 1976) (Table 1) (GDP grew 9.3% in 1968, 9.0% in 1969, 9.5%
in 1970, 11.3% in 1971, 10.4% in 1972, and 11.4% in 1973).
93. See G. Wynia, supra note 75, at 200 (Venezuela's GDP grew by an average 5.7o per
year from 1960 to 1975); Schydlowsky & Wicht, The Anatomy of an Economic Failure, in
The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered 94, 95 (C. McClintock & A. Lowenthal eds. 1983)
(Peru's GDP grew by an average 5.4% per year from 1945 to 1966).
94. Chile's average annual growth was 3.7% from 1950 to 1955, 3.9% from 1955 to 1960,
and 5.4% from 1960 to 1965. However, from 1965 on, Chile's growth oscillated, varying from
a high of 6.9% in 1966 to a low of -11.2% in 1975 (a decline in GDP). See M. Mamnalakis,
supra note 81, at 92; Sutton, Structuralism: The Latin American Record and the New Cri-
tique, in The IMF and Stabilisation: Developing Country Experiences 19, 27 (Table 2.1) (T.
Killick ed. 1984).
95. See Schydlowsky & Wicht, supra note 93, at 95.
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high rates of growth. In contrast to a reliance on commodity ex-
ports before 1930, the dynamo that generated the impressive
growth rates was industry. In Brazil, for example, industrial sector
growth rates were about double the growth rates of the agricultural
sector, except during Brazil's recession of 1962-1967.1" A similar
trend can be observed in Mexico.9 7 Obviously, the effect of such
disproportionate rates of growth was that the industrial sector be-
came increasingly important (in the process, of course, making the
entrepreneurial middle class more prominent). Between 1950 and
1970 in both Brazil and Mexico, agriculture's share of GDP de-
clined from one-quarter to one-tenth, while the share of GDP at-
tributable to industrial production increased."'
The primary developmental policy to foster productive growth in
the 1930's to 1950's was "horizontal import substitution," that is,
the replacement of imported manufactured consumer goods with
domestically manufactured consumer goods.9 This was thought to
96. Baer, supra note 92, at 47 (Table 1) (industrial growth rates were 10.3% per annum
for 1956-1962, 3.9% for 1962-1967, 12.85% for 1968-1973; agricultural growth rates in the
same periods were 5.7%, 4.0%, and 5.5%, respectively).
97. Gollas, supra note 91, at 141 (Table 2).
98. Graham, Mexican and Brazilian Economic Development: Legacies, Patterns, and Per-
formance, in Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development 13, 21 (S. Hewlett & R,
Weinert eds. 1984) (Table 3):
Percentage Distribution of GDP
1950 1960 1970
Sector Brazil Mexico Brazil Mexico Brazil Mexico
Agriculture 24.9 22.5 19.2 15.9 10.2 11.6
Industry 26.0 30.4 32.6 29.2 36.3 34.3
Services 49.1 47.1 48.2 54.9 53.5 54.1
99. Luiz Bresser Pereira has shown that import substitution was the basic development
strategy for Brazil between 1930 and 1961, and has generated a model of development based
upon this strategy:
1. The needs of the domestic market, limitations on import capacity (war, tar-
iffs), and governmental stimuli create possibilities for import substitution.
2. The government builds an infrastructure of transportation, communication,
and education.
3. Entrepreneurs take advantage of the import substitution possibilities and
whatever infrastructure the country has and enter into businesses that can dis-
place existing imports.
4. The indigenous import substitution businesses are very successful (high prof-
its). Investment is channeled into sectors offering the highest and most rapid
return on investment-in which a relatively small investment yields large in-
creases in production.
5. Industrial growth attracts more people to the urban areas and produces higher
wages and increased consumption.
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be an easy way to grow rapidly, because internal markets were vir-
tually untapped. Due to low transportation and labor costs, con-
sumer goods could be manufactured more cheaply within the coun-
try in many instances, and resources could be targeted to sectors
where great returns might be expected. The policy of import sub-
stitution was earliest and most firmly embraced by the big coun-
tries in the region-Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico-for they had
large internal markets (i.e., large populations of consumers) that
could sustain substantial domestic industrial production. 00
Smaller countries followed this policy somewhat later and less pur-
posively. For example, while their governments did encourage
some import substitution, Peru, Venezuela, and Chile still relied
on commodity exports for much of their growth into the 1960's.o1
Because of their very small internal markets, Central American
countries did not seriously initiate import substitution efforts until
the 1960's (after formation of a Central American Common
Market).
10 2
3. The Third Period: 1960's-1980's
Import substitution was hardly a panacea, though. Once the
most profitable markets were tapped by domestic industry,
marginal returns began to fall. The result was slower and/or more
erratic growth and, all too often, political crises, with new avenues
of growth explored by the authoritarian governments that took
control. Problems with horizontal import substitution as a mecha-
nism for industrialization helped usher in a third period of growth
in the 1960's. Several examples reveal the diversity of economic
policy responses in this new period.
Brazil's robust growth rate decelerated from 1962 to 1967, and
See L. B. Pereira, supra note 90, at 32-44, 45 (Figure 2.1).
100. See T. Skidmore & P. Smith, supra note 75, at 58 (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina); Gra-
ham, supra note 98, at 22-25 (Brazil followed the most rapid and diverse import substitution
policy in the region in the 1950's; Mexico almost caught up with Brazil in the 1960's).
101. See T. Skidmore & P. Smith, supra note 75, at 117, 118 (Chile: copper in 1956 and
after), 200-02 (commodity exports led growth in Peru); L. Allen, supra note 90, at 13, 177-78
(Venezuela- oil); Cotfer, Democracy and National Integration in Peru, in The Peruvian Ex-
periment Reconsidered 3, 11-15 (C. McClintock & A. Lowenthal eds. 1983) (import substitu-
tion policy in Peru, 1950-1968).
102. The Central American Common Market (CACM) was formed in 1960 "to stimulate
industrial development [by]... promoting free trade among member countries and creat-
ing common tariffs to protect infant industries." T. Skidmore & P. Smith, supra note 75, at
297-98.
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the economy's poor performance triggered a military coup in
1964.13 The military held power from 1964 until March 1985 (the
scheduled transition back to civilian rule), 104 and its central goal
was the maintenance of strong economic growth. To do this, the
military government, in alliance with the technocrats and entrepre-
neurs, shifted Brazil's development approach from horizontal im-
port substitution to vertical import substitution (domestic produc-
tion of capital goods to displace imports) and export expansion. 10
As a result, the growth industries from 1967-1973 were not those
oriented toward the domestic consumption market (clothing, shoes,
foodstuffs), but rather capital goods and export items in which
Brazil had a labor-cost or resource advantage (minerals, metal
products, machinery, electrical equipment, transport equipment,
rubber products, and chemicals). 106 The new export-led model of
development envisioned by the Brazilian government contem-
plated the solidification of a modern productive sector of the econ-
omy which would be fully integrated with international capitalism
and would receive most of the benefits of development; the
marginalized sector would be gradually integrated into the modern
one, though in a subordinate position. 07
103. S. Robock, Brazil: A Study in Development Progress 160 (1973). After 1964, "Brazil
became a technocratic government under military guardianship." Id. at 163. This incident
was representative of a larger phenomenon: the embourgeoisement of the military. After
World War II, an increasing number of military officers came from middle-class back-
grounds (or adopted middle-class points of view). Hence, many of the military coups of the
1960's were inspired by essentially middle-class growth aspirations. See Nun, The Middle
Class Military Coup, in The Politics of Conformity in Latin America 66 (C. Veliz ed. 1967).
104. Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 1985, at Al, col. 5. With the military government's acquies-
cence, opposition leader Tancredo de Alimeda Neves was elected president by a special elec-
toral college on January 15, 1985. Neves is expected to be inaugurated on March 15, 1985, as
Brazil's first civilian president in over two decades.
105. L. B. Pereira, supra note 90, at 152-58. See also S. Robock, supra note 103, at 111-15.
106. See Baer, supra note 92, at 48 (Table 2); Cline, Brazil's Emerging International Eco-
nomic Role, in Brazil in the Seventies 63, 64-65 (R. Roett ed. 1976) (placing the shift to
export expansion in 1967-1968).
107. Luiz Bresser Pereira has generated a model of development based upon Brazil's
post-1967 strategy:
1. The limits of horizontal import substitution are reached with resulting lower
growth rates. An alliance of the entrepreneurial middle class, government tech-
nocrats, and/or the military takes over the government and shifts the direction
of economic development policy.
2. The economy is increasingly integrated with that of international capitalism.
There is more emphasis on producing manufactured goods for export to indus-
trial and other countries. Greater production of capital goods may reduce some
imports as well.
3. The government works to modernize the country's infrastructure further. In-
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The establishment of an authoritarian government was not
unique to Brazil in this third period. Authoritarian military gov-
ernments replaced democratic ones in Argentina in 1966 and 1976,
in Peru and Panama in 1968, in Ecuador and Honduras in 1972,
and in Chile and Uruguay in 1973, in most instances justifying mil-
itary control as a means of redirecting the country's economic pol-
icy to improve economic growth.108
After substantial, albeit irregular, growth in the 1960's, Chile
under the Allende government (1970-1973) experimented with a
socialist approach to development, including redistribution of land
and nationalization of major industries. In the short term, these
policies produced economic chaos and problems, thereby triggering
the military coup of 1973. With mixed success, the military govern-
ment sought to achieve high growth rates in the 1970's by opening
the economy to foreign investment, which was intended to stimu-
late export industries. 109 Peru, like Chile and Brazil, had sluggish
growth in the early 1960's, and the lack of suitable economic direc-
tion was one justification for the military coup by General Velasco
in 1968.110 The Velasco government, while authoritarian, followed
policies of redistribution and nationalization akin to those of Al-
lende rather than those of General Pinochet, Allende's successor.
Although the third period of Latin American development has
been a time of political and economic experimentation, the funda-
mental structures in Latin America have not changed much from
the seminal second period. Politics still tends to be cyclical. Al-
though the authoritarian governments have been able to hold
power longer, most were replaced with democratic governments be-
tween 1979 and February 1985.111 Additionally, hard decisions are
still finessed, and regimes are still devoted to economic growth as a
vestment by multinational enterprises is welcomed, especially so that the coun-
try can have access to modern technology needed to make its goods competitive.
4. The government favors the upper classes, in part because of the need for more
investment funds. The theory is that some of the growth will ultimately "trickle
down" to the lower classes.
See L. B. Pereira, supra note 90, at 152-58.
108. See Roett, supra note 77; Latin American Political Tables, supra note 77.
109. See Foxley, Towards a Free Market Economy:. Chile 1974-1979, in The Political
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment 397 (C. Wilber ed. 1984).
110. See P.-P. Kuczynski, Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress: An Account of
the Belafinde Administration, 1963-1968 (1977). See also Manifesto of the Revolutionary
Government of Peru-1968, in The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America
208 (B. Loveman & T. Davies, Jr. eds. 1978).
111. See Latin American Political Tables, supra note 77:
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means of satisfying all the relevant interest groups as well as main-
taining order and authority.
An integral part of the middle-class ideology of productive
growth that has dominated policy since 1930 is the idea that capi-
tal is critical to rapid development and that the annual rate of pri-
vate domestic capital formation is insufficient to achieve the level
of growth desired. Hence, the capital for development must come
from somewhere else.
Latin American governments themselves have been one major
source of investment capital, through subsidization to favored in-
dustries, capitalization of state-owned trading and manufacturing
enterprises, and creation of an infrastructure (roads, communica-
tions, and education) capable of sustaining modernizing growth.
The Brazilian and Mexican governments own about half of the
capitalized value of their respective countries' fifty largest firms.1 12
Brazil's state sector has been particularly active, dominating some
of the main export industries and doubling its share of the GDP
between 1947 and 1973.11' Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, and Colom-
bia also have stressed the role of government expenditures and












112. See Graham, supra note 98, at 31-33 (Table 7):






















Mexico 34 45 21
Brazil 35 33 32
113.' See Baer, supra note 92, at 51.
114. See Sheahan, The Economics of the Peruvian Experiment in Comparative Perspec-
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under military rule has moved away from state financial involve-
ment in the economy.
Latin American planners have generally assumed that govern-
ment capital was insufficient to stimulate the growth they de-
sired-external sources of capital were needed. Foreign direct in-
vestment was the main source of external capital in the second
period (through the 1960's). For example, 49% of the sales volume
of Brazil's top 1000 nonfinancial firms in 1974 could be attributed
to firms owned or controlled by foreign multinational corporations;
Peru in 1969 saw foreign-controlled subsidiaries account for 69%
of sales; comparable figures for Mexico and Argentina for 1972
were 27% and 31%, respectively.11 5 Foreign control was even more
pronounced in industries geared mainly for exports, such as the
rubber, machinery, and chemicals industries. In Jamaica, for exam-
ple, direct foreign investment accounted for one-third of the total
investment in the period 1953-1972 but was overwhelmingly im-
portant for the development of the bauxite industry in that same
period.11 6 Overall for Spanish Latin America, U.S. investment in
1970 was 1.18 times the total domestic governmental revenues of
these countries.117 Between 1950 and 1966, foreign direct invest-
ment was the main external source of development capital in Latin
America.""
A third source of capital for Latin American development was
external indebtedness. It was widely assumed that development
would entail current account deficits, as capital goods were im-
ported and expensive infrastructural investments were undertaken.
Those deficits were financed by foreign indebtedness.1 8 A great
1983).
115. See J. L. Reiffers, Transnational Corporations and Endogenous Development: Ef-
fects on Culture, Communication, Education, and Science and Technology 23-24 (1982).
116. See Bernal, Economic Growth and External Debt of Jamaica, in Foreign Debt and
Latin American Economic Development 89, 91 (A. Jorge, J. Salazar-Carillo & R. Higonnet
eds. 1983) (Table 1).
117. See Appendix, Table 7.
118. Fishlow, Latin America's Debt: Problem or Solution, Colum. J. World Bus., Spring
1982, at 35, 36.
119. Susan Strange has repeatedly asserted: "A political economy has two ways to grow:.
by direction and by debt." The former would require the preemption of immediate con-
sumption in favor of long-term capital investments leading to a centrally planned economy.
Strange, Debt and Default in the International Political Economy, in Debt and the Less
Developed Countries 7, 8 (J. Aronson ed. 1979). For earlier standard authorities preaching
the same gospel, see, e.g., C. Kindleberger, Economic Development 198-200, 233-40 (2d ed.
1965); P. Samuelson, Economics 636-40 (7th ed. 1967).
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deal of Brazil's "economic miracle" after 1967 was fueled by exter-
nal debt, which quadrupled between 1968 and 1973; in 1970, the
overall ratio of external debt to total exports was a virtually un-
precedented 150% .12o In Spanish Latin America, the overall ratio
of external debt to total exports increased from 41% in 1950 to
115% in 1970.121 By the early 1970's, external indebtedness had
surpassed direct foreign investment as the main source of capital
in most of these countries.
1 22
Thus, even before 1973, Latin American debt was increasing sig-
nificantly. Given the social, political, and economic policy struc-
tures described above, it is easy to see why Latin American politi-
cal leaders after 1973 quite naturally responded to external shocks
by increasing indebtedness rather than by adopting other policies.
Horizontal import substitution could produce only limited reduc-
tions in the payment deficits, because the most likely domestic
markets were already localized. (Recall that this is the reason such
policies were partially abandoned in the 1960's.) Export growth re-
quired further capital investment in imported technology, compo-
nents, and materials, and thus further debt. Increasing public sec-
tor deficits would have been intolerable because of the inflationary
pressures of such a move. The only viable alternative to con-
tracting more debt, therefore, was to cut back on the growth rate.
And that the governments were generally not willing to do: twenty
to thirty years of growth exercised an enormous gravitational force
on decisionmaking. Growth was the government's raison d'9tre,
and its cessation might prove to be its coup de grace. Fragile gov-
ernments could please most of the power groups so long as the pie
was expanding (unions and the middle class could gain without pe-
nalizing the landowners), but once the pie started to stagnate or
shrink, political sacrifices by important groups were all but inevita-
ble. In other words, given the socio-political dynamics, govern-
ments could safely make distributional decisions (which groups
will receive added income), but not redistributional decisions
120. L. B. Pereira, supra note 90, at 170-72. Note, though, that debt as a fraction of GDP
actually declined in 1971-1973 (due to the large growth rate, which offset the increase in
debt). Id. at 173 (Table 8.5). See also Wellons, Brazil: Financing the Miracle, in P. Wellons,
World Money and Credit: The Crisis and Its Causes 3, 15 (1983) (Brazil was better off due
to external borrowings).
121. See Appendix, Table 9.
122. See Graham, supra note 98, at 28 (Table 6) (foreign debt was 1.04 times direct for-
eign investment in 1967 for Mexico, 2.51 in 1975; for Brazil, 0.95 in 1967, 1.50 in 1975).
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(which groups will be penalized so that the debt can be brought
under control).
Different countries responded in different ways, but generally
they followed this pattern of debt expansion. The authoritarian re-
gimes in Brazil and Peru, for example, pursued middle-class, tech-
nocratic goals (particularly growth) and saw themselves as engines
of more effective development. Rather than curtail that
growth-and antagonize unions and entrepreneurs-they increased
their external indebtedness more than sixfold. The authoritarian
regimes in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, less "liberal" than those
of Brazil and Peru, expanded their external debt sixfold to placate
their contending interest groups, the most important perhaps be-
ing the military (which in the case of Argentina fought a war).
From 1970 to 1982, the democratically elected governments of
Mexico explicitly followed a policy of continuing growth as well as
improving the lot of the poor, which entailed large increases in
government deficits, as well as a ninefold increase in external debt.
Venezuela, which (like Mexico) became a leading oil exporter, fol-
lowed a similar policy, grounded upon the hope that oil wealth
would keep the pie expanding. Whatever the actual form of gov-
ernment, most Latin American countries consciously followed the
path of least political resistance: rather than force important
groups to make present sacrifices, the governments borrowed a lot
of money. It is hard to imagine their following any other policy in
response to the post-1973 external shocks.
B. The Decline of the Bretton Woods System: The Reemergence
of Uncontrolled Private International Lending
Of course, no matter how much Latin American (and other)
countries might have wanted to finance enormous current account
deficits through external borrowing in the 1970's, they could not
have done so if potential lenders had been unprepared to lend un-
precedented sums of money. The currently fashionable explanation
for the large-scale lending of the 1970's is that private commercial
banks had enormous amounts of money on deposit from the OPEC
countries, creating hydraulic pressures on them to lend that
money-and NODC's were the only available borrowers for loans
of that magnitude. What is often overlooked is that the banks ea-
gerly solicited the OPEC deposits, apparently believing that loans
to NODC's were not only acceptable but indeed very profitable
lending opportunities. The banks knew what they were doing, yet
1985]
HeinOnline  -- 25 Va. J. Int'l L. 327 1984-1985
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
they apparently overextended themselves in their haste to attract
OPEC petrodollars and then to lend those funds to NODC's, ex-
pecially in Latin America. Two additional structural phenomena
explain the eagerness of banks to overextend themselves.
The first structural factor is the Minsky-Kindleberger theory of
manias and panics, which historically has been applicable to inter-
national sovereign lending.123 After an external political or eco-
nomic shock (a "displacement"), there will be an increase in specu-
lative activity in which certain investments are thought by some to
be superprofitable in the period of uncertainty.124 Others join in
this activity, creating a "mania" of speculation, fueled by a collec-
tive "euphoria," or unjustified herd-like optimism about the in-
vestment opportunity (increased speculation does, indeed, make
the activity profitable in the short term).125 When the speculation
bottoms out, there is a period of uncertainty ("distress"), followed
sooner or later by a "revulsion" against the speculative activity and





The mania-and-panic cycle characterized international sovereign
lending, especially to Latin American countries, in the nineteenth
century through the 1920's, and was repeated after the 1960's. The
displacement was inflation caused by U.S. deficits and the OPEC
price increases; the mania was euphoric private bank lending to
NODC's (especially in Latin America); distress and revulsion fi-
nally came in 1982, when everyone realized that the loans could
not be repaid. This section, which will explore the structural com-
ponents of the mania-and-panic cycle in more detail, will also ex-
plain why the cycle revived in the 1960's after a 35-year hiatus. A
critical reason for the hiatus was the Bretton Woods system of con-
trolled international finance and, under it, the relatively minor role
of private lenders in international sovereign borrowing after World
War II.
The decline of the Bretton Woods system and the reemergence
123. C. Kindleberger, supra note 71, at 15-24; see also C. Kindleberger, Debt Situation of
the Developing Countries in Historical Perspective, in Financing and Risk in Developing
Countries 3 (S. Goodman ed. 1978); Aronson, The Politics of Private Bank Lending and
Debt Renegotiations, in Debt and the Less Developed Countries 283, 283-84 (J. Aronson ed.
1979).
124. C. Kindleberger, supra note 71, at 41-45.
125. Id. at 45-49. In this period, money will be created to fuel the flames of speculation,
id. at 52-54, and swindles are likely to occur, as the speculating frenzy increases business
greed and insecurity. Id. at 78-96.
126. Id. at 107-15.
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of private institutions in international sovereign finance is the sec-
ond structural factor leading to the large volume of sovereign loans
after the 1960's. The 1930's, when many developing countries had
defaulted on their international loan obligations and industrial
countries adopted protectionist measures which all but killed
world trade, taught the world financial community a lesson. The
end of World War JI provided an opportunity to do something
about that lesson, and the result was the Bretton Woods system,
whose purpose was to provide a stable international monetary and
trade climate, with the United States as the guarantor of interna-
tional economic stability. 127 Thus the Bretton Woods system pos-
ited that the dollar (fully redeemable in gold) would replace gold
as the ultimate standard of value, and that other currencies would
have fixed exchange rates pegged to the dollar. The IMF was es-
tablished to regulate currency exchange rates (and approve
changes in the rates if a country was chronically in balance-of-pay-
ments deficit) and to provide access to credit to allow countries to
adjust to short-term economic difficulties. The World Bank was es-
tablished to make loans to countries, enabling them to make in-
frastructural improvements. A corollary to Bretton Woods was
that the United States would provide foreign aid and loans, first to
Europe under the Marshall Plan and then to underdeveloped
countries, to help the world economy recover from World War
]1.128
In most respects, the Bretton Woods system provided a worka-
ble world financial environment for economic development. Inter-
national trade flourished, creating a supply of capital goods to de-
veloping countries and a market for their exports. Foreign direct
investment also flourished, providing technology, know-how, and
capital for industrial development. And, not least important, de-
veloping countries seeking to borrow money could obtain funds
from the IMF to smooth over trade imbalances, from the World
Bank to fund development and infrastructural projects, and from
Western governments (especially the United States) to finance im-
127. A useful summary of the creation, rise, and fall of the Bretton Woods system can be
found in M. Moffitt, The World's Money. International Banking from Bretton Woods to the
Brink of Insolvency 13-40 (1983). See also J. Aronson, Money and Power Banks and the
World Monetary System (1977).
128. For a history and critical evaluation of the Marshall Plan, see generally H. Price,
The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (1955).
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ports and some development projects.129
Official international lenders, moreover, made the loans for long
terms and at concessionary interest rates. The disadvantages of of-
ficial loans were that the lenders often attached conditions (the
IMF insisted on measures to redress poor trade balances, for exam-
ple) and did not have unlimited monies to lend. But these "disad-
vantages" had some positive effect as well: a structural bias in
favor of underlending may have been useful, because the ideology
of productive growth, so fervently embraced by developing coun-
tries, and the weaknesses of their political systems (especially in
Latin America) made them all too prone to overborrow if they
were not so constrained. Indeed, from 1956 to 1979, notwithstand-
ing the bias of underlending, developing countries regularly con-
fessed inability to service their debts, and their official creditors
(typically under the auspices of the Paris Club) 130 would restruc-
ture the debt so that it could be serviced.'31
The Bretton Woods arrangement in large part unravelled in the
1960's, and its demise set the stage for a new mania of lending to
NODC's. First, the United States partially withdrew as the guaran-
tor of world trade.132 Its own balance-of-payments deficits, which
helped to fuel the 25-year post-War boom, led to a flow of dollars
abroad and exposed U.S. gold reserves to instant depletion. Thus
President Nixon, on August 15, 1971, renounced gold convertibil-
ity, thereby allowing the dollar's value to be determined by market
forces. Although currencies of many developing countries contin-
ued to be pegged to the dollar, other currencies floated; in neither
case was the IMF able to enforce exchange rate discipline as it had
done in the past. As a result, countries had greater freedom to
maintain overvalued currencies (the exchange rate against other
currencies is higher than its purchasing power indicates), which ar-
129. The roles of the IMF and the World Bank are described in R. Ayres, Banking of the
Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty (1983); J. Williamson, The Lending Policies of
the International Montary Fund (1982).
130. The Paris Club was the most prominent among several deliberately noninstitutional
groups of industrialized country representatives. These government representatives began in
the 1950's to negotiate some relief of "official" debt. D. Delamaide, supra note 20, at 133-34;
see also Rieffel, The Paris Club, 1978-1983, 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 83 (1984).
131. See I. Friedman, supra note 18, at 110 (Table 7.1) (listing 59 multilateral debt rene-
gotiations of developing countries with official creditors).
132. See generally D. Delamaide, supra note 20, at 38-40; M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at
29-40 (tracing process by which the burdens on the United States imposed by the Bretton
Woods system became too great in the period 1960-1971).
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tificially stimulated imports for individual countries and hurt their
export positions (exports being relatively expensive). So, too, they
felt less constrained about maintaining a reasonable balance of
payments.' 33 The post-Bretton Woods era has been characterized
by
a lack of any form of cooperation or coordination in ex-
change rate or monetary policies on a global scale. The
floating system itself could not have been expected to of-
fer an automatic mechanism to correct imbalances and
instabilities resulting from independent, uncoordinated
policies motivated solely by national self-interests."3
Without external constraints on their balance-of-payments deficits
and exchange rates, NODC's were more free to continue payments
deficits and to overvalue currencies-policies that ultimately im-
pelled them to seek huge foreign loans.
Second, by the end of the 1960's, the official lenders were being
supplanted by private commercial banks as the main source of de-
velopment loans. Reasons for this include the failure of official
lending's supply of funds to keep pace with the inflation of the
1960's and the growth of private international banking institutions.
After a 20-year hibernation, private international banking showed
signs of revival in the 1950's, as U.S. banks opened overseas
branches so that they could serve the global financial needs of
their multinational corporate clients. 135 Moreover, in 1963, the U.S.
government created an incentive for greater use of foreign
branches when it created the Interest Equalization Tax on foreign
borrowing from U.S. banks. 3 6 The tax did not apply to bonds is-
sued abroad by branch offices of U.S. banks. This, together with
the 1965 Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program (creating
voluntary ceilings on bank loans to foreign entities) and the Office
for Foreign Direct Investment Guidelines (preventing multina-
tional corporations from sending too much money to their foreign
133. See M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 101-04.
134. Preface, Floating Exchange Rates and the State of World Trade Payments xv (D.
Bigman & T. Taya eds. 1984); see also Agmon, Hawkins & Levich, Introduction, in The
Future of the International Monetary System 1, 2-3 (T. Agmon, R. Hawkins & R. Levich
eds. 1983).
135. M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 43-44.
136. Interest Equalization Tax of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88.563, 78 Stat. 809 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
1985]
HeinOnline  -- 25 Va. J. Int'l L. 331 1984-1985
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:2
subsidiaries), generated an explosion of overseas branches. 13 7 The
number of foreign branches of U.S. banks almost quadrupled be-
tween 1965 and 1974.138 Foreign loans as a portion of total U.S.
bank loans increased from 3% in 1960 to 15% in 1972.139
The "Euromarket" was the result of this flow of U.S. bank assets
abroad: "Eurodollars" (or U.S. currency abroad) were freely and
continuously exchanged, placed on loan, and invested through the
London and other exchanges. Branches of U.S. and Japanese
banks joined European banks in putting together enormous syndi-
cated loan packages to sovereign and commercial borrowers around
the world. A typical $10 million loan could be for a medium term
(seven to twelve years), with risks to be limited by participation of
several banks in the loan and by periodic rollovers of the loan
every six months (at prevailing interest rates). 40 Most of the
NODC sovereign loans were made on the Euromarket after 1970,
and (due in part to infusions of OPEC country deposits after 1973)
the Euromarket's growth enabled it to meet developing countries'
demands for credit."4' Well before the OPEC price increases of
1973, there was what Michael Moffitt terms a "global money mar-
ket, ' 142 whose goals dovetailed almost perfectly with those of de-
137. See M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 47.
138. In 1965, thirteen U.S. banks with gross assets of $8.9 billion had foreign branches in
211 locations. By 1974, 125 banks with gross assets of $140.5 billion had 732 branches. See
Appendix, Table 8.
139. M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 50.
140. See D. Delamaide, supra note 20, at 40-43.
141. The Eurodollar market grew at a compound annual rate of 37% between 1965 and
1971, in large part because of the tax incentives for keeping dollars abroad. See supra notes
136-137 and accompanying text. According to Wellons, International Banks and Balance of
Payments Finance in the Mid-1970's, in P. Wellons, supra note 120, at 23, 59 (Table A), the
Eurodollar market reached the following levels after 1971:
Eurodollar Market












142. M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 41.
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veloping countries: the latter wanted to borrow a lot of money, and
the former very much wanted to lend it.
While it is true that there would have been pressure on the large
international banks to recycle petrodollars through loans to
NODC's, that does not explain the banks' eagerness to attract pe-
trodollar deposits and then place them on loan to NODC's. Nor
does it explain the banks' continued enthusiasm for sovereign
lending after 1979. Indeed, this enthusiasm for what are now seen
as risky loans seems to be at odds with the widely held view that
bankers are risk averse. 143 The "mania" (using the Minsky-Kin-
dleberger term) of NODC, and especially Latin American, loans
was in retrospect mildly irrational. The hypothesis suggested here
is that bankers as a group shared a "mentality of expansion" that
justified large-scale lending, which appears unreasonable only in
light of subsequently understood facts. That mentality can be ex-
plained by reference to three structural themes.
1. The Allure of Short-Term Profits, and the Lemming
Phenomenon
Institutions do not make loan decisions. Their officers, influ-
enced by their own career goals and objectives, make those deci-
sions. Once U.S. banks had established so many foreign branches
(originally to service their clients, and subsequently to avoid
taxes), the officers in charge of them were under some pressure to
justify the investment by generating loans. If a banker heading up
a foreign branch office did not make loans, that banker's career
went nowhere, and in the early 1970's the old multinational corpo-
rate customers were not generating as many loans as they did pre-
viously. The successful Eurobanker was the one who-like Walter
Wriston-made loans one day and worried about the consequences
the next.'4 - If private (corporate) demand slackened but foreign
143. See Schirano, supra note 22; White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property
Security, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 495-97 (1984). But see Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of
Secured Debt, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1051, 1062-65 (1984), who argues that because the risk
preferences of lending officers will be neutralized by the banks' managers, banks are risk
neutral This mechanism was not operative during the mania period, however, because of
the allure of short-term profits and the indistinct nature of the long-term risks.
144. Wriston, who built Citibank into the world's most aggressive bank, epitomized the
new breed of international bankers. See M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 56. For these interna-
tional bankers:
[T]he name of the game was growth. Once banks had expansive foreign
branches, the officers who ran them had to generate enough business to justify
19851
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sovereign demand was strong, the sovereign loans were made.
In the short term, these loans were quite profitable. Banks typi-
cally charged several up-front fees: a "commitment fee" for com-
mitting funds to the borrower; various "servicing" or "manage-
ment" fees; and, if the bank put together a loan package for a
group of banks, a "syndication" fee. Moreover, the interest rates
on these loans were usually one or two points above LIBOR. Noth-
ing advances a banker's career like short-term profits, and the
more foreign sovereign loans made, the greater the profits. In 1970,
the profits of Chase Manhattan Bank included $108 million from
domestic loans, $31 million from foreign loans; in 1976 the figures
were $23 million and $108 million, respectively. Other banks
showed similarly impressive earnings figures.'" Because large-scale
banking is both fiercely competitive and closely knit (everyone
knows everyone else), good profits from international lending for
one bank created a "lemming" phenomenon: If Citibank and Chase
Manhattan were making a lot of money on loans to Latin America,
other banks would be left behind if they did not make loans there
as well. Walter Wriston was the lemmings' guru. Much of the ex-
pansion was thus defensive in nature. 4"
the costs of going global .... For Eurobankers, the emphasis on growth comple-
mented their career objectives nicely. A rapid increase in lending and borrowing
was the way to advance careers and reach the pinnacle of top management.
Id. at 55. See also D. Delamaide, supra note 20, at 34-37.
145. M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 52 (Table 1) (specific profit figures for top ten mul.
tinational banks, broken down into domestic and international segments). International
earnings as a percentage of total earnings for the top ten U.S. multinational banks were as
follows:
Domestic International Compound annual rate
(millions of dollars) of change, 1970-76
1970 1976 1970 1976 Domestic Int'l
Citicorp 87.1 112.0 58.0 293.0 4.3% 31.0%
Bank of America 141.5 201.5 25.0 134.4 6.1 32.4
J.P. Morgan 77.1 95.3 25.5 107.4 3.6 27.1
Chase Manhattan 108.6 23.0 30.7 82.0 -22.8 17.8
Manufacturers Hanover 76.0 63.1 11.4 80.2 -3.1 38.4
Chemical 70.2 51.7 7.7 41.0 -5.0 32.1
Bankers Trust 46.3 20.7 7.8 36.9 -12.6 29.6
Continental Illinois 64.4 101.0 -0.1 30.0 7.8 n.a.
First Chicago 61.0 77.1 1.2 15.8 4.0 53.7
Security Pacific 57.4 71.0 0.2 5.3 3.6 72.7
Total 789.6 817.3 167.4 826.0 -1.4% 33.4%
Id. at 53 (Table 2).
146. See id. at 93-98 (reasons for expansionist philosophy: (a) defensive expansion to re-
tain clients; (b) contribution to current earnings; (c) servicing multinational client needs; (d)
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2. Failure to Appreciate Country Risk
The initially favorable profits were not completely accurate indi-
cia of the true value of these loans. Once banks started making
international sovereign loans again, they could naturally obtain
higher-than-market interest rates and up-front fees which im-
proved immediate and short-term earnings, but there were serious
long-term risks involved. These risks included not only the ordi-
nary risks inherent in domestic lending, but also "country risk."
Country risk is "the possibility that sovereign borrowers of a
particular country may be unable or unwilling, and other borrow-
ers unable, to fulfill their foreign obligations for reasons beyond
the usual risks which arise in relation to all lending." 147 Obviously,
because of the increased riskiness of these sovereign loans, banks
have substantial incentives to monitor sovereign loans and to en-
sure that they not become overcommitted to particular sovereign
borrowers. It is therefore surprising to learn that few banks did
country risk analyses of loans to developing countries and their en-
terprises. It is all the more surprising that the loans were not
monitored more carefully, for banks were lending large sums of
money to borrowers who (1) were putting up no collateral, (2) were
subject to no bank control of the specific use of the funds, and (3)
were (apparently) free to borrow as much money as they wished
from other sources as well.148 In the domestic lending markets, it is
unusual to find such failure to appreciate a substantial risk. Three
reasons contributed to this underestimation of risk in international
sovereign lending during the mania period. Two of the reasons re-
present banker misperceptions; the third has some validity but
represents a tendency of Western private banking systems to im-
pose costs on the public.
One reason for underestimating country risk is that the decision-
making and information-gathering structures of banks in the
1970's were biased. One bias was partial blindness to the historical
problems with international sovereign lending. The bank managers
of the 1970's were not around in the 1930's, when the Latin Ameri-
can countries had last defaulted on their external debts, and even
opportunities of the Euromarket); Schirano, supra note 22 (herd-like instincts of bankers
caused them to make sovereign loans).
147. Group of Thirty, Risks in International Bank Lending 6 n.3 (1982).
148. See International Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 3, at 381, 392 ff. (state-
ment of Richard Dale, Brookings Inst.) (explaining risk in loans to foreign sovereigns).
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the largest banks had very little experience in this area until the
1960's. The facts that confronted bankers in the 1970's suggested
less risk: the leading Latin American borrowers had been growing
vigorously for ten to twenty years, and there seemed to be every
prospect that they would continue to do so. Decisions, including
review and monitoring of loan decisions, may reflect an "availabil-
ity heuristic": people are more sensitive to vivid current news than
to historical patterns because the former makes more of an impres-
sion (and hence is more likely to dominate a present considera-
tion).149 The vivid, readily available current information may then
be overgeneralized, as decisionmakers often assume that current
information is representative of the relevant data (the "representa-
tiveness heuristic").1 °0 The future will probably resemble the pre-
sent. For these reasons, a bank manager defending a decision to
lend a lot of money to Brazil and Mexico in 1974 or even 1980 was
far more persuasive than one arguing that in the 1930's those coun-
tries had defaulted, because the recent "hard" data (summarized
in charts and graphs) supported the first banker.
A second type of bias relates to the way in which the banks gath-
ered and processed information. There was very little readily avail-
able information in the 1970's about Latin American patterns of
debt, due to haphazard accounting by the debtor countries and a
lack of cooperation among the lenders. Even when the data was
available, its importance was not fully appreciated. Once large
volumes of loans were made to these countries, "cognitive disso-
nance" among the decisionmakers biased their analyses of later
loan requests by overemphasizing good news about foreign sover-
eign lending and by underappreciating the doubts and risks." 1 In
149. See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inferences: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgment 45-60 (1980); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics &
biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974), reprinted in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases 3 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); see also J. March & H. Simon,
Organizations (1958) (institutions and companies are subject to many of the same decision-
making biases as individuals are).
150. See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 149, at 17-28, 37-42; Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 149, at 4-11. Experimental results show that decisionmakers do generally believe
in the (erroneous) "law of small numbers"-that a small sample will yield representative
results. This mistaken belief causes decisionmakers to have unrealistic expectations about
the stability of observed patterns and the replicability of prior beneficial experiences. Tver-
sky & Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 2 Psych. Bull. 105 (1971), reprinted
in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 23 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A.
Tversky eds. 1982).
151. According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, once a decisionmaker becomes even
[Vol. 25:2
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short, to deny later loan requests might suggest questions about
earlier decisions, and bankers were generally unwilling to face
those questions. These psychological mechanisms explain why the
euphoria of this mania period was, for a time, almost self-
regenerating.
A second reason for the failure of banks to appreciate country
risk was that they believed that diversification of loans among dif-
ferent countries would spread the risk of default, based upon the
conventional view that economic performance of borrowers in dif-
ferent countries is subject to divergent risks. 1 2 Yet this view ig-
nored the experience of the 1930's, when a worldwide depression
affected sovereign loan repayments in a wide range of countries.
While some external global events would affect some countries and
not others, a great many events-such as higher oil prices, reces-
sion, and interest rate increases-would affect most countries simi-
larly. The amount of systematic, or nondiversifiable, risk in inter-
national lending was apparently underestimated by bankers.
Moreover, to the extent that country risk can be managed by geo-
graphical diversification, the banks failed to follow a legitimate di-
versification policy, for they concentrated most of their loans in
similarly situated Latin American states.
1 3
A third reason banks did not worry much about country risk was
that they assumed that there were political checks on default: the
developing country would not default because that would exclude
it from future loans essential to its development, and even if there
were a default, the U.S. government would step in and rescue the
banks. 1' Such an assumption may also be subject to some ques-
tion, for Latin American countries had frequently defaulted on
tentatively committed to a decision, he will tend to view subsequent evidence as more sup-
portive of the decision than it really is and will tend to avoid or denigrate nonsupportive
evidence. See L. Festinger, Conflict, Decision and Dissonance (1964); L Janis & L. Mann,
Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment 171-72,
213-14 (1977) (amending the original Festinger analysis).
152. See Folkerts-Landau, The Regulatory Origins of the International Debt Crisis, The
Banker's Magazine, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 44; . Dale & R. Mattione, Managing Global Debt
23-24 (Brookings Inst. Staff Paper 1984); Goodman, Bank Lending to LDC's: Are Risks
Diversifiable?, Fed Res. Bank N.Y.Q. Rev., Summer 1981, at 10; Walter, Country Risk,
Portfolio Decisions and Regulation in International Bank Lending, J. Banking & Fin., Mar.
1981, at 77.
153. Minority Staff, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Global Debt
and International Financial Stability, in International Financial Markets Hearings, supra
note 3, at 137, 144-46 [hereinafter cited as Minority Staff Report on Global Debt].
154. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 152, at 44.
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loans in the nineteenth century and then returned to the interna-
tional funds market within a short time. (Indeed, historically,
countries often do behave in ways contrary to their long-term self-
interest.) Also, the banks may not have appreciated the political
hostility in Congress to any kind of "bail-out" of the banks.,, Fi-
nally, recent econometric studies suggest that it is in the borrowing
country's self-interest to default when the debt-servicing burden
becomes too high, even though default would exclude the country
from international money markets.15
Nevertheless, because of the unique public importance of the
large international banks, it was probably a valid assumption that
political checks would tend to prevent a series of defaults whose
costs would be borne entirely by banks. On the one hand, because
of their commitment to development and their reliance on foreign
capital to achieve it, Latin American countries would be loathe to
force an outright schism with the banks, which were the main
source of past and future external capital. On the other hand, na-
tional regulators would view the survival and prosperity of the
large international banks as an important public policy and might
step in with remedial measures, for any major bank failures could
trigger a financial panic. 58 To a certain extent, then, the banks'
cocky political optimism may have been perceptive, though hardly
justified in a larger policy sense.
155. For example, when Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker appeared before the House
of Representatives in 1983 to urge regulatory cooperation in working out the problems with
foreign sovereign loans, he was peppered with hostile questions and attacks against using
any tax dollars to assist the banks in their restructures. One congressman noted: "One of the
most difficult questions . . . [is] why the banks loaned the money. If the banks make a
profit, they don't share it with the taxpayers. Why should the taxpayers share in their
losses?" International Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 3, at 94 (remark of Rep. Wy-
lie); see id. at 119-21 (remarks of Rep. Frank) (questioning whether the U.S. government
should rescue banks from the consequences of uncollectable loans overseas); id. at 90-91
(remarks of Rep. St. Germain, Chair, House Banking Comm.) (questioning whether Con-
gress should be more concerned about banks and their foreign borrowers than about U.S.
farmers, small businessmen, and homebuyers); id. at 98-99 (remarks of Rep. McKinney,
Ranking Republican, House Banking Comm.) (questioning whether banks can have both
deregulation and government support in the event of investment/lending failure).
156. See Eaton & Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 48 Rev. Econ. Stud. 289 (1981); J. Sachs, LDC Debt in the 1980's: Risk and Re-
forms (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 861, Feb. 1982).
157. See Wellons, Business-Government Relations in International Bank Lending: The
Debt Crisis, in A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the
International Debt Problems ch. 6 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming).
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3. Lack of Regulatory Constraints
The decline of the Bretton Woods system and the phenomenal
growth of private international money centers resulted in an inter-
national financial system that was, in Michael Moffitt's words, "a
private system with only marginal official participation."'' 1 8 The
Euromarket, where most of the loans were made, was unregu-
lated-no central bank, no exchanges, no domestic laws to check
the stampede of bankers to make sovereign loans. The banks' fail-
ure to require some kind of collateral for their loans and their fail-
ure to devise a more appropriate diversification strategy were not
subject to any meaningful scrutiny.
Of course, the private participants themselves, private commer-
cial banks, are subject to national regulation. In the United States
the Comptroller General, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation are supposed to ensure that
shareholders do not lose their investments, or depositors their ac-
counts, due to poor lending policies on the part of banks.159 These
regulators, however, seem to have had no greater understanding of
country risk in the 1970's than the banks did.16 0 Moroever, as Pro-
fessor Lichtenstein has cogently argued,1 61 federal banking regula-
tors in the United States have traditionally eschewed analysis of
portfolio diversification; instead, regulators have focused (perhaps
too mechanically) on monitoring the reserves appropriate for a
bank's level of lending. 162 Any examination of sovereign loans has
tended to be ex post rather than ex ante.
Even if the federal regulators had understood the problem and
had had the clear authority to act, there were political reasons for
them to do nothing except hope that the risks would not material-
ize. The big banks and some commentators already complain that
the United States over-regulates bank lending, thereby putting
158. M. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 71.
159. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seq. (1982); Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982).
160. Federal Reserve Chair Volcker testified that the traditional regulatory methods were
not well-suited to evaluating country risk. "Individual bank examiners were not generally
equipped to evaluate economic conditions and prospects of countries. . . .The traditional
criteria for formally 'classifying' or 'criticizing' loans were developed for private borrowers or
local governments, and were not readily adaptable to consideration of 'transfer risk' or eval-
uating sovereign entities." International Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 3, at 41, 52
(statement of Paul Volcker).
161. Lichtenstein, supra note 25, at 403.
162. Id. at 403-05.
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U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage with banks in other
Western countries.'6 3 Consequently, there is something of a "com-
petition in laxness" among different national bank regulators.
Moreover, bank regulators have been reluctant to institute rules
that would offend borrowing countries. As Federal Reserve Chair-
man Volcker candidly admitted in 1983, bank regulators were
loathe, for foreign relations reasons, to establish classifications that
might be offensive to particular countries. 6 4 Indeed, federal regu-
lators encouraged private bank lending to developing countries be-
cause it removed pressure on the U.S. government and the interna-
tional financial institutions to make such loans in a period when
they did not have the resources to do so.""5
Under the Bretton Woods system, NODC's generally did not be-
come too heavily indebted and there were mechanisms to smooth
over short-term payment problems without denying borrowing
countries more credit. When they did take on debt, it was on con-
cessionary (bargain) terms from Western countries (chiefly U.S.
trade credits and foreign aid) or multilateral lending institutions.
When this public order withered in the 1970's, massive, less con-
strained private lending took its place. The corollaries of the de-
mise of Bretton Woods and the mania-to-panic syndrome were
that (1) the rapidity and competitiveness with which international
lending developed charged it with an ideology of expansion parallel
to that found in developing countries; (2) the risks of this sort of
lending were systematically underestimated; and (3) the ideology
of growth and accumulation of risks were not checked by national
regulators because the existing regulatory philosophy was not sen-
sitive to the possibility of overlending to sovereign debtors.
When OPEC dramatically raised its oil prices in 1973, and devel-
oping countries increased their demand for bank loans, the inter-
national banking system was poised to accommodate. Between
one-third and one-half of the OPEC investable cash surplus was
channeled into the Eurodollar market and domestic U.S. bank de-
163. See id. at 433; International Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 3, at 391-92
(statement of Richard Dale, Brookings Inst.).
164. International Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 3, at 52-53 (statement of Paul
Volcker).
165. Lichtenstein, supra note 25, at 407-09 (federal financial regulators encouraged loans
to Indonesia in 1970's and were criticized by Congress); see Minority Staff Report on Global
Debt, supra note 153, at 141.
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posits. 16 Given this new supply of funds, the necessity of turning
it over quickly, the paucity of equally attractive alternative de-
mand, and the bankers' expansionist mentality and underestima-
tion of sovereign risks, it was natural for U.S. (and other Western)
banks to make further loans to developing countries from 1973 to
1979. In other words, unchecked by regulation and encouraged by
systematic group euphoria about the profits and risks of interna-
tional lending, international bankers made an increasing volume of
loans each year to countries whose true creditworthiness was, in
many cases, sinking just as fast as new money came in.
The power of these structural causes of the debt problem can be
seen after 1979. Although the new OPEC price increase generated
a substantial new influx of funds into the Eurodollar market, the
level of country debt and bank exposure was remarkably high and
(finally) cause for concern. The federal regulators in 1979 insti-
tuted a system requiring bank consideration of country risk and
encouraging diversification of lending practices. 167 Yet the momen-
tum of developing country sovereign lending continued and, in
fact, accelerated.
The 1979 federal guidelines were a substantial failure, in part
because they were only hortatory and reflected considerable regu-
latory ambivalence over whether and how to regulate. 68 More
money was lent by banks to developing countries, and the level of
their exposure increased (the nine major U.S. banks had 137% of
their equity on loan to Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina in mid-1982,
compared with 114% when the 1979 federal regulation was initi-
ated),'69 because of the lemming phenomenon and the continued
underappreciation of the risks. The period of euphoria persisted
far longer than any objective analysis would have justified. Even
after mini-crises concerning the debts of Mexico, Peru, Zaire, and
166. See T. Enders & R. Mattione, supra note 15, at 6-13.
167. See supra note 24.
168. Richard Dale, for example, argues that the only workable approach is to have abso-
lute ceilings on bank lending to sovereign borrowers and that the various regulations es-
sayed by federal regulators through the 1970's-disclosure, light pressure to diversify,
stricter accounting rules-were doomed to failure. See International Financial Markets
Hearings, supra note 3, at 381, 384-91 (statement of Richard Dale). Professor Lichtenstein,
in some contrast, argues that individual country ceilings are inconsistent with traditional
U.S. regulatory policy, which stresses regulation of reserve levels rather than particular
lending decisions. See Lichtenstein, supra note 25, at 403.
169. See supra note 23.
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Poland between 1976 and 1981,1° banks continued to make large-
scale loans to Latin American and other developing countries. Re-
markably enough, many banks were, according to one top execu-
tive, caught entirely by surprise when Mexico confessed its inabil-
ity to service or repay its debt in August 1982.171 In retrospect, the
largely private system of international finance was not a system
that worked very well.
C. The Debt Problem as a Prisoners' Dilemma and Its Solution
as a Public Good
So far, the argument has been that the causes underlying the
debt problem involve political, economic, and financial structures
evolving after World War II. The Latin American debtor countries
adopted an uncritical philosophy of growth which, in combination
with an excessively accommodative political system unable to re-
quire short-term economic sacrifices, impelled those countries to
seek more foreign loans in the 1970's. This unprecedented demand
was met by an unprecedented extension of loan supply by interna-
tional bankers who were unconstrained by regulatory attention.
The countries' philosophy of growth and the liberation of interna-
tional lending from earlier regulatory constraints came together to
create a mania after 1966-1973, when the Vietnam War and the
OPEC price increases ended the post-war period of low inflation
and low nominal interest rates, and ushered in a new and troubling
era of greater economic uncertainty (displacement). The mania
continued without distress for some years after 1973 because
favorable economic conditions for the debtor countries meant that
their export growth more or less offset any growth in external debt.
After 1979, however, the mania created a problem of too much
debt and too much lending, but the euphoria caused the players in
the market (and those ostensibly regulating them) to ignore the
problem still. Distress became apparent in 1982, when banks cut
back on their international sovereign lending. August 1982-the
Mexican confession of its inability to pay-produced a revulsion.
Two issues remain for consideration. One is posed by Professor
170. By the end of 1981, the commercial banks had engaged in multilateral debt renegoti-
ations with at least six NODC's (Peru, Zaire, Jamaica, Turkey, Nicaragua, and Sudan) and
had initiated negotiations with at least two others (Bolivia and Costa Rica). L Friedman,
supra note 18, at 127-33.
171. Schirano, supra note 22.
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Diaz-Alejandro. After June 1982, banks did not just curtail their
lending and/or demand higher interest rates in light of the higher
perceived risks; they all but stopped lending to Latin American
countries and created capital outflows by 1983.172 Why? Part of the
reason is the chain-reaction nature of the Minsky-Kindleberger re-
vulsion: once the overextension has been realized, everyone wants
out-immediately. But why was there no crash? Instead of com-
plete disaster (default by the borrowers, a run on the main lenders,
credit cut-offs, and so forth), the formerly euphoric bankers took
their bad NODC investments to the once-written-off public sector
(the IMF and the Western governments) and negotiated a series of
measures to avert a crash. All the main participants perceived that
their interests were best protected by negotiations that preserved
bank-NODC relationships.
A more elaborate structural answer to these two questions starts
with the peculiarly non-legal range of remedies available to the
banks and the countries. Had the borrowers been private and not
sovereign entities, the banks most likely could have enforced their
rights under the loan agreements by instituting lawsuits to enforce
liens, by foreclosing on collateral, or by attaching other assets to
satisfy the debt. Had the total creditor claims exceeded the net
worth of private (and not sovereign) debtors, the debtors could on
a voluntary or involuntary basis have entered bankruptcy proceed-
ings to settle their debts and/or reorganize their operations, thus
giving them a "fresh start" unencumbered by debt. These options
are not formally available in cases of sovereign debt: lawsuits to
collect the debt are impractical, and there is no formal fresh start
(bankruptcy) for countries.
Some commentators have written or assumed that countries can-
not be sued for repudiation of their public debt.1" As a matter of
law they are wrong, though practically such lawsuits are not neces-
sarily effective remedies. Sovereign loans are typically not backed
by collateral that the banks can attach in the event of default, but
they may have acceleration and elaborate cross-default clauses.174
172. Diaz-Alejandro, supra note 73, at 350 (Table 4).
173. See, e.g., R. Dale & R. Mattione, supra note 152, at 20-21 (assuming that legal re-
dress is not available against a defaulting government if sovereign immunity is invoked).
174. See, e.g., Model Mexican Restructure Agreement art. IX (July 1983) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter cited as Model Restructure Agreement] (model agreement containing
acceleration and cross-default clauses). See also Mendez, Recent Trends in Commercial
Bank Lending to LDC's: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 8 Yale J. World Pub.
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If the Mexican government, for example, fails to make timely pay-
ments of principal and interest, its creditors can demand that the
entire loan amount fall due (be accelerated) and that all other
loans to the Mexican government, its political subdivisions, and its
state trading companies also fall due. The right of acceleration, of
course, does the banks little good if they cannot enforce it through
legal process. A lawsuit in Mexico would not likely be successful,
since Mexican courts would defer to any state decree renouncing,
or unilaterally amending, the debt obligation.
As a formal matter, a lawsuit in the United States against Mex-
ico would usually be possible. Federal subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction in lawsuits against "foreign states" (including political
departments or subdivisions and most state trading companies) is
governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.175 Such
jurisdiction exists "as to any claim for relief . . . with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to [sovereign] immunity
under either sections 1605-1607 of [the Act] or under any applica-
ble international agreement. ' 17 For example, pursuant to section
1605(a)(1), if the foreign state debtor "has waived its immunity ei-
ther explicitly or by implication" in the loan agreement, it is not
immune from suit to enforce the terms of the loan agreement.177 A
clause submitting the foreign state to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts to enforce the terms of the loan agreement would be such a
waiver. 7 8 The waiver exception to immunity would usually be
available for U.S. lenders to enforce sovereign debt agreements.1 79
Order 173, 193-94 (1982) (describing cross-default clauses and their effects).
175. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982). See Eskridge, The Iranian Nationalization Cases: To-
ward a General Theory of Jurisdiction over Foreign States, 22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 525 (1981).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). An oddity (if not an idiocy) of the FSIA is that it com-
bines sovereign immunity, subject-matter jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction inquiries
into a single statutory test: If the "foreign state" is not immune under sections 1605 through
1607, it not only loses the sovereign immunity defense, but subject-matter jurisdiction is
established and (if proper service is made) personal jurisdiction exists as well. Smit, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Plea for Drastic Surgery, 1980 Am. Soc'y Int'l
L. Proc. 49, 50-69 (1981).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982).
178. See von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 33, 55-56 (1978) (sample waiver clause).
179. See Model Restructure Agreement, supra note 174, § 13.08 (detailed waiver of immu-
nity clause).
One complication is that some Latin American countries have constitutional or statutory
provisions that might be interpreted as prohibiting such waivers. The effect of such provi-
sions has produced some uncertainty. See Kahale, State Loan Transactions: Foreign Law
[Vol, 25:2
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A second basis for jurisdiction under the FSIA is section
1605(a)(2), the commercial activity exception to foreign state im-
munity. Under that exception, a foreign state that defaults on a
public loan entered into in the United States or to be repaid in the
United States would not be immune if the public loan were a
"commercial activity."'' s0 The traditional view was that a country's
public debt is not a commercial activity, and thus actions arising
out of its nonpayment were immune from suit, even under the
modern restrictive theory of immunity.'8r Although far from clear,
the rationale for such a rule was probably based upon the govern-
mental purposes of the public debt (development, infrastructure).
The 1973 State Department draft of the FSIA would have left for-
eign states immune "in any case relating to its public debt," unless
there were an explicit waiver of immunity or the debt were that of
a state agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision.8 2 That
provision was deleted in the FSIA as enacted in 1976. Congress
rejected the exception, in part, because "both a sale of bonds to
the public and a direct loan from a U.S. commercial bank to a for-
eign government are activities which are commercial in nature and
should be treated like other similar commercial transactions. '18
3
Thus in most cases foreign states can be sued if they breach
their loan agreements with U.S. banks. The problem would be to
collect on the judgment, for these states may not have sufficient
Restrictions on Waiver of Immunity and Submissions to Jurisdiction, 37 Bus. L. 1549
(1982).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982); see id. § 1602 (the purpose of the FSIA is to ensure
that, pursuant to "international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned"); id. § 1603(d) (defining "com-
mercial activity," albeit in a circular manner).
181. See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) ("public loans" are inherently governmental acts, for which
siates require immunity from suit), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Lalive, L'Immunit de
Juridiction des Etats et des Organisations Internationales, 3 Recucil des Cours de
l'Acad~mie de Droit International 206, 285 (1953) (similar).
182. Draft § 1606 is reprinted in Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
183. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976); see Jackson v. People's Re-
public of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982). The Act's inclusion of sovereign loans
within its intended definition of commercial activity is supported by modern international
practice in other restrictive theory states. See, eg., U.K. State Immunity Act of 1978,
§ 3(3)(b), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123, 1124 (1978) (a "commercial transaction," for which
the state has no immunity, includes "any loan or other transaction for the provision of fi-
nance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other
financial obligation").
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assets in the United States, and many of the assets found there
would in most cases be immune from attachment to enforce the
judgment. The modern restrictive theory of immunity gives foreign
states greater protection against losing their assets through attach-
ment than against being sued. Under the FSIA, only the "property
in the United States . ..used for a commercial activity in the
United States" can be attached if the judgment is against the
country itself or its departments or subdivisions.1 8 4 Moreover, un-
less there is a waiver of attachment immunity, the property at-
tached would have to be that "used for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based," namely, the loan."' The funds
held by the state's central bank for its own account are expressly
immunized by the FSIA.186 In short, very little of the country's
property in the United States would be available to satisfy any
judgment accelerating and demanding payment on the country's
public debt. If there were cross-default clauses in the loan agree-
ment, the debt of state trading companies might also be acceler-
ated, and any judgment against trading companies might be exe-
cuted against any of their properties or funds in the United States,
with certain exceptions. 87 But the central government's debt judg-
ment would still remain largely uncollected in most instances.
The peculiar dearth of formal legal sanctions against sovereign
borrowers that fail to make payments contributed to the uncon-
trolled spree of NODC borrowing and Western bank lending, espe-
cially after 1979. Without easily enforceable legal remedies, banks
did not believe they were in a position to place restrictions on their
sovereign loans in the 1970's, such as limitations on the use of the
borrowed money, disclosure requirements, or ceilings on the coun-
try's total debt.' As a result, the countries were allowed to borrow
as much as they wanted-which was too much. More important,
the banks had insufficient incentives to monitor aggregate sover-
eign borrowing carefully and to develop a "maximum level of sus-
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1982).
185. Id. § 1610(a)(2).
186. Id. § 1611(b)(1).
187. Id. § 1610(b).
188. In the case of corporate borrowing, bond covenants restrict the corporation's pay-
ment of dividends, its total indebtedness, maintenance of assets to secure the debt, and
periodic disclosure of information so that the creditor may monitor the debtor's financial
status. Because these covenants are practically unenforceable against sovereigns, they are
typically not included in sovereign loan agreements. See R. Dale & R. Mattione, supra note
152, at 21 & n.34.
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tainable debt" for each individual country.
Ultimately, when the euphoric lending gave way to reality, the
dearth of legal sanctions generated a "prisoners' dilemma," a situa-
tion in which each player has strong self-interested incentives not
to cooperate with the other players, with the result that all players
are left in a worse position than the one they would have enjoyed
had they cooperated with one another.18 9 The banks involved in
the debt dilemma in 1982 had precisely these incentives. Each
bank realized that Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil (the three largest
borrowers) were not the good credit risks they were once believed
to be. Also realizing that if those countries were to default or de-
clare a moratorium on interest payment there would be no effec-
tive legal sanction available, each bank responded rationally by
eliminating new loans to these countries and by refusing to roll
over old loans. These were perfectly normal, rational decisions for
individual banks. But when all the banks curtailed, or virtually
eliminated, sovereign lending in the second half of 1982, Mexico,
Argentina, and Brazil found themselves without even the most
minimal sources of finance that a well-managed country might
need during a period of trade recession and high interest rates. As
a result, these and other countries simply had to confess their in-
ability to pay, leaving all the banks worse off because of rational
behavior by the banks individually. This has been called a "conta-
gious collapse of confidence" by some commentators,' e° and is the
Minsky-Kindleberger "revulsion," but in truth it is nothing more
than the playing out of this prisoners' dilemma on a massive scale.
As a result, the banks and their borrowers faced something more
than a dilemma in 1982-1983: If they did not work their way out of
the crisis, they faced disaster (the Minsky-Kindleberger "crash").
A successful workout required cooperation on two levels: first, co-
189. For an excellent explanation of the prisoners' dilemma and an application of game
theory to international trade, see Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the
International Political Economy, 28 Int'l Studies Q. 5 (1984).
190. The contagious collapse works as follows: (1) Since it has no legal redress, a bank
with loans to a sovereign state will react to the state's prospect of default by cutting off
further loans. (2) If other banks follow this strategy, then the country is placed in an unten-
able position, for even healthy Third World economies need commercial or other loans for
their sovereign and private sectors. (The banks' cut-off of funds may apply to the private
sector as well as the public.) (3) Once a bank has lost confidence in the ability of Country X
to service its debts over time, it will re-evaluate its lending policy to adjacent Country Y
(which probably should have been done long ago) and may cut off credit to Country Y as
well. Again, the other banks do the same, and Country Y might be forced into default, even
though it is better able to service its debts than is Country X.
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operation between the banks as a group and the individual debt-
ors, and second, cooperation among the banks in supplying new
money and other forms of relief.
There were, indeed, very substantial motivations for cooperation
on the first level. The big lenders were willing to cooperate because
much of their capital was on loan to individual countries. If the
countries in question were to threaten default or moratorium, the
most heavily exposed banks would practically be required to lend
"new money" even after the crisis of confidence. This phenomenon
is called "involuntary lending": to prevent a total loss of a sizeable
chunk of its assets (which might threaten its own solvency or prof-
itability), a bank will rationally commit a smaller chunk of assets
to new loans that carry high risks of loss, further committing the
bank to that country.191
So long as it continues to embrace the ideology of growth, the
sovereign borrower is also a captive of the situation. If a private
company's debts exceed its assets, it may voluntarily go into bank-
ruptcy or reorganization proceedings to reorder and reduce its ex-
ternal debt. There is no bankruptcy proceeding for sovereign
states. Their traditional relief has been to default on loans or to
suspend payments for a period of time.192 But so long as they ad-
here to a philosophy of productive growth that stresses the need
for capital investment, and their own citizens do not save and in-
vest at the necessary levels, they continue to have a long-term need
to borrow from international or foreign sources. If a sovereign bor-
rower exercises its power to default, the banks can retaliate by ex-
clusion from international capital markets. For this reason, and
notwithstanding the discussions of a debtors' cartel in 1984, the
Latin American countries have not walked away from their loans,
even though debt servicing in 1984 kept growth rates relatively low
and consumed most or all of their hard-earned trade surplus. To
191. "The basic dynamic of forced lending is that the lender with existing exposure will
increase the exposure with new loans as long as the new funds are judged likely to enable a
firming-up of the previous exposure rather than to be merely a throwing of good money
after bad." W. Cline, supra note 6, at 72. Involuntary lending will occur when "(a) the re-
duction in the probability of country default thereby achieved, multiplied by previously
outstanding loans, exceeds (b) the terminal probability of default (after the new loans) as
multiplied by the amount of the new loans." Id. (emphasis in original). For this analysis, the
probability of a moratorium (suspension of principal and interest payments) is counted as
20% to 40% of a default. Id. at 73.
192. See Dammers, A Brief History of Sovereign Defaults and Rescheduling, in Default
and Rescheduling: Corporate and Sovereign Borrowers 77 (D. Suratgar ed. 1984).
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prevent loss of access to foreign capital, these countries have ra-
tionally committed themselves to increase trade surpluses through
austerity programs and other measures and, in turn, to pay most or
all of that surplus to foreign banks and other lenders.
While cooperation existed at the first level, a major problem
jeopardized cooperation at the second level: hundreds of banks had
money on loan and their exposure was very uneven. This created a
"public goods dilemma" as the banks tried to reach agreement on
new lending and loan rescheduling packages for the debtor nations.
A public goods dilemma is a situation in which some participants
have incentives to create a common benefit from which it is diffi-
cult to exclude "free riders," that is, those who have not contrib-
uted to the benefit's creation.19 As a result, insufficient quantities
of the benefit will be created. For each borrowing country, there
were some banks whose exposure was very great and for which in-
voluntary lending was a natural response. The exposure of other
banks was not great, and their individual lending calculus sug-
gested to them that no new money should be placed on loan. They
were willing to risk default rather than advance new money, espe-
cially if they perceived that default could be staved off by new
lending from the highly exposed banks. These free riders were po-
tentially quite numerous. Realizing that the big lenders would have
to supply new money, and seeing others free ride, moderately ex-
posed banks might also have followed the free riders. The fear was
that once a trickle of banks opted out of a joint solution, a wave
would soon follow.
This public goods dilemma did not wreck the workout process,
however. A major reason is that political pressures were applied to
encourage the less exposed banks to contribute to the public good
and not to be free riders. The highly exposed lenders tended to be
big banks, which used their influence to lobby the smaller regional
banks.9 More important, national bank regulators in the United
States and other countries applied pressure. Because the solvency
of the big international banks was perceived to be a matter of pub-
lic concern, national regulators committed public funds as bridge
loans for the borrowing countries and pressed the regional banks to
193. For an excellent explanation of the public goods dilemma and its possible applica-
tion to international trade, see Conybeare, supra note 189.
194. See Gibbs, A Regional Bank's Perspective: An Analysis of the Differences and Simi-
larities in the U.S. Banking Community's Approach to and Participation in the Mexican
Restructuring, 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 11, 18-19 (1984); Wellons, supra note 157.
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participate in the joint effort.19 "Cooperation" was thus ensured.
Although the lack of traditional legal remedies has thus made
international sovereign financing erratic and vulnerable to sponta-
neous collapses, constructive mechanisms have been created to
cope with the problem. Because neither the banks nor the debtor
countries have an easy legal remedy like the foreclosure or bank-
ruptcy available to private partners, their practical recourse is to
cooperate with one another, and with the United States and the
IMF, to create equivalent solutions by negotiation. Hence the se-
ries of debt-restructuring negotiations, in which the borrowing
country agrees to an IMF program to improve its current account
deficit, in return for new funds (from the IMF and the banks) and
an extended time in which to repay its foreign debt.
These negotiated agreements have served the same ordering
functions in this international sovereign context typically served
by formal, coercive legal rules in private party settings.198 First,
and most important, the process of debt restructuring has com-
pelled the Latin American governments to make some of the hard
decisions that paralyzed them earlier. Although the IMF austerity
plans have not necessarily been the best approaches, they have at
least forced countries to adopt more realistic policies. Second, the
process has enforced collective discipline on the banks. Acting
through advisory groups, the banks have accomplished what the
national regulators have never required: a group determination of
the country's level of sustainable debt and a workout of loans that
will fit into that determination. Third, the process has fostered
better informed decisions. Information is now available to banks
not only through the IMF and other multilateral agencies, but also
through the Institute of International Finance created by the
banks in 1983.7 More important perhaps, country risk evaluations
are now taken seriously. At least for a while, the banks will remem-
ber the lesson.
The forced dialogue between lenders and debtor countries does
195. See Diaz-Alejandro, supra note 73, at 355; Wellons, supra note 157.
196. On the ability of negotiation and other informal means to serve as the functional
equivalent of a formal legal regime (if not a more satisfactory regime), see, e.g., W. Stoever,
Renegotiations in International Business Transactions ch. 7 (1981); Eisenberg, Private Or-
dering through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 637
(1976).
197. See Surrey & Nash, Bankers Look Beyond the Debt Crisis: The Institute of Interna-
tional Finance, 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 111 (1984).
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not, however, assure that structural problems will be eliminated
entirely, or even that the current debt problem will be easily
solved. Beneath the negotiations are deep chasms of disaster. On
the one hand is the possibility that the IMF austerity measures
will destabilize individual countries or entire regions. Sacrifices de-
manded of politically potent corporatist interests might trigger a
crisis of legitimacy similar to that which occurred during the De-
pression of the 1930's. Additionally, the debt-induced austerity
measures might generate mass unrest due to unfulfilled popular
expectations after so many years of growth.""' Or, as Dr. Riordan
Roett has argued, the workout process might imperil the fragile
trend toward redemocratization in Latin America.9 9 On the other
hand is the possibility of sovereign loan default, which could se-
verely damage the international financial system or lead to the fail-
ure of leading U.S. banks. 00 If the terms of renegotiation them-
selves dry up capital needed for development, of if they impose
what appear to be unfair costs on Latin American or other devel-
oping countries, the possibility of breakdown remains.
IlI PARADIGMS OF DEVELOPMENT AS EXPLANATIONS OF THE DEBT
PROBLEM
The structural explanation set forth in Part H helps to place the
current international debt problem in a broader historical perspec-
tive, and for that reason it is complementary to the shocks-and-
mistakes explanation of Part I. The structural explanation, how-
ever, does not fully explore one final, critical dimension of the in-
ternational debt problem. How does the problem relate to the
ongoing theoretical and policy debate about economic development
itself? Indeed, it can be "explained" by several competing develop-
ment theories (or ideologies). Conversely, the debt problem sheds
valuable light on the validity of the development theories
themselves.
It is impossible here to essay any comprehensive analysis of the
debt problem under every one of the many schools of development
198. CfL C. Brinton, Anatomy of a Revolution (1938) (one trigger for revolution: unful-
filled expectations).
199. See Roett, supra note 77 (concerns regarding austerity); see also Roett, Democracy
and Debt in South America: A Continent's Dilemma, 62 For. Af. 695 (1984).
200. See, e.g., Rowe, Latin Nations Ask for More Help, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1985, at CI,
coL 4; Brazilian Debt Moratorium "No Longer Taboo," The Latin American Times, No. 60,
at 22 (1984); Dangers of the U.S. Recovery, The Latin American Times, No. 58, at 1 (1984).
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theory. 0 1 All that can be done here is to explore, rather provision-
ally, the explanatory value of three influential paradigms of eco-
nomic development: the modernization paradigm, which is closely
tied to the process by which Western Europe and the United
States developed; the dependency paradigm, generated by Third
World (especially Latin American) scholars as a response to their
perception that "modernization" is only the process by which in-
dustrialized countries render other countries permanently "under-
developed" or dependent upon and subservient to their capital and
technology; and a global interdependence paradigm, which views
the world economic system as an interdependent one in which the
leading industrial economies have a privileged and controlling role,
but in which newly industrializing countries in Latin America and
elsewhere are seeking to join their ranks.
The conclusion of Part III is that neither the modernization nor
the dependency paradigm is a wholly satisfactory historical context
for explaining and understanding the international debt problem
(though each provides very useful insights). Indeed, the debt prob-
lem exposes some difficulties in those theories as general historical
approaches to economic development. With some elaboration and
refinement, a global interdependence paradigm is a more helpful
historical explanation for the current crisis: it is a crisis in the cap-
italist world system, in which the post-1960's dysfunctions of
Western core state economies threaten the ability of certain newly
industrializing countries to advance in the world system, as well as
the ability of the Western states to continue their own economic
position in the world.
A. The Modernization Paradigm
Development theory emerged as a systematic discipline only af-
ter World War II, in part as an intellectual means for Western lib-
eral thinkers to justify the dominance of Western countries in the
post-War economy and to defend large expenditures of foreign aid.
The "modernization paradigm" of development evolved among
201. For example, I shall not explicitly deal with the influential Marxist school of devel-
opment theorists, in part because two of the three paradigms are influenced by Marxist
insights. Notwithstanding absorption of many Marxist ideas in other theories, there is a
lively neo-Marxist school of development theory. See Neo-Marxist Theories of Development
(P. Limqueco & B. McFarlane eds. 1983); Weaver & Berger, The Marxist Critique of Depen-
dency Theory- An Introduction, in The Political Economy of Development and Un-
derdevelopment 45 (C. Wilber ed. 1984).
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Western or Western-influenced economists and sociologists." 2
Under the view that emerged, development was seen from an evo-
lutionary, progressive perspective. An "underdeveloped" country of
today was expected to evolve into the "developed" country of to-
morrow. This evolutionary process would be basically imitative:
the underdeveloped country would follow the steps taken by the
United States and Western Europe in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, until it gradually assumed the characteristics
of the developed Western "mass consumption society," including
sustained internal capital accumulation, substantial and diversified
industrialization, self-perpetuating growth, and middle-class mores
and democratic institutions. The process would be gradual, inexo-
rable, and non-disruptive.0
The first problem explored by Western development theorists
was how countries achieve rapid economic growth. The post-War
modernization thinkers started with the observation that the econ-
omies of most countries in the world had not reached the level of
self-sustaining growth that the economies of Western Europe and
the United States had maintained (notwithstanding the interrup-
tion of the Depression). Instead, underdeveloped countries seemed
"stuck" at a more primitive level of economic organization. How
could these countries become "unstuck"? What could stimulate
self-sustaining growth as in the Western countries?
One framework for answering those questions was Keynesian ec-
onomics, which had been perceived as useful in pulling the "under-
employed" Western economies out of the Depression. Keynes and
those influenced by him believed that an increase in aggregate in-
vestment would have a multiplier effect, increasing the overall
level of economic activity geometricaly.2° Although Keynes him-
202. Compare B. Hettne, Development Theory and the Third World 11-38 (1982) (origins
and evolution of the modernization paradigm), with Pioneers in Development (G. Meier &
D. Seers eds. 1984) (collection of essays by early modernization theorists reevaluating and,
for the most part, reiterating their positions on development). See also Wilber & Jameson,
Paradigms of Economic Development and Beyond, in The Political Economy of Develop-
ment and Underdevelopment 4, 7-13 (C. Wilber ed. 1984).
203. "The ruling paradigm of the economics of development rests on the classical or neo-
classical view of a world in which change is gradual, marginalist, non-disruptive, equilibrat-
ing, and largely painless.... Once initiated, growth becomes automatic and all-pervasive,
spreading among nations and trickling down among classes so that everybody benefits from
the process." Nugent & Yotopoulos, What Has Orthodox Development Economics Learned
from Recent Experience?, 7 World Dev. 541, 542 (1979).
204. See J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 113-31
(1936).
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self did not write about long-term economic development, two
Keynesians, Evsey Domar and Roy Harrod, explored these issues
in the decade after World War II. They posited that growth is a
function of the level of savings in a country and of the productivity
of capital. Savings are translated into investment, which creates
additional productive capacity, thereby creating more income (es-
pecially if the capital-to-output ratio is low). Higher income in one
period generates more saving, investment, capital formation, and
income in the following period. 205 The corollary of their theory was
that in underdeveloped countries, every increase in output pro-
vides the groundwork for further growth because part of it is rein-
vested; once income levels become consistently high enough to
yield a certain level of reinvestment, then growth may become self-
sustaining.
The Domar-Harrod model focused on capital investment as the
key to economic growth, and suggested that economic growth im-
plies that capital stock grows more rapidly than the labor force.200
Hence, a central concern of development theory in the 1950's was
how "a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or
5 per cent of its national income or less, converts itself into an
economy where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per
cent of national income or more."2 07 Much of the literature focused
on social and economic traps, such as rapid population increases
and nonproductive use of savings, which obstructed growth oppor-
tunities and threatened to maintain a country in a low-level
Keynesian equilibrium (indefinite stagnation). Although Domar
and Harrod seemed to assume that the capital needed for develop-
ment could be generated within developing countries, these traps
indicated that much more capital was needed than developing
countries themselves could supply. Consequently, one means of de-
velopment was to provide massive inflows of external capital that
would stimulate a balanced growth (Keynesian general equilib-
rium)-thereby breaking the "vicious cycle of poverty" (the
traps).0 Possible sources of such seed money were foreign aid,
205. E. Domar, Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth 70-108 (1957); R. Harrod, Eco.
nomic Essays 254-90 (1952).
206. For a useful analysis of the contribution and limitations of the Domar-Harrod the.
ory, see B. Herrick & C. Kindleberger, Economic Development 28-34 (4th ed. 1983).
207. Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 22 Manchester
Sch. Econ. & Soc. Stud. 139, 155 (1954).
208. A leading advocate of large-scale infusions of capital into underdeveloped countries
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loans, and direct investment.
The second problem explored by Western development theorists
was how societies change as they mature from traditional to mod-
em ones. Sir W. Arthur Lewis provided the sociological insight
that underdeveloped societies are typically dualistic: an advanced
modern industrial sector co-exists with a traditional agrarian sec-
tor. According to Lewis, industrialization is a way out of this social
conundrum, because it draws upon the surplus agricultural labor
and puts it to productive use. When the profits are reinvested, de-
mand for both consumption goods and capital goods will increase,
leading to further industrialization and shifts of labor away from
the agricultural sector. The industry-led growth will gradually ab-
sorb the labor of the traditional sector, thereby drawing the whole
country into modernized social and economic structures.0 9
Neoclassical economists complemented Lewis's thesis with the
argument that free international trade and investment are "en-
gines of development." Free trade in the world economy creates an
efficient international division of labor that yields benefits for un-
derdeveloped countries by impelling them to specialize in the la-
bor-intensive industries for which their dual economy is suited (in
exchange for the capital-intensive imports from Western countries)
and by reducing factor price discrepancies in the world. 210 Their
well-known theory of comparative advantage of free trade posited
that surplus value is created by trade when the trading countries
have differing abilities to specialize in the traded products, and
that the surplus value is shared among the trading countries. 21 1 To
to break the cycle of poverty, like other modernization authors, did not consider the cycles
or traps to be structural ones, but rather obstacles that could be surmounted by money. R.
Nurske, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (1953). See also A.
Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (1958); H. Leibenstein, Economic
Backwardness and Economic Growth (1957); G. Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdevel-
oped Regions (1957).
209. See W. A. Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (1955); Lewis, supra note 207; see
also B. Herrick & C. Kindleberger, supra note 206, at 63-67. Lewis reviews his contribution
(and answers some of his critics) in Lewis, Development Economics in the 1950's, in Pio-
neers in Development 121 (G. Meier & D. Seers eds. 1984).
210. J. Viner, International Trade and Economic Development (1953); B. Hettne, supra
note 202, at 24-25.
211. See J. Viner, supra note 210; B. Hettne, supra note 202, at 24-25. As early as 1949,
however, classical economists questioned whether the gains of trade would be evenly divided
between underdeveloped and developed countries. The so-called "Singer-Prebisch thesis"
was that underdeveloped countries producing primary commodities received few of the
trade advantages. If so, then such countries ought not to pursue existing comparative advan-
tages, but rather to create new advantages by industrialization. See id. at 25.
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the extent that trade is constrained by tariffs and other barriers,
the same spreading of benefits can occur through Western multina-
tional enterprises that transfer their technological innovations
through the world economy and create their own internal markets
that are efficient and wealth-enhancing for the host developing
countries as well as the multinationals.s 2
Later theorists generated historical models, patterned on the ex-
perience of Western countries, for the evolution of a traditional,
underdeveloped society to a modern, entrepreneurial one. The
most celebrated is the five-stage model created by Walt Rostow. 213
In stage one (traditional society), the country creates an improved
infrastructure, and in stage two (pre-take-off) a new en-
trepreneurial class. The leading growth sectors of the economy pull
the other sectors into the critical third stage (take-off). At that
point, the last major obstacles to economic development are re-
moved, and the share of net investment and saving as a part of
national income reaches a permanent plateau of 10% or more.
Growth and development become self-sustaining, and in stage four
(road to maturity), modernization spreads from the dynamic sec-
tors to other parts of society, which are then integrated into the
country's overall growth. The ultimate and inexorable result is
stage five-the mass consumption society. The Rostow model had
a great influence, in large part due to its optimism. Other scholars
expanded upon that optimism by positing that late-developing
countries have the advantage of borrowing technology and seed
capital from the early-developing countries, thereby producing
even faster growth and earlier take-off.2 14
The central concepts of the modernization paradigm-(1) Asian,
African, and Latin American countries can "develop" along the
same historical process as Western industrial countries; (2) the key
to development is capital investment; and (3) trade, investment,
212. See, e.g., R. Caves, The Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (1982); A.
Rugman, Inside the Multinationals: The Economics of Internal Markets 22-27, 133-55
(1981).
213. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (1960); see The Economics of Take-off
into Sustained Growth (W. Rostow ed. 1963); W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth
(1971). Professor Rostow reviews his contribution in light of events of the last 20 years in
Rostow, Development: The Political Economy of the Marshallian Long Period, in Pioneers
in Development 229 (G. Meier & D. Seers eds. 1984).
214. See, e.g., A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962).
But see S. Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure
(1971) (empirical critique of Rostow model).
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and loans from industrialized countries will trigger or speed up the
linear process of development-were widely accepted by policy-
makers in the 1950's and 1960's. They were the basis for Western
infusions of foreign aid, and the U.N. proclamation of the 1960's as
the "Decade of Development." Although its concepts are strongly
ethnocentric (reflecting the experience of the United States and in-
dustrialized Europe, relatively ignorant of Third World exper-
iences), the modernization paradigm was accepted, at least in part,
by the leaders and technocrats of most developing countries.
Does the modernization paradigm help explain the origins of the
international debt problem? In its pure theoretical form it does
not. Indeed, quite the opposite: Faith in popular forms of the
model probably contributed to the international debt crisis! The
modernization paradigm teaches that once take-off occurs, mod-
ernizing growth spread throughout the society will ineluctably fol-
low.21 5 In the 1960's and early 1970's, Brazil, Mexico, and other
developing countries achieved impressive rates of GDP growth and
investment.216 Based on the modernization paradigm, most West-
ern financiers and Third World leaders probably assumed that
these countries had reached some kind of self-perpetuating eco-
nomic take-off. The continued and vigorous growth of these coun-
tries after 1970217 (subsidized in large part by foreign debt) only
confirmed those presuppositions. Of course, as noted above, there
were other political and financial forces at work in favor of massive
new lending in the 1970's, but the pervasive belief in moderniza-
tion theory certainly helps explain the long-lived euphoria of so
many intelligent people-from Western bankers to Third World
technocrats to government regulators. So rooted in the popular
world view, modernization was almost an ideology that could not
be questioned. A surprising number of bankers and policymakers
215. Sir W. Arthur Lewis, typically, put the matter most directly: "Once the snowball
[i.e., economic growth and development] starts to move downhill, it will move of its own
momentum, and will get bigger and bigger as it goes along." Lewis, Industrialization in the
British West Indies, 2 Caribbean Econ. Rev. 36 (1950).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
217. After the economic "shock" of 1975, the Chilean economy grew rapidly. Chile's GDP
increased 5.0% in 1976, 8.6% in 1977, 6.0% in 1978, and 7.25a in 1979. See Foxley, supra
note 109, at 399. GDP in Brazil grew an average 9.3% per annum in 1970-1975 and 5.8% per
annum in 1975-1978, while average GDP growth in Mexico was 5.5% per annum and 4.0%
per annum for the same periods. Graham, supra note 98, at 19. The Peruvian GDP grew an
average of 5.5% per annum in 1970-1975. Schydlowsky & Wicht, supra note 93, at 102 (Ta-
ble 4.3).
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were not willing to believe or accept the facts smacking them in
the face after 1979, because there was such faith in the continuous
growth of the main debtor countries.
Of course, only a popularized form of modernization theory can
be stigmatized as having helped "cause" the debt problem, for sev-
eral of the theorists had explored the non-linearity of development
even under a Western model. The debt problem certainly suggests
that modernization theorists must explore socio-economic and de-
mographic bottlenecks and traps more carefully, for it has empha-
sized the discontinuities in the economic history of most Latin
American countries. Moreover, the debt problem indicates that
most Latin American and other Third World economies simply
have not and will not develop along the same historical lines as the
economies of the United States and Western Europe. Sociological
and anthropological studies suggest, for example, that moderniza-
tion theory grossly oversimplifies the effect of a "modern sector"
on the traditional parts of a Third World society. The former will
not necessarily absorb the latter; they can and do remain sepa-
rate. s18 Brazil, for example, was once thought to be a classic case of
Rostovian modernization, but its take-off has crashed not only into
high oil prices, world recession, and rising interest rates, but also
into poor policy planning, internal tensions, and an increasing
(rather than receding) division between "modern" and "tradi-
tional" segments of society. Luiz Bresser Pereira, a leading histo-
rian of Brazil's economic development, sees that country moving
218. See, e.g., R. Stavenhagen, Siete tesis equivocados sobre America Latina [Seven Erro-
neous Theses about Latin America], 4 Desarrollo Indoamericano 23 (1966) (arguing that
Latin American countries were intrinsically dualistic: the modern part of society developed
in the way suggested by modernization theory, but it did not necessarily "draw in" the
traditional sector). In a bitterly polemical but scholarly attack on Professor Rostow's five-
stage model, Andre Gunder Frank has argued that the model does not correspond at all to
the past or present reality of the underdeveloped countries whose development it is sup-
posed to guide, and has challenged scholars to find one example of an underdeveloped coun-
try that had followed the pattern of the United States and Western Europe. Gunder Frank,
Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, in Sociology of Development and Un-
derdevelopment of Sociology (A. Gunder Frank ed. 1969). Gunder Frank argues that un-
derdevelopment may itself be an end, rather than a beginning, of a process. See also F. H.
Cardoso & E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (1979).
Many anthropologists have argued that the penetration of "modern" institutions (i.e.,
Western modes of culture and economic arrangement) in underdeveloped societies has been
limited by indigenous structures which will not go away. See, e.g., C. Gregory, Gifts and
Commodities (1982); A. Lowry, Legislating the Nuclear Family in Zaire: Integrating the
Core and the Periphery (Nov. 14, 1984) (unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia
School of Law).
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toward a condition of "industrialized underdevelopment," in which
part of the economy creates manufactured export goods within a
Western social and physical infrastructure, while a larger part of
the economy remains undeveloped, if not marginalized from the
dynamic sector.219
The international debt problem also provides evidence to rebut
modernization theory's central proposition that large-scale capital
accumulation is necessary and sufficient for growth and develop-
ment. Obviously (though this point has received insufficient atten-
tion), large capital infusions are not sufficient to generate growth.
The growth rates of the leading Latin American debtor countries
are expected to be less than 2% for 1984, and they may not be
much higher for several years, in part because most of each coun-
try's trade surplus must be paid over to Western banks as debt-
servicing payments.220 The optimism that helped generate this siz-
able debt has given way to the reality that capital accumulation
will do a country little good if the capital is used inappropriately, if
the terms of its acquisition are unfavorable, or if external condi-
tions (e.g., interest rates) change drastically. In other words, capi-
tal-led development has risks.
Additionally, infusions of investment capital or increased domes-
tic savings do not automatically generate growth when there are
internal structures that impede the effective utilization of that
capital. Neo-classical economist Ronald McKinnon argues that the
level of savings and investment in an economy is less important
than the existence of internal social, economic, and political barri-
ers to the effective matching of capital and economic opportuni-
ties.2 21 For example, when infusions of capital are controlled by the
state or by Western multinational enterprises, the capital may be
unproductively used, or its profits may be channeled out of the
219. L. B. Pereira, supra note 90, at 214-16. "We will continue to be an underdeveloped
country to the extent that the highly productive capitalist sector is unable to absorb all
available labor power, so that the social system remains permanently disintegrated." Id. at
215.
220. See Riding, supra note 2, at 1:
Growth Interest Trade Balance
Country (1984) on Debt (1984)
Brazil 1.5% $10.9 billion $12.0 billion
Mexico 1.3% $13.2 billion $14.0 billion
Argentina 2.4% $ 3.8 billion S 3.5 billion
Venezuela 1.0% $ 2.0 billion $ 0.7 billion
221. R. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development 5-21 (1973).
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country. Even with a great deal of capital infusion, small-scale en-
trepreneurs (the real engines of development) might find them-
selves unable to obtain funds for their own expansion. McKinnon
suggests that big capital infusions are not at all necessary to devel-
opment; developing countries would be better off by creating capi-
tal through an endogenous process of firm growth rather than
through outside infusions that are misdirected by structural
impediments.222
Finally, the debt problem may be the occasion to question the
modernization paradigm's traditional emphasis on economic
growth, as measured by materialist indices. The debt problem
reveals that a country can enjoy tremendous growth even while im-
poverishing large segments of its people and mortgaging its future.
Uncritically adopted from classical economics, the idea of growth
may be an inadequate basis on which to build a development pol-
icy for Latin American countries, for it ignores distributional con-
sequences (the unfairness of increased income going exclusively to
the elite class), leaves out unmeasurable factors that are neverthe-
less critical to the country's well-being (environmental purity,
health, community feelings), and overemphasizes superficial statis-
tical measurements without considering the need for constructing
economic, social, and political structures that will benefit the coun-
try in the long term.223 For instance, Mexico's rapid growth and
development between 1950 and 1970 went largely to the top 30%
of the population. Although the government tried to follow a policy
of redistribution plus growth in the 1970's, its efforts were largely
unsuccessful.22 4 Brazil's rapid growth development has marginal-
222. Id. at 170-74 (analyzing the example of Japan, which rapidly industrialized without
reliance on foreign capital). See also Hughes, supra note 5, at 106 (Japan and China "have
demonstrated that it is possible to transform backward, feudal societies with practically no
external capital").
223. In the 1970's, the concept of "Another Development" (or "Alternate Development")
was accepted by many scholars who rejected the normative assumptions or consequences of
the modernization paradigm. As popularized by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation and
Development Dialogue, Another Development is (a) need-oriented (geared to meeting both
material and non-material needs of all groups in society), (b) endogenous and self-reliant,
(c) ecologically sound, and (d) based upon structural transformation. Another Development:
Approaches and Strategies 10 (M. Nerfin ed. 1977); B. Hettne, supra note 202, at 75 if; see
also Development Strategies in the Eighties (J. Friedmann, T. Wheelwright & J. Connell
eds. 1980).
224. See R. Newell & L. Rubio, supra note 81, at 128-32, 159, 161 (income share going to
poorest Mexican families deteriorated between 1950 and 1967, though most poor Mexicans
were better off in absolute terms); Graham, supra note 98, at 45 (Table 12) (comparing
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ized 80% of the country's population, making much of it worse off
in the 1970's than it was in 1960.225 The austerity measures of the
last two years, moreover, have been borne by this same marginal
sector.
In short, the international debt problem supports the doubts of
the critics of the modernization paradigm, or, at least, calls for
substantial alterations in the paradigm. Specifically, the problem
suggests that economic development might not proceed in a linear
fashion toward Western industrial results. It also suggests that
massive infusions of capital do not necessarily generate
growth-even by emphasizing traditional industrialization policies.
As Professor Irma Adelman has argued, the debt problem may re-
present the failure of a development policy of rapid industrializa-
tion, the debt from which is now choking off Latin American econ-
omies, and an agriculture-based growth policy may be a superior
strategy in the next decade.226 Furthermore, growth is not a pan-
acea, nor is it necessarily the sole object of development. Alterna-
tive goals need to be considered more seriously. One of several no-
table alternative theories of development has been set forth by
Frangois Perroux, who rejects the traditional focus on growth and
urges more attention to nonmaterialist features of community de-
velopment and a dialectic which seeks a balance between auton-
omy and foreign inputs, atomistic independence and social cooper-
ation, industry and agriculture.227 Perroux and other theorists
point the way toward considering development that is human
need-oriented, endogenous and self-reliant, ecologically sound, and
grounded in a transformation of social, political, and economic
income inequality in Brazil and Mexico).
225. It appears that most, if not almost all, of Brazil's real growth has gone to those
already well-off. One unofficial estimate of family income shares:





G. Pfeffermann & R. Webb, The Distribution of Income in Brazil 10 (World Bank Staff
Working Paper No. 356 (1979)) (Table 1). For criticisms, both normative and positive/eco-
nomic, of Brazil's industrialization policy in light of the unequal distribution of its benefits,
see Aguiar, Arruda & Flores, Economic Dictatorship Versus Democracy in Brazil, 11 Latin
Am. Persp. 13 (1984) (T. Groth trans.); Knight, Brazilian Socioeconomic Development- Is-
sues for the Eighties, 9 World Dev. 1063 (1981).
226. See Adelman, Beyond Export-Led Growth, 12 World Dev. 937 (1984).
227. F. Perroux, A New Concept of Development (1983).
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structures of the country.
B. The Dependency Paradigm
The prevailing modernization paradigm came under strong intel-
lectual challenge in the 1950's and 1960's. Marxists and other
thinkers of the Left argued that modernization theory was a mere
smokescreen for continued imperialist domination in the post-colo-
nial era following World War 11.28 They viewed underdevelopment
as a continuous historical status resulting from capitalist domina-
tion; the industrialized countries required subordinate markets and
sources for investing their surplus capital once they had overgrown
their national boundaries. Latin American economists and sociolo-
gists criticized modernization theory as an unrealistic portrait of
the reality they saw.229 International trade and foreign investment
failed to lead to economic take-off, they argued. Indeed, it impeded
the natural development of their countries, because the terms of
trade and investment systematically favored developed coun-
tries.230 Although substantially influenced by modernization the-
ory, the Argentine economist Rafl Prebisch created a framework
of "core" states, which benefited from trade, and states of the "pe-
riphery," whose raw materials and labor were still being ex-
ploited.2 31 The dependency paradigm has evolved from these vare-
228. See, e.g., S. Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development 117-36 (1977); S. Amin,
Unequal Development (B. Pearce trans. 1976); P. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth
9 (1957); A. Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution 149-61 (1969);
Fitzgerald, Sociologies of Development, in Neo-Marxist Theories of Development 12 (P.
Limqueco & B. McFarlane eds. 1983).
229. Most of the early Latin American thought in this direction grew out of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the Comision Economica para
America Latina (CEPAL). See generally F. Cardoso, The Originality of the Copy: ECLA and
the Idea of Development (1977); F. Cardoso & E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in
Latin America (M. Urquidi trans. 1979); T. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the
Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile 66-71, 79-83 (1974); Latin American Issues-Essays
and Comments (A. Hirschman ed. 1961).
230. See R. Prebisch, Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America (1964);
Singer, The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries, 40 Am.
Econ. Rev. 473 (1950), reprinted in American Econ. Ass'n, Readings in International Eco-
nomics, at 306 (R. Caves & H. Johnson eds. 1968); see also Corporaso & Zare, An Interpreta-
tion and Evaluation of Dependency Theory, in From Dependency to Development: Strate-
gies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality 43 (H. Munoz ed. 1981).
231. See Economic Commission for Latin America [R. Prebisch, Exec. Sec'y], Economic
Survey of Latin America (1950); R. Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America
and Its Principal Problems (1950); Prebisch, Five Stages in My Thinking on Development,
in Pioneers in Development 175, 176-77 (G. Meier & D. Seers eds. 1984).
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gated lines of thought.
Although different authors have formulated the dependency ap-
proach in different ways, its central thesis is that global interests of
metropolitan capitalist classes structure world development
processes and power relationships to their advantage and to the
detriment of the dependent countries of the world. 32 What this
means for poorer countries is either permanent underdevelopment
or, at best, "associated-dependent development," where the host
country abandons its indigenous values and acquires a secondhand
version of metropolitan capitalism enjoyed by a small band of local
elites.
2 33
This central tenet involves three corollary ideas. First, the major
impediment to development is not lack of capital (internal), but
rather the prevailing international division of labor (external), in
which the core countries specialize in manufactured goods and the
peripheral countries supply raw materials and labor. The periphery
is dominated by the core-politically, culturally, and economically.
Second, domination by the core countries, particularly through ad-
verse terms of trade, leads to the systematic transfer of the periph-
ery's productive surplus to the core, which in turn invests it for its
own economic growth. In this way, development in the core states
implies underdevelopment in the peripheral states. Third, because
the periphery is doomed to underdevelopment through its depen-
dency links with the core, and because the interest of the dominant
states is in maintaining the periphery's underdevelopment, the
only true path to development is delinkage from world trade. That
is, the developing country should adopt a radical program of im-
port substitution and pursue endogenous economic growth.
Early dependency theory focused on the subordinating effects of
free world trade: the surplus value created by trade tended to go to
232. "By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is
subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between
these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant
ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can
do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative
effect on their immediate development." Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependency, 60 Am.
Econ. Rev. 231 (1970). For a survey of the evolution and expression of the dependency para-
digm, see, e.g., Corporaso & Zare, supra note 230; Palma, Dependency. A Formal Theory of
Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Un-
derdevelopment?, 6 World Dev. 881 (1978).
233. Cardoso, Associated-Dependent Development- Theoretical and Practical Implica-
tions, in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future 142-76 (A. Stephan ed. 1973).
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the industrialized countries, and commodity-producing developing
countries fell further behind." 4 In the 1960's, dependency theorists
argued that a more potent engine of the asserted Western eco-
nomic hegemony were the multinational corporations, which not
only engaged in worldwide trade and the licensing of technology,
but also set up operations (branches, joint ventures, subsidiaries)
in various countries as part of a global plan for marketing and syn-
thesizing their technologically sophisticated products." 5 Depen-
dency theorists have criticized multinationals and their foreign di-
rect investment as an invidious mode of Western domination.
23 0
Drawing from dependency theorists' critique of multinational in-
vestment and some of the recent literature addressing the domi-
nating aspects of foreign external debt, it is possible to construct
an explanation for the international debt problem based upon the
dependency paradigm.237 Under this approach, outlined in Chart 5,
the connection between the underdeveloped country and the in-
dustrial West creates a vicious cycle in which more foreign invest-
ment leads to more debt, which in turn leads to a double depen-
dency and, ultimately, to crisis.
234. See supra notes 211 & 230; see also N. Hood & S Young, The Economics of Multina-
tional Enterprise 327, 344-47 (1979); Singer, The Distribution of Gains from Trade and In-
vestment-Revisited, 11 J. Dev. Stud. 376 (1975), reprinted in The Contemporary Interna-
tional Economy: A Reader, at 393-94 (J. Adams ed. 1979).
235. On the rise of multinational enterprises generally, see C. Bergsten, T. Horst & T.
Moran, American Multinationals and American Interests 3-15 (1978); R. Vernon, Sover-
eignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises 3-25 (1971); Report of the
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Third Survey, Transnational Corpo-
rations in World Development 1-16, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/46 (1983).
236. Some of the main dependency theory works directed specifically at multinationals'
exploitation of host countries include R. Barnet & R. Muller, Global Reach: The Power of
the Multinational Corporations (1974); C. Furtado, Obstacles to Development in Latin
America (C. Ekker trans. 1970); Hymer, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of
Uneven Development, in The Papers of Stephen Herbert Hymer, The Multinational Corpo-
ration: A Radical Approach 54 (R. Cohen et al. eds. 1979); Sunkel & Fuenzalida, Transna-
tionalization and Its National Consequences, in Transnational Capitalism and National De-
velopment: New Perspectives on Dependence 67 (J. Villamil ed. 1979). For a useful digest of
the competing arguments of the dependency and modernization paradigms as they relate to
multinationals, see T. Biersteker, Distortion or Development?: Contending Perspectives on
the Multinational Corporation 1-68 (1978); N. Hood & S. Young, supra note 234, at 179-228,
325-54.
237. There is surprisingly little scholarship dealing with the debt problem from the per-
spective of dependency theory. One good treatment is Corm, supra note 72 (examining the
historical basis for the debt problems and dependence of the less developed countries).
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The beginning of thb cycle of debt is the desire of the underde-
veloped country's elites to emulate the West, itself an ideological
dependency. 3 Material dependency follows, as elites seek more
industry and technology, which are provided by two debt-creating
sources. First, the government plays a major role in modernization
by (1) creating infrastructures needed for industrialization (roads,
communications, education), (2) subsidizing certain sectors of the
economy to encourage their growth, and (3) establishing state trad-
ing and manufacturing companies that can supply the domestic
market and produce goods and services competitive on the interna-
tional market. 39 The government's activities generate debt in two
ways. Because tax revenues are insufficient to pay for the increased
public sector expenditures and domestic financing of the public
debt is largely unavailable, the public sector debt is typically fi-
nanced by borrowing from Western lenders. 240 Because government
projects are given high priority and Western firms are often more
experienced suppliers of goods and services, government-led devel-
opment relies heavily on imported goods and services. The massive
imports contribute to current account deficits, which are also fi-
nanced by external loans.
A second major source of industry and technology is direct for-
eign investment-branch offices, subsidiaries, and joint ventures
by Western multinational enterprises. Under conventional theory,
one advantage of direct foreign investment is that it provides coun-
tries with capital, industry, and technology without creating new
debts. Dependency theorists argue that this has not been the case:
foreign investment not only places much of the domestic economy
under foreign control, but also actually contributes to current ac-
count deficits and, thereby, to the growing external debt. 41
To begin with, often the foreign investor will not bring in any
238. "Most underdeveloped countries have already made the decision to emulate the
economies of developed countries through a similar process of industrialization, and there-
fore dependency on outside technology, finance capital, and marketing techniques . ..is
built into their model of development." R. Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 236, at 140.
239. See Hewlett & Weinert, Introduction: The Characteristics and Consequences of Late
Development in Brazil and Mexico, in Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development 1,
2-4 (S. Hewlett & R. Weinert eds. 1984).
240. Id. at 1, 2-6.
241. See generally C. Furtado, supra note 236, at 58-64 (analysis of effects of multina-
tional investment in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina); Corm, supra note 72, at 59-64 (discuss-
ing the increase in Third World public debt and its significance for technological moderniza-
tion through multinational investment).
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outside capital at all, but will establish operations based upon local
capital (which is more readily available to the creditworthy foreign
multinational).242 Although the foreign-owned subsidiary will gen-
erate some exports, they are often sold to other subsidiaries in the
multinational chain and may be underpriced to avoid tariffs and
other taxes. In any event, the balance-of-trade impact of the ex-
ports will typically be offset by the subsidiary's import of raw
materials and other inputs from other firms in the multinational
chain. 43 Within the host country market, the subsidiary wil ex-
pect to make supernormal profits, either because the market for its
goods in the host country has little competition or because the
product is sharply differentiated from possible competitors' prod-
ucts. 244 Those profits will be repatriated to its parent company
abroad.245 If the host country tries to limit repatriations, the same
result may be achieved either by overpricing imports from other
companies in the multinational chain or by paying high royal-
ties.246 In short, according to dependency theory, the capital in-
vestment plus exports generated by multinational subsidiaries are
often less than repatriated dividends plus imports on a year-to-
year basis. As a result of such "development," Latin American
countries such as Brazil and Mexico have suffered chronic trade
242. See R. Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 236, at 152.53. According to U.N. Studies by
Fernando Fajnzylber, U.S. multinationals financed 83% of their Latin American invest-
ments locally, other studies indicate that between 1960 and 1970, 78% of multinational op-
erations in Latin America were financed out of local capital. Id. See C. Furtado, supra note
236, at 58-60.
243. R_ Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 236, at 157-61. See also M. Brooke & H. L. Rem-
mers, The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise: Organization and Finance 120-23 (2d ed.
1978) (transfer pricing practices); N. Hood & S. Young, supra note 234, at 190-93, 212-15
(examination of studies on transfer pricing); Aharoni, On the Definition of a Multinational
Corporation, in The Multinational Enterprise in Transition 3, 11 (A. Kapoor & P. Grub eds.
1972) (transfer pricing as a method of regulating "earnings" to minimize tax burdens).
244. See Evans & Gereffi, Foreign Investment and Dependent Development: Comparing
Brazil and Mexico, in Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development 111, 164 (S. Hew-
lett & R. Weinert eds. 1984) (Table A).
245. See R. Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 236, at 153-54 (52% of the profits of U.S.
manufacturing subsidiaries in Latin America were repatriated, even though 78% of the in-
vestment funds needed to generate that amount of profit came from local sources).
246. See Newfarmer, Multinationals and Marketplace Magic in the 1980s, in The Political
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment 182, 195-96 (C. Wilber ed. 1984).
"[Iln countries which impose a percentage limitation on the repatriation of profits," which
includes many Latin American countries, "overpricing imports and underpricing exports are
good ways to repatriate more profits than the local government allows." R. Barnet & R.
Muller, supra note 236, at 159.
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imbalances, which have contributed to growing indebtedness. 2 7
Under conventional theory, subsidiaries of multinational corpo-
rations make long-term contributions of technology and industrial
growth, which should ultimately strengthen the host country's cur-
rent account position.248 Dependency theory argues, however, that
the long-term effects of direct foreign investment are enervating
rather than strengthening. While multinationals may expose the
host country to new technology through licensing agreements or
joint ventures, the technology is typically not top-of-the-line and
its use is often hedged in by restrictive contractual provisions.
2 49
More important, exposure to technology is of little use if the
host country does not develop the capacity to start with that tech-
nology and improve on it domestically. Direct foreign investment
does not necessarily lead to such development. Typically, the re-
search and development for the multinational-the brain work-is
still done in the West; only the manufacturing-the hands-on
work-is done in foreign subsidiaries. 50 Most important, foreign-
owned companies often come to dominate the most dynamic sec-
tors of the economy (the main export industries or the most profit-
able import substitution ones), depriving local entrepeneurs of val-
uable business opportunities and experiences. 25 1  Domestic
enterprises that might compete with the multinational's subsidiary
will find themselves at a tremendous competitive disadvantage be-
cause they have less capital and less access to domestic and foreign
capital markets. Consequently, they are less able to compete
through mass advertisements, product development and differenti-
ation, and research. The magnetic pull of the foreign-owned com-
pany will ultimately extend to the talented entrepreneurs, who will
247. See Evans & Gereffi, supra note 244, at 146-47.
248. See, e.g., A. Emmanuel, Appropriate or Underdeveloped Technology? 30 (1982).
249. See C. Michalet, Transfer of Technology and the Multinational Firm (1973), summa-
rized and evaluated [favorably] in Wionczek, Technology Transfer Through Transnational
Corporations, in M. Wionczek, Some Key Issues for the World Periphery 265, 267-74 (1982).
250. See J. Behrman, National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise: Tensions
Among the North Atlantic Countries 59-67 (1970). Indeed, the foreign subsidiary may at-
tract the bright host country scientists and technicians away from more productive national
projects, and even export them to the West, thereby contributing to the celebrated "brain
drain" from these countries. R. Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 236, at 163.
251. R. Newfarmer & W. Mueller, Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico:
Structural Sources of Economic and Noneconomic Power, Report to the Subcomm. on Mul.
tinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-
38, 149-52 (Comm. Print 1975).
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sell out or merge with their powerful competitors.0 2
According to dependency theory, growth fueled by government
spending and/or direct foreign investment will inevitably lead to a
large external indebtedness. The process by which the country
comes to depend on external borrowing is itself harmful, because it
discourages the mobilization of domestic savings (there is no need
to create indigenous mechanisms when money is easily obtainable
from abroad) and creates a structural dependency on foreign im-
ports rather than domestic inputs, on foreign technology rather
than local innovation, and on foreign entrepreneurial leadership in
many of the leading manufacturing and mineral-extraction sectors
of the economy.
Finally, a large external debt is per se undesirable, according to
the dependency viewpoint. To the extent that the government en-
courages indebtedness as a means to rapid growth, that process
creates further distortions in the economy: exports become less
competitive in world markets, domestic investment is misallocated,
and income distribution may be skewed (in favor of the already-
existing elites).0 3 Servicing the debt consumes an increasing por-
tion of the developing country's income, and ultimately more
money will be paid out in servicing the debt than will be sent into
the country. In this way, the debt "becomes a self-sustaining and
continually growing phenomenon completely beyond the control of
the economic policy of the local authorities," and as a result, "the
creditor countries, through their national credit organs and also
the international bodies [IMF and World Bank] in which they usu-
ally wield a preponderant influence, do their best to control the
economic management of the debtor countries. ' 2
When a crisis comes, the toll will be paid from the borrowing
countries' growth and development. For example, the effect of
stringent IMF programs in the current crisis has been postpone-
ment of needed capital investment in Latin America, sharp drops
in real wages, and reverse capital flows (from Latin America to the
industrial countries).255 In short, developing countries linked up
252. See Evans & Gereffi, supra note 244, at 140-44; Newfarmer, TNC Takeovers in Bra-
zih The Uneven Distribution of Benefits in the Market for Firms, 7 World Dev. 25, 26
(1979) (multinationals place a higher value on local corporations than do domestic
entrepreneurs).
253. See Corm, supra note 72, at 67-76.
254. Id. at 77.
255. See Diaz-Alejandro, supra note 73, at 360-66; infra note 266.
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with Western multinationals mortgage their future twice: first, by
turning many of their resources over to foreign companies, and sec-
ond, by incurring massive external debts. In both situations, the
country loses its freedom without advancing even its material
interests.2 56
The dependency paradigm is in many respects a persuasive per-
spective for analyzing the international debt problem, for there is
substantial evidence to support the factual correlations required by
dependency theory. As developing countries have become increas-
ingly integrated into the international system of trade and mul-
tinational investment in the last three decades, their external debt
has increased.257 Although the source of external indebtedness var-
ies from country to country, public sector deficits and outflows by
multinational operations have contributed to the external debt in
most of the countries. Notwithstanding their greater economic "de-
velopment," Latin American balance of payments shifted from
positive balances in 1950 to negative ones in 1970,28 a trend
greatly magnified after 1973. These conclusions are difficult to
dispute.
It is less clear whether these countries would have done "better"
in material terms without the external debt. On the one hand, in
most years between 1954 and 1979, Latin American economies
(GDP's) grew more rapidly than the accumulation of debt, al-
though the level of debt grew more rapidly than the level of ex-
ports.25 9 Some analysts believe that most of the indebtedness was
put to productive use.280 While multinational companies have had
some counterproductive effects in local economies, they have in
many instances provided jobs (including skilled jobs), productive
capacity, and some technology for countries that have insufficient
256. "Given that the TNCs were ... increasing their share of the ownership of the lead-
ing sectors of manufacturing [in Brazil and Mexico] during this period, the increases of loan
capital must be seen as an addition to dependence on top of the effects of DF1." The overall
impression is one of increasing dependence. Evans & Gereffl, supra note 244, at 153.
257. See Appendix, Tables 1 & 9.
258. See Appendix, Table 10.
259. See supra notes 91-95 & 119-122 and accompanying text; Appendix, Tables 5 & 9.
260. Notwithstanding the borrowing binge of NODC's in the 1970's, domestic savings in-
creased in these countries from 19% to 21%, and gross domestic investment increased from
21% to 27%. World Bank, World Development Report 1982, at 118 (1982). William Cline
suggests that these figures indicate the external debt was not used to finance local consump-
tion (for in that event local investment and savings would be expected to drop). W. Cline,
supra note 6, at 16.
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levels of each.261 And, they argue, to the extent that the borrowed
money was "wasted" (not put to long-term productive use), it was
most often wasted by the governments themselves-through graft
and corruption, through distorting subsidies to unprofitable do-
mestic sectors, and through losses by poorly run state trading
companies.262
On the other hand, dependency theorists would respond that
there was little "real" growth after 1954 because population in-
creases absorbed most of the GDP increases, and that population
increases in the 1980's threaten to outstrip GDP growth.6 3 The
level of external debt and high interest rates has made the "devel-
oping" countries net exporters of capital to the United States.
What growth there has been has gone to the collaborative elites,
the local surrogates, and allies of the multinationals, because the
"productive" foreign investments are typically in capital-intensive
industries that provide very few jobs for the masses.2 " The depen-
dency theorist would further argue that most of the waste in the
late 1970's was capital flight of money from Latin America to U.S.
and European banks, which openly courted such deposits.
The debt problem also bears out the dependency paradigm's
view that Western core countries have built-in advantages (capital,
technology, social and physical structures) that tend to perpetuate
their ascendancy over countries on the periphery. The core coun-
tries can usually absorb external shocks better because they have
more diversified economies, more effective political systems, and
more resources on which to fall back.6 5 Moreover, they control the
levers of finance and investment by which the world itself responds
to major crises. Their policy decisions, from Bretton Woods to the
ongoing restructuring agreements, determine the economic fate of
the rest of the world. Hence, when a crisis occurs, a disproportion-
ate share of the sacrifices will be made by the borrowing
261. See "X.", Multinationals at Worl An Inside Assessment, 1983 Y.B. World Af. 168,
for an indication of the local production gains from the presence of multinationals.
262. Note the enormous deficits run by state enterprises in the main Latin American
debtor countries between 1979 and 1982 (from 3.3% of Peru's GDP to 6.2% of Mexico's).
See Appendix, Table 6.
263. See infra note 266; Graham, supra note 98, at 46-48 (average annual rate of popula-
tion growth was 3.3% for Mexico in the period 1970-1975 and 2.5% for Brazil in the period
1970-1980).
264. Newfarmer, supra note 246, at 191-92 (case study for Brazil). See R. Barnet & R.
Muller, supra note 236, at 166-70 (multinationals destroy jobs).
265. F. Perroux, supra note 227, at 139.
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(subordinate) countries. For example, the effect of stringent IMF
austerity programs and the banks' reluctance to lend money has
been postponement of needed capital formation in Latin America,
sharp drops in real wages, and severe curtailment of GDP growth
in a period of population pressures.2 6 Another consequence is that
Latin American countries are at the mercy of core state economic
decisions. The U.S. Federal Reserve Board's restrictive monetary
policies in 1979-1980 and the enormous federal deficits of the last
few years have been crippling for Latin American debtor countries,
for which each percentage point increase in the real interest rate
means hundreds of millions of dollars more in yearly debt-servic-
ing payments. Moreover, the debtor countries' prospects of ever
digging out of the debt hole are contingent upon the West's eco-
nomic recovery and a relaxation of the recent trends toward pro-
tectionism, and upon following the policy constraints imposed by
the restructuring agreements between the debtor countries and the
IMF and commercial banks.
The international debt crisis is the most severe economic crisis
facing Latin America since the Great Depression of the 1930's. In
one way it is worse. The Depression cut Latin America off from
Western markets, thereby stimulating some indigenous import
substitution entrepreneurship. The current debt crisis threatens to
tighten ties of dependency by bleeding Latin America of capital
and impelling it to rely more heavily on multinational enterprise
investment. In normative terms, the debt crisis seems to vindicate
the dependency paradigm's indictment of the unfairness and sub-
ordination inherent in Latin America's relationship with industrial
countries.
In historically explanatory terms, however, the dependency para-
digm is not wholly satisfactory for two reasons. First, it seems
overly simple in arguing that "dependent-underdeveloped" coun-
266. See Diaz-Alejandro, supra note 73, at 360-67.
Changes in Aggregates at Constant Prices
(1980-81 to 1982-83)
Country GDP Population Capital Formation Real Wages
Argentina -7% 3% -31% -3%
Brazil -1% 4% -11% 1%
Chile -12% 3% -62% -4%
Colombia 2% 5% -10% 7%
Mexico 1% 5% -32% -24%
Venezuela -1% 6% -17% -3%
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tries inevitably sink further into their pit so long as they are tied
to the dominant countries. This is simply not so. For example,
Latin American countries are in some respects less dependent to-
day than they were in 1930 or in 1950. Spanish America in 1970
was significantly less dependent on single commodity exports and
upon the U.S. market than it was in 1950.27 The reason is that
Western technology has helped these countries to diversify. Brazil
has been even more successful than Spanish America. It is no
longer just an exporter of cocoa and caffeine to satisfy the addic-
tions of the Western middle class, 26 8 for by the 1970's Brazil had
become an important exporter of technologically sophisticated
manufactured goods.2 69 For all of their debt problems, Venezuela
(a member of OPEC) and Mexico (a non-member but sometimes
an OPEC ally) are hardly powerless producers of raw materials;
both countries are trying in the long term to transmute their oil
profits into industrial development. Even more striking is the suc-
cess story of South Korea, which on a per capita basis is more
heavily indebted than most of the Latin American countries. 270
While it is dependent upon Western loans and technology, it is
hard to say that the country's material growth has been impeded
by foreign dependence or that the foreign debt has grown more
rapidly than the country's ability to service it (exports grew by
11% in 1983, for example). 17 ' Likewise, Taiwan is dependent upon
Western loans and technology yet has established industries that
compete successfully with U.S. multinational companies on a
worldwide basis.27 2 Neither of these countries is stuck in the pe-
riphery, and the debt crisis does not seem to have impeded their
economic development, for both countries have strong govern-
ments that responded decisively and constructively to the external
shocks .273 Generally, dependent countries were not all equally vul-
267. See Appendix, Tables 11-12.
268. Coffee constituted 42.0% of Brazil's export of goods in 1965-1969, but only 32.6% in
1968-1972, 21.7% in 1973, and 12.6% in 1974. Baer, supra note 92, at 50 (Table 5).
269. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
270. Burgess, South Korea Booming: Officials Say Debt is Manageable, Wash. Post, Oct.
21, 1984, at K 1, col. 3.
271. Id.
272. See generally Crane, The Taiwanese Ascent- System, State, and Movement in the
World-Economy, in Ascent and Decline in the World-System 93 (E. Friedman ed. 1982)
(discussing Taiwan's move from "periphery" to "semi-periphery" resulting form concerted
government action and U.S. support); S. Kuo, The Taiwan Economy in Transition (1983)
(discussing Taiwanese economic development between 1951 and 1981).
273. See Balassa, Adjustment Policies in Developing Countries: A Reassessment, 12
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nerable to the debt problem. A recent study by Bela Balassa ar-
gues that "inward-oriented" economies were more vulnerable than
"outward-oriented" ones to the external shocks of 1973-1982, be-
cause the former accumulated more debt and then failed to take
strong measures when the situation deteriorated." 4 In other words,
Balassa found that countries following a policy of partial delinking
did less well than those which were more completely tied into the
capitalist economy.
Second, the debt problem suggests some of the ways in which
core countries themselves are vulnerable and dependent. The
structures of international sovereign lending, explained above,
make this clear. Just as the debtor countries are dependent upon
the Western banks to obtain development funds, so too the banks,
and indeed the whole Western financial structure, have become de-
pendent upon the willingness of the debtor countries not to default
on their loans (which is what they regularly did in the nineteenth
century). While certainly in a superior bargaining position so long
as the borrowers do not act as a group, the banks are suprisingly
vulnerable: if even one of the major debtors were to default, a
number of large banks could become insolvent, and a general fi-
nancial panic together with a loss of faith in the remaining banks
could result.27 5 The lesson of the debt crisis is not that the periph-
eral countries are at the mercy of the core countries and must nec-
essarily make all the sacrifices. In an odd and ironical way, each
group is at the mercy of the other: the debtor countries can default
and wreak havoc upon Western finance, which can exclude the
debtor countries from capital markets and impede their further
development.
C. A Global Interdependence Paradigm
The Third World's dependency paradigm and the West's mod-
World Dev. 955 (1984).
274. Id. at 966-71. Outward-oriented economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) relied
on vigorous export promotion and import substitution to respond to the shocks of 1974-1976
and 1979-1981 and accepted short-term growth reductions; inward-oriented economies (Bra-
zil, Argentina, Mexico) financed the 1974-1976 shocks by external debt but have had to
undertake deflationary measures since 1980. Balassa's conclusion is that "[t]he policies ap-
plied led to economic growth rates substantially higher in outward-oriented than in inward-
oriented economies, with the differences in growth rates offsetting the differences in the size
of external shocks several times." Id. at 971.
275. See Palmer, The Debt-Bomb Threat, Time, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42-51.
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ernization paradigm are both incomplete theoretical explanations
for the post-War economic development in the world. While each
paradigm still has a great deal of popular acceptance (the moderni-
zation view in Western countries, the dependency view in countries
supporting the New International Economic Order27 ), neither is
completely satisfactory as a theoretical historical basis for discuss-
ing the international debt problem. Indeed, the debt problem is an
antidote to the determinism of both paradigms: development is
neither inevitable nor foreclosed. On the other hand, the two theo-
ries do provide important insights and are in some ways comple-
mentary views of the same phenomena. One might even say they
establish a dialectic suggesting a third (synthetic) approach to eco-
nomic development. Thus the westernization of the modernization
paradigm is set against the indigenization of the dependency para-
digm, suggesting a synthesis of universalization. (Or, the endoge-
nous development of the former is set against the exogenous un-
derdevelopment of the latter, suggesting a synthesis of global
shared development.) Not surprisingly, one important new direc-
tion for development theory has been toward models based upon
the global interdependence of the states of the world community
and the need for developmental cooperation.
Global viewpoints became very popular in part due to ecological
and population concerns of the 1960's (the "global village" idea).
Various U.N. studies, Third World demands for a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, and worldwide reformist proposals such as
those of the Brandt Commission Report presupposed a global ap-
proach to problem solving. 77 Business school theorists and econo-
mists stressed the increasing importance of international trade and
multinational corporations as sources of economic integration in
the world. 8 Unifying all these views was the realization that there
is a world economy, a structural whole, and that the constituent
276. On the New International Economic Order in general, see Garcia-Amador, The Pro-
posed New International Economic Order. A New Approach to the Law Governing Nation-
alization and Compensation, 12 Law. Am. 1 (1980).
277. See Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues,
North-South: A Program for Survival [Brandt Commission Report] (1980) (emphasizing cri-
sis in the world system and the need for international cooperation); B. Hettne, supra note
202, at 55-58.
278. See, e.g., Sunkel & Fuenzalida, supra note 236 (growth of multinationals and inter-
national organizations such as the IMF and the OECD fosters a system of transnational
capitalism in which nation-states and particular cultures are absorbed into the internation-
ally integrated marketplace of goods and services).
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parts are dependent (in varying degrees) on what goes on in the
whole.
There are several models of development based on notions of
global interdependence. One is Immanuel Wallerstein's socio-his-
torical "world systems" model.27 9 Professor Wallerstein argues that
the "capitalist world system" was created in the sixteenth century
through the emergence of "core" states in Western Europe, which
had strong governments and money-based economies dominated
by a dynamic bourgeoisie, risk-taking international merchants, and
mass-producing industrialists.2 s0 The capital-oriented dynamism of
the metropolitan entrepreneurial class has extended far beyond the
political borders of the core states and has served as an organizing
influence within the arena of the world system. Thus "peripheral"
areas supply cheap labor and raw materials to the industrial net-
work of the core states. "Semi-peripheral" areas have trade and
industry but are not the dynamic sectors of the world economy;
they are buffers between the dynamic core states and the passive
periphery.
281
Wallerstein's model is influenced by dependency theory but
avoids some of the theory's drawbacks. For one thing, it is a less
static analysis: states and regions can move from one arena to an-
other (core to semi-periphery, and vice versa).282 For example,
Wallerstein traces the decline of Spain from core status to the
semi-periphery because of its structural socioeconomic weakness in
the sixteenth century. Its own repeated debt crises (five defaults
279. Professor Wallerstein's theory is set forth in I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-
Economy (1979), a collection of his essays. See also sources cited in note 280, infra. Profes-
sor Wallerstein has also written numerous articles and is the editor of a series of volumes on
Political Economy of the World-System Annuals.
280. I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of
the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century 38-63 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Wallerstein, The Modem World-System I]. For a discussion of developments in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, see I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II: Mercan-
tilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (1980).
281. Wallerstein's core-periphery terminology is obviously taken from dependency theory
and, in particular, the writings of Prebisch. See supra note 231. His category of semi-periph-
eral countries is more original. The role of the semi-periphery is explicated in Wallerstein,
Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation
Within the Capitalist World Economy, 17 African Stud. Rev. 1 (1974), reprinted in I. Wal.
lerstein, supra note 279, at 66 [hereinafter cited as Wallerstein, Dependence]; Wallerstein,
Semiperipheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis, 3 Theory & Soc'y 461 (1976),
reprinted in L WaUerstein, supra note 279, at 95 [hereinafter cited as Wallerstein, Semiper.
ipheral Countries].
282. See Wallerstein, Dependence, supra note 281, at 72-74.
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on foreign loans between 1550 and 1650) were symptoms of its slip-
page in the emergent world system.83 While Wallerstein does not
believe it easy for a country to break through to a higher level in
the world system, there are, he says, "limited possibilities of trans-
formation within the capitalist world-economy."28' Also, Waller-
stein envisions the possibility of a global change to a socialist world
system that would smooth out many of the malign distributional
consequences of the capitalist system. 58 The important point is
that notwithstanding the problems with core state dominance,
Wallerstein's response is not to withdraw from the world system,
since it yields many advantages, but to transform the system into a
larger cooperative mechanism.
Because Wallerstein's and other global historical approaches to
development theory are relatively novel, they require several imag-
inative leaps to apply them to the international debt problem. The
attempt that follows is simply one way to view the problem along
these theoretical lines, with the hope that the larger theory will
shed some light on the nature and possible resolution of the crisis.
The thirteen English colonies on the eastern shore of North
America were originally part of the periphery: they were sources of
raw materials for English manufacturing; they were part of the tri-
angular trade between England, North America, and the Car-
ribean; and they represented an expanded market for English ex-
283. L Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I, supra note 280, at 164-96. As Waller-
stein notes, Spain's decline was the result of its economic and financial inability to manage a
large empire. Interestingly, there is a parallel between Spain's dependence on foreign loans
and a similar dependence in the 1970's on the part of its former Western Hemisphere
colonies.
Genovese bankers monopolized the profits from the exploitation of American
mines; Genovese outfitters controlled the provisioning of the fleets. Far from re-
acting, the monarchy became more and more involved in dangerous financial
disorders that tied it to the capitalist machinery on the far side of the Pyrenees;
at first this tie was indispensable, then ruinous, and finally sterile.
J. V. Vives, Approaches to the History of Spain 97-98 (2d ed. 1970); see Elliot, The Decline
of Spain, 20 Past & Present 52, 69 (1961).
284. Wallerstein, Dependence, supra note 281, at 66. See also Wallerstein, Semiperipheral
Countries, supra note 281, at 99 (suggesting that semi-peripheral countries can become core
countries). Professor Wallerstein envisions this possibility in times of crisis or economic
downturn, when core producers will tend to compete with one another for investment op-
portunities, products, or raw materials in semi-peripheral countries. Id. at 99. Only some
countries of the semi-periphery can move "up," however, because "a semiperipheral country
rising to core status does so, not merely at the expense of some or all core powers, but also
at the expense of other semiperipheral powers." Id. at 101.
285. Walerstein, Crises: The World-Economy, the Movements, and the Ideologies, in Cri-
ses in the World-System 21 (A. Bergesen ed. 1983).
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ports. By 1800, the newly independent United States had moved
into the semi-periphery, for it had a dynamic middle class, indige-
nous merchants, and nascent industries. By 1900, the United
States was on a par with other core countries, and after World War
II it was the preponderant core country in the world.
The capitalist world system after 1945 was in large part molded
by the United States: 286 the liberal norm of free trade and invest-
ment was adopted in the Bretton Woods system287 and later in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,288 not to mention dozens
of bilateral commercial treaties entered into by the United States
and Western European countries with one another and with less
developed countries. The United States was the world's largest
market and the leading exporter of manufactured and agricultural
goods. The dollar was the keystone of the world financial system,
and the international financial institutions established by the Bret-
ton Woods system (IMF, World Bank) provided development as-
sistance, fixed exchange rates, and monitored trade balances.
For twenty years or so, the world system enjoyed this Pax Amer-
icana. The United States was the sparkplug and organizing force
of the capitalist world system, but within that system there was
substantial jockeying for position. The countries of Western Eu-
rope recovered from the devastations of World War II and re-
mained at the core, albeit clearly subordinate to the United States.
In 1956-1957, six countries formed the European Economic Com-
munity to coordinate their economic and trade policies and to cre-
ate a substantial internal market that would abet the further re-
covery and development of the member states' economies. The
United Kingdom, a waning member of the core, joined the Com-
munity in 1972. Meanwhile, Japan also recovered from the War
and joined the core through a very successful policy of using and
improving on Western technology through indigenous
development.
Just as the West European countries were adapting to a reduced
importance in the core and as Japan was joining the group of core
societies, the periphery of the world system was expanding to in-
clude countries in Africa and the Middle East. And, as the periph-
286. See, e.g., McMichael, Social Structure of the New International Division of Labor, in
Ascent and Decline in the World-System 115, 119-24 (E. Friedman ed. 1982).
287. See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
288. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat., pts. 5, 6 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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ery was expanding, many of the countries in the old periphery were
themselves attempting to move into the semi-periphery and ulti-
mately (like Japan) to become core states. Latin American coun-
tries, especially Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, were among the
chief newly industrializing countries (NIC's) of the period after
1945.289 The development strategy of the Latin American and
other NIC's was tied to the capitalist world system led by the
United States, with technology and capital coming from U.S. aid
and loans, the multilateral financial institutions, and U.S. multina-
tional corporations. The United States was the chief supplier of
capital goods to the NIC's and the chief purchaser of their new
manufactured products.
The NIC's were obviously dependent upon the United States
and other core countries. But, as an historical matter, their strat-
egy seems to have been quite reasonable. Absent a revolution and
delinking from the world system such as that employed by the
People's Republic of China in the 1940's or Cuba in the 1950's
(both with mixed success), the NIC's were going to be dependent.
Given the socio-political structures of the Latin American NIC's
described in Part H, and (more important) their proximity to the
intimidating political and economic power of the United States, a
revolutionary delinkage may not have been a plausible strategy in
the 1960's and 1970's. Instead, these NIC's opted to improve their
position in the world system, just as Japan had done after World
War H.
The United States was dependent upon the other core countries
and the NIC's of the semi-periphery for its own continuing posi-
tion, as events after 1966 established. To the extent that the Bret-
ton Woods system was based upon the convertibility of the dollar
into gold and to the extent that the dollar was subject to continu-
ing U.S. trade deficits, the system was bound to become unraveled
at some point because both trends could not continue indefinitely.
289. The concept of newly industrializing countries was developed in the late 1960's,
when economists realized that certain "developing" countries were predominant in trade
relations with the developed countries. They imported far more from the West than all
other developing countries combined, and they exported manufactured goods to the West in
much greater amounts. Among the NIC's most often mentioned in the 1960's were Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Yugoslavia. Bradford, The Rise of the NICs as Exporters on a Global Scale, in The
Newly Industrializing Countries: Trade and Adjustment 7,910 (L. Turner & N. McMullen
eds. 1982). To that list today might be added oil-exporting countries such as Venezuela,
Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia (and other Arab oil-producing countries).
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That point came in the 1960's, when the Vietnam War, trade defi-
cits, and inflation exposed the political and economic limitations of
the United States.290 Increasingly vulnerable to international de-
mands that dollars be converted into gold, the United States in
1971 renounced convertibility. The oil price shocks of the 1970's
revealed the extent to which the Pax Americana had been depen-
dent upon cheap sources of energy. Growth in the U.S. economy
became less impressive; recessions, sometimes combined with high
inflation, seemed to characterize the economy in the 1970's, capped
off by the major recession after 1979. After 1966, the world system
entered into a new period of uncertainty about the economic fu-
ture because the sparkplug U.S. economy misfired repeatedly and
the international financial stability formerly guaranteed by the
United States waned. In its place was emerging an international
economic system dominated by private entrepre-
neurs-multinational corporations, transnational financial institu-
tions, giant trading and shipping companies-whose allegiance was
not necessarily tied to any single country.
The flux and dysfunction of the world system after 1966
presented both challenges and opportunities to the NIC's. One ob-
vious challenge was whether those countries could continue their
ascent in the face of higher oil prices, uncertain export markets,
and (after 1978) unusually steep real interest rates. Linked to the
challenge, though, was the opportunity the NIC's had to "seize the
moment," that is, take advantage of the economic uncertainty to
assure their rise in the world system, much as Japan had seized the
moment after World War II.291 NIC's that met the challenges of
290. McMichael, supra note 286, argues that U.S. political hegemony disappeared with
the U.S. humiliation in Vietnam and the rise of Europe and Japan. Contributing to the loss
of economic hegemony were (1) the growing U.S. government deficit and its accompanying
inflation, (2) a deteriorating trade balance, and (3) the rise of the Eurodollar market (in part
due to U.S. capital controls policy). "In short, as revealed in the rise of the Eurocurrency
system, the decline of U.S. hegemony devolved a growing power to the international capital
market as a force shaping global economy." Id. at 125. "Given the particular features of U.S.
hegemonic decline, the structuring of global economy is undertaken increasingly by transna-
tional capital, which internalizes world exchange relations as one of its circuits." Id. at 126.
291. Tylecote & Lonsdale-Brown, State Socialism and Development: Why Russian and
Chinese Ascent Halted, in Ascent and Decline in the World-System 255, 278-81 (E. Fried-
man ed. 1982), argue that Japan ascended in the world system because it had or developed
the basic socio-political institutions needed for progress:
-The economy is structured around independent enterprises linked primarily
by market relationships and controlled by workers democratically.
-State intervention should be limited to high-technology sectors which are by
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the 1970's and exploited the opportunity of faltering Western
economies to improve their own position as exporters of manufac-
tured and technological goods included Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, and South Korea. Other NIC's, like India, Egypt, and those
of Eastern Europe, coped with the challenges but failed to move
forward in the world system, and may even have slipped somewhat
because of the oil price dilemma. A third group of NIC's overex-
tended themselves and failed to meet the challenge. The debt crisis
arose in large part out of these countries' historic failure. Most of
the Latin American NIC's-Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela,
Chile, Peru-are in this third category of countries, which tried to
seize the moment but failed. Their growth has been severely cur-
tailed, and the still-crushing interest-and-principal payments on
their foreign debt may harm their development prospects for the
next decade.
Historically and descriptively, the international debt crisis is a
reflection of the failure by many similarly situated NIC's to seize
the moment.292 In the wake of the external shocks of 1966 to 1982,
some countries have continued their ascent; others have fallen
back. Why did some countries advance and others decline or stag-
nate? Part of the answer may lie, ironically, in the unique depen-
dency of the advancing NIC's. Taiwan and South Korea have prob-
ably benefited from their special relationship with the United
States as the result of the latter's resistance to world communism:
they have received massive military and economic aid, favorable
trade conditions for the critical U.S. market, and important flows
of technology.29 Likewise, Hong Kong's and Singapore's trade ties
nature interdependent. State management should be through monetary and fis-
cal policies and taxes/subsidies.
-The most important aim of state management of the market is to reduce
inequality. On the other hand, incentives are preserved, because the more effi-
cient control more resources and have more authority. Another type of motiva-
tion is also fostered: the widening of one's frame of altruism, by conceptualizing
the firm as a "family" whose members one wants to help.
-Strict control of market relations was maintained (and has been only
slightly relaxed even after Japan reached the core). Thus trade is restricted, and
multinationals are not permitted free entry.
Id.
292. See H. Marcussen & J. Torp, The Internationalization of Capital The Prospects for
the Third World 158-60 (1982) (crisis in the core countries gives some countries of the pe-
riphery the opportunity to advance).
293. See P. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea 84-110
(1977) (South Korea grew at an annual rate of 9.1% between 1960-1962 and 1970-1972);
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with Great Britain have provided them with some advantages; for
instance, British colonial administrators and traders encouraged
and relied on local entrepreneurs who were then able to expand
their operations after 1950 when world trade expanded. s 4 These
"four little tigers" are further evidence that dependency ties need
not stifle. But the question remains: how did these four Asian
NIC's escape the downside results of dependency that seem to af-
flict the Latin American NIC's. Three endogenous reasons may
help explain why they have succeeded in the world system.
One reason is the constructive role of the state. Bruce Cumings
has characterized the governments of these Asian NIC's as "bu-
reaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regimes," in which the
state is ubiquitous in the economy and society, and relatively au-
tonomous of specific groups and interests. 29 1 The strong govern-
ments have contributed to the rapid development of these states,
and their continued success notwithstanding the debt problem, in
two ways. First, the governments of Taiwan, South Korea, and
Hong Kong have been a tool for indigenous capital accumulation
and efficient capital use. The governments established state enter-
prises and guided development but, just as important, subjected
state enterprises to market discipline (in some cases even returning
to private ownership).,98 Second, the Asian NIC's responded deci-
sively and prudently to external shocks such as those after 1966:
measures were taken to prevent currency overvaluation, to contain
government spending and public sector deficits, and to turn a
profit in the state enterprises. 29 7 Perhaps the most striking differ-
Crane, supra note 272, at 99-102. See generally S. Kuo, supra note 272; Little, An Economic
Reconnaissance, in Economic Growth and Cultural Change in Taiwan: The Postwar Experi-
ence of the Republic of China 448 (W. Galenson ed. 1979) (explaining Taiwan's exogenous
growth).
294. See A. Rabushka, Hong Kong: A Study in Economic Freedom (1979); see also Hamil-
ton, Capitalist Industrialization in the Four Little Tigers of East Asia, in Neo-Marxist The-
ories of Development 137, 152-53 (P. Limqueco & B. McFarlane eds. 1983) (noting the
strong roots of the indigenous capitalist classes in Singapore and Hong Kong).
295. Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy:
Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles and Political Consequences, 38 Int'l Org. 1, 7, 28 (1984).
296. Amsden, Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatism and a Challenge to Depen-
dency Theory, 5 Mod. China 341, 342 (1979); Crane, supra note 272.
297. See Crane, supra note 272, at 105 ("Taiwan's ascent has been a function of both the
favorable climate of the world-system as a whole and the role of the state enterprises");
Burgess, supra note 270 (notwithstanding enormous external debts, South Korea is improv-
ing its economic position because of tight government supervision and stringent fiscal poli-
cies); Cumings, supra note 295, at 35-40.
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ence between the Latin American NIC's and Taiwan, South Korea,
Singapore, and Hong Kong, therefore, lies in the degree of their
respective political coherence. The successful NIC's have been Will-
ing to impose short-term sacrifices that the others have not. Be-
cause of the cycles of democracy and authoritarian governments
and the liberum veto exercised by the major corporatist political
groups in the Latin American polities, the policy responses to the
external shocks after 1966 were short-sighted and immature. For-
eign debt was used to forestall unpleasant economic realities and
to placate obstreperous interest groups, a policy doomed to
trouble. In contrast, South Korea and Taiwan used their foreign
debt for more long-range productive purposes.
Another reason for the success of the Asian NIC's may be histor-
ical. Their special relationships with the United States or Great
Britain have been historically fortunate, as has been their choice of
export, industry. Much of the dynamism in these countries was
generated by exports of clothing and textiles. 98 The advantage of
that strategy is that the textile industry is relatively labor inten-
sive. Thus, small local entrepreneurs have dominated production,
and the role of multinational enterprises has been modest in all the
countries except Singapore.2 99 A further advantage is that there
has been a relatively sustained demand for textile products from
1960 onward, though the Asian NIC's have already begun to diver-
sify their exports. The lesson is that the Asian NIC's have devel-
oped their own entrepreneurial dynamism, which aids them in cop-
ing with new challenges.
A final reason for the relative failure of rapid industrialization in
Latin American countries may be social and cultural. While the
judgment is at best an informed, impressionistic one, it appears
that one component of the success of at least some of the Asian
NIC's has been a more equitable distribution of income (in Tai-
wan, for example, capitalism has actually narrowed income dispari-
ties).300 And their populations as a whole appear goal-oriented,
298. Hamilton, supra note 294, at 163-64 (textiles constituted 40-50% of total exports in
Hang Kong over three decades, 50% in Taiwan [1979], 34% in Korea [1971-73]). Singa-
pore's exports have been concentrated in electronics, electrical machinery, and petroleum
goods. Id. at 164.
299. Id. at 166 ("[In the early 1970's, foreign-controlled companies accounted for about
10% of Hong Kong's manufactured exports, at least 20% of Taiwan's, at least 15% of Ko-
rea's, and nearly 70% of Singapore's.").
300. See generally S. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970, at 165-70 (1978)
(discussing Taiwan's land reform and its effect on the redistribution of wealth); Crane,
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hardworking, and determined to forge ahead. These intangibles
have provided incentives to broad groups of society to contribute
to the social product (and to make sacrifices in response to crises)
and have created a broader internal market.301 In contrast, the
gross inequalities in most of the Latin American countries deprive
them of internal markets and kill incentive (not to mention the
socio-political risks which gross inequality entails). 2  In Taiwan,
farmers own their land, and the agricultural sector has been an im-
portant support for development. In most of Latin America, land-
owning is still concentrated in the archaic elites, and the most re-
cent attempt to change that status quo (Allende's nationalization
of estates in Chile) met with political upheaval and military
reaction.
By focusing on a combination of exogenous and endogenous fac-
tors, the world systems model is a more sophisticated tool for ex-
plaining the historical dimensions of the international debt crisis.
But this historical, descriptive analysis should not obliterate the
normative analysis. Like dependency theory, world systems theory
sees "development" in the capitalist system as an exploitive phe-
nomenon-a zero-sum game in which Taiwan's win is Argentina's
loss. The role of Wallerstein's semi-periphery is to exploit the pe-
riphery and to be exploited by the core. The fairness concerns of
dependency theory are sounded anew: the Latin American debtors
are participating in a financial system increasingly stacked against
them. It may be hard for them to dig out of the debt problem, not
only because of the imposing transfer payments they are making to
Western banks, but also because they are losing export markets to
other NIC's which coped with the debt problem in different ways.
CONCLUSION
This Article has set forth three contexts in which the interna-
tional debt problem can be analyzed. The short-term economic
supra note 272, at 98 (citing factors contributing to Taiwan's land reform).
301. See D. McClelland, The Achieving Society 43, 57-70 (1961) (arguing that a para.
mount reason for underdevelopment is the lack of a "need for achievement," or "n-achieve-
ment," among individuals in the culture). See also D. McClelland & D. Winter, Motivating
Economic Achievement (1969).
302. See, e.g., Selowsky, Income Distribution, Basic Needs and Trade-Offs with Growth:
The Case of Semi-Industrialized Latin American Countries, 9 World Dev. 73 (1981) (severe
income inequalities hamper the development of Latin American states with special concen-
tration on Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador).
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perspective (Part I) focuses on the complex interconnected events
and decisions that immediately caused or generated the debt "cri-
sis" starting in 1982. It is a mechanical perspective, and I mean
"mechanical" in its benign sense: it seeks to discover what went
wrong in an otherwise acceptably operating system. The long-term
structuralist perspective (Part H) is more historical and system-
atic: it examines the system itself and, in this case, finds that there
were certain risks or malfunctions built into it. The broadest per-
spective is that of development theory (Part I), which views the
debt problem as a manifestation of dysfunctions in the way na-
tional economic systems change and interrelate in the international
arena. This perspective is also more explicitly normative, for it
raises questions whether the world system itself is fair and what
strategy a national economic system might follow in response to its
evaluation of its prospects within the world system.
Apart from their value as explanations of the international debt
problem, these perspectives reveal the divergent roles of "law" in
the system of transnational sovereign finance. Specifically, each of
the three differing perspectives operates within its own appropriate
sphere of analysis and presumes a different attitude about private
international law. For example, the bank creditors and their coun-
sel, the borrowing countries and their counsel, and even the na-
tional and international financial regulators usually, if not always,
think about the sovereign debt problem from the short-term, oper-
ational perspective, because their task is simply to deal with the
local manifestations of the problem. Their job should never be un-
derestimated, for it involves not only skill but also substantial
creativity.
These day-to-day participants have been dealing with a classic
legal problem-the debtor does not have enough money to pay all
its creditors-to which there was no established set of legal reme-
dies before 1982. Hence, the participants have had to create a legal
regime of rights and remedies by negotiation. The negotiated
transnational law is embodied in contractual restructuring agree-
ments and agreements with the IMF. These agreements establish
limitations on the domestic and import-export policies of the bor-
rower countries in return for commitments by official and private
lenders to continue lending and to spread out the repayment
schedule of maturing loans.
In negotiating restructuring arrangements, the shocks-and-mis-
takes explanation explored in Part I is a very useful intellectual
construct that fits with the problem-solving role of private interna-
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tional law, for it identifies the reasons individual borrowing coun-
tries have been unable to service their external indebtedness, the
ways in which the different contributing reasons have interacted,
and the basic mechanical policies that will result in repayment to
the creditor and in the restoration of the borrowing country to
creditworthy status. As a basis for creating negotiated law it is a
perspective that has worked well in the short term. Unless a fresh
disaster strikes (a revolution or new external shocks), the classical
economic theory underlying the shocks-and-mistakes explanation
will probably prevent.a major breakdown.
The problem, of course, with the short-term economic perspec-
tive is that it tends to be too ad hoc, "muddling through" each
situation without trying to generate long-term solutions. En-
trenched or systemic problems tend to recur, even if in a variety of
unanticipated forms. For example, it can be anticipated that inter-
national bankers will not repeat the exact mistakes of the 1970's at
any time in the near future, but they may well repeat the general
pattern (a mania of a certain type of lending, followed by a panic).
The structuralist perspective teaches that private international law
should attempt to be more than a problem-solving device. Law
should seek to alter or redirect existing political and economic
structures to minimize risks of large-scale problems. Thus private
international law might assume a longer range "reformist" role of
making the system of international sovereign finance work better.
Two of the systemic problems identified by the structuralist per-
spective-the tendency of Latin American and other political sys-
tems to postpone hard decisions and avoid present sacrifices, and
the mania-to-panic syndrome of periodic financial crises-may be
intractable. If left to their own devices, many Third World coun-
tries will tend to overborrow, and banks may still overlend in some
circumstances (underlend in others). Moreover, once overlending
occurs there is a prisoners' dilemma which encourages all the
banks to cease making loans all of a sudden, thereby precipitating
a panic and crash.
The structuralist analysis reveals, however, an important way to
mitigate such tendencies. One structural origin of the debt prob-
lem is the erosion of the Bretton Woods system of publicly regu-
lated international finance. That system cannot be resuscitated,
but new thought should be directed toward increasing the role of
multilateral institutions (IMF, BIS, World Bank) and monitoring
the activity of banks more carefully at the national level. Specifi-
cally, the OECD countries must increase their capital commit-
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ments to the multilateral financial institutions and coordinate
their efforts at bank regulation. There should be information about
individual and aggregate private sovereign lending, as well as
mechanisms to discourage excessive concentration of loans.
Increased participation in sovereign lending by international
agencies could have several structural advantages. First, it would
contribute an additional layer of caution in a volatile arena of eco-
nomic activity. Experience reveals that IMF officials and national
bank regulators do not necessarily have any greater insight into the
risks of sovereign lending than the bankers have. But when there
are two levels of analysis of loan decisions, there is a somewhat
greater chance that risky trends will be headed off, especially if
more information becomes available concerning lending trends by
all banks to certain countries. Second, greater public participation
would reintroduce conditionality into the system. If linked to spec-
ified policy efforts or results, or if linked to particular projects, in-
creased lending from private or official lenders ought to be more
productively employed and not lost to capital flight as it was after
1979. Third, when a problem or dislocation does arise (due to ex-
ternal shocks or internal political pressures), public involvement
tends to prevent panics and crashes. The public sector is better
able to mobilize rescue packages and to organize the private sector
to act in constructive ways (sometimes through jawboning, other
times through mild coercion). In economic argot, the public sector
can organize private actors to create public goods (continued lend-
ing) or to break the incentives of the prisoners' dilemma.
The first two perspectives of the international debt problem jus-
tify its appellation as "crisis," that is, a dramatic set of events im-
pelling a change of direction (possibly for the worse). In a broader
sense, though, the international debt problem is not a crisis at all,
but rather a manifestation of larger trends within the historical
context of the capitalist world system. The third perspective, that
of development theory, takes this broad view of the system itself
and, further, asks whether it is coherent and fair. From a norma-
tive perspective, the answer seems to be that the world system
does not operate fairly. The advantages of it go largely to existing
world elites, and the burdens of its dysfunctions rest mainly with
the already disadvantaged.
If there is a "crisis" posed by the debt problem under the broad
perspective of development theory, it is a crisis of confidence in the
prevailing modernization paradigm. Inspired by a New Yorker
cover, sociologist and development theorist Andre Gunder Frank
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asserted in his essay on the sociology of development that the
modernization paradigm that has been the basis of most Latin
American development policy and Western capital transfers re-
volves around "twin gods"-Santa Claus and Sigmund Freud.
303
Underdeveloped countries in the South achieve economic develop-
ment, first, by receiving gifts from the friendly Santa Claus of the
North, and second, by learning the lessons taught by Sigmund
Freud (e.g., improvement by self-examination). The international
debt problem has exposed the wishful thinking involved in this
modern bit of mythology. Santa Claus has only delivered thistles
to Latin America lately, and Freudian self-analysis provides little
solace when these countries are making outrageous sacrifices due in
large part to events beyond their control (the shocks and the
mildly irrational behavior of the Western system of international
finance). The "crisis" is the questioning anew of the received wis-
dom about how countries develop and whether in the capitalist
world system there is much prospect for improvement of the lives
of most people in the world. Fairness should be a moral concern of
people in both the core and the periphery. Western leaders should
be more attentive to the equity concerns of the disadvantaged, not
only because it is "right," but also because it is expedient given the
interdependency of the international financial system.
In early 1984, an idea occurred to several Latin American politi-
cal leaders: "There is only an international debt 'problem' or 'cri-
sis' if we recognize the legitimacy of paying unprecedented real
rates of interest on loans fueled by transfer payments from our
own productive capacity. It makes no sense for our people to pay
out more money to the banks than we achieve as a current ac-
counts surplus after cutting imports to the bone and expanding ex-
ports to our breaking point." The leaders discussed forming a
debtors' cartel and declaring unilateral moratoria on servicing their
loans. Westerners for whom the modernization paradigm (Santa
Claus and Sigmund Freud) is the only conceivable view of develop-
ment dismissed the idea. And the more accommodating approach
of Latin American leaders and the banks themselves suggests that
this is not an idea whose time has come. But it is an idea whose
time might come, unless Western governments and institutions
show more sensitivity to the worldwide fairness concerns raised by
the plight of Latin American and other less advantaged countries.
303. A. Gunder Frank, supra note 228, at 77.
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Table 4
Non-Oil Developing Countries: Distribution of Outstanding Debt Among
Selected Groups of Countries, End-1982





Major China and Other
Borrowers' India) Countries'
I. In billions of U.S. dollars
Total debt 447.0 56.6 108.8
Short-term debt 99.7 3.0 10.0
Long-term debt 347.3 53.6 98.8
Guaranteed, to
official creditors 93.7 44.8 54.7
Other 253.6 8.8 44.1
II. In percent of corresponding totals
for all non-oil developing countries
Total debt 73.0 9.2 17.8
Short-term debt 88.4 2.7 8.9
Long-term debt 69.5 10.7 19.8
Guaranteed, to
official creditors 48.5 23.2 28.3
Other 82.7 2.9 14.4
The 20 countries (in the non-oil developing group) with the largest estimated external debts to
private creditors: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, South Korea, Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia, Greece, Morocco, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Israel, Turkey, Portugal, Romania, and
Hungary.
2 Residual group (including China and India).
Source: IMF, Annual Report 1983, at 30 (1983) (Table 9).
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Table 6
Economic Indicators for Selected Latin American Countries
1979-1982














as Percentage of GDP
(average 1979-1982)













69.3 103.2 88.0 92.5 112.7 96.4
60.2 106.9 72.0 81.7 99.4 85.7
75.4 99.3 71.5 76.8 90.9 81.5
132.0 105.6 93.0 116.9 96.7 79.6
7.2 8.1 -4.8 6.8 1.7 -1.1
8.6 7.1 -5.6 7.7 6.4 -1.2
14.3 12.1 -1.1 14.8 8.6 3.4
14.2 13.8 4.0 18.6 8.8 11.0
3.8 4.2 0.95 6.2 3.3
9.6 52.7 33.4 18.2 66.7 12.4
82.8 35.1 26.4 59.2 21.5
105.6 19.7 27.9 75.4 16.2














Source: T. Enders & R. Mattione, Latin America: The Crisis of Debt and Growth 65-66
(Brookings Institution, 1984) (Tables B-5 to B-8); Kubarych, The Financial Vulnerability of
LDCs: Six Factors, in A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions
of the International Debt Problem (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming) (Table 1-7).
Reprinted with permission.
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Table 8









































































I Net of claims on other foreign branches of the same bank.
Source: J. Spindler, The Politics of International Credit: Private Finance and Foreign
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Table 9
Indicators of Dependency in Spanish America: Foreign Debt and Debt/Export
Ratios by Country, 1929-1970
(public debt in millions of $)
1929 1950 1970
Debt Ratio Debt Ratio Debt RatioCountry
Argentina $1,202.40 1.30 $ 400.00
Bolivia 90.96 1.78 50.00
Chile 499.20 .71 355.40
Colombia 88.20 .71 157.50
Costa Rica 18.00 .99 12.00
Cuba 70.20 .25 95.80
a
Dominican Republic 18.80 .81 10.00
Ecuador 20.10 1.18 31.90
El Salvador 19.20 1.04 22.40
Guatemala 13.80 .57 .40
Honduras 27.30 1.11 1.30
Mexico 826.20 2.49 509.10
Nicaragua 2.90 .27 4.60
Panama 16.30 2.91 13.00
Paraguay 3.90 .29 15.30
Peru 113.00 .69 107.20
Uruguay 138.20 1.44 105.50
Venezuela 3.90 .03 24 9 .8 0c
Total: $3,172.56 1.03 $2,141.20



















a 19 4 5 .b 73.
c1955.
Source: D. Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition 81 (1980) (Table 5.8).
Reprinted with permission.
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Table 10
Indicators of Dependency in Spanish America: Balance-of-Payments Ratio
(Imports/Exports), 1930-1970
Country 1930 1950 1970
Argentina 1.20 .87 .85
Bolivia .59 .85 .86
Chile 1.06 .87 .75
Colombia .68 .92 1.03
Costa Rica .67 .82 1.24
Cuba .97 .84 1.25
Dominican Republic .82 .51 1.30
Ecuador .88 .55 1.05
El Salvador .90 .71 .82
Guatemala .71 .90 .90
Honduras .42 .61 1.14
Mexico .76 1.07 1.57
Nicaragua 1.03 1.08 1.02
Panama 5.18 2.54 2.53
Paraguay 1.07 .58 1.18
Peru .62 .93 .68
Uruguay .92 .78 .91
Venezuela .37 .51 .65
Average: 1.05 .89 1.10
Panama = .80 Panama .79 Panama - 1.02
Source: D. Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition 83 (1980) (Table 5.10).
Reprinted with permission.
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Table 11
Indicators of Dependency in Spanish America: Principal Export/Total
Exports, 1928-1971













































































Source: D. Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition 82 (1980) (Table 5.9).
Reprinted with permission.
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Table 12
Indicators of Dependency in Spanish America: Principal Foreign
Market/Total Exports, 1928-1971
Country 1928 1947 1971
Argentina 28.7 30.0 15.0
Bolivia 83.2 59.8 37.8
Chile 34.3 44.5 19.7
Colombia 77.7 88.2 38.4
Costa Rica 53.7 77.2 40.1
Cuba 72.8 66.7 50.0
Dominican Republic 44.5 41.4 74.4
Ecuador 37.4 42.4 35.9
El Salvador 29.1 77.5 23.4
Guatemala 54.2 86.4 32.7
Honduras 76.3 72.9 52.0
Mexico 68.1 76.6 62.5
Nicaragua 51.5 77.4 35.2
Panama 91.6 85.4 48.1
Paraguay 88.2 75.0 27.4
Peru 28.5 29.3 28.8
Uruguay 22.6 28.6 11.8
Venezuela 35.4 50.0 37.9
Average: 54.4 61.6 37.3
Source: D. Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition 84 (1980) (Table 5.11).
Reprinted with permission.
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